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On Frustration: Toward A Theory Of A Democratic Politics Of Perseverance 
Abstract 
This study examines democratic frustration as a defining experience of ordinary citizens, exploring how 
ordinary citizens should properly understand their democratic aspirations as being the source of both 
inspiration and frustration, and how a more robust citizenship can take shape in three distinct dimensions 
of democracy—communicative, symbolic, and temporal. Examining democratic communication as a site 
of frustration that invites a moral-psychological analysis of how to foster a better attitudinal strategy, 
Chapter two proposes a theory of magnanimity with which we can harness the motivational power of 
superiority while making the very power more compatible with and conducive to a sound and vibrant 
democratic politics. Focusing on the symbolic dimension of democracy, which involves the politics of the 
people, Chapter three offers a theory of the sublime people as an interpretive tool that highlights both the 
need of individual citizens to invite and invoke the people and the importance of holding up against the 
tendency of endangering themselves to lapse into uncritical passivity and the idolatry of the claimed 
people. Chapter four warns against the popular trend of placing overemphasis on relatively short-lived 
extraordinary moments in our democratic experience, and proffers an alternative view of time as a 
journey, showing how each individual can grow more attached to reality while becoming more attentive, 
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This study examines democratic frustration as a defining experience of ordinary citizens, 
exploring how ordinary citizens should properly understand their democratic aspirations 
as being the source of both inspiration and frustration, and how a more robust citizenship 
can take shape in three distinct dimensions of democracy—communicative, symbolic, 
and temporal. Examining democratic communication as a site of frustration that invites a 
moral-psychological analysis of how to foster a better attitudinal strategy, Chapter two 
proposes a theory of magnanimity with which we can harness the motivational power of 
superiority while making the very power more compatible with and conducive to a sound 
and vibrant democratic politics. Focusing on the symbolic dimension of democracy, 
which involves the politics of the people, Chapter three offers a theory of the sublime 
people as an interpretive tool that highlights both the need of individual citizens to invite 
and invoke the people and the importance of holding up against the tendency of 
endangering themselves to lapse into uncritical passivity and the idolatry of the claimed 
people. Chapter four warns against the popular trend of placing overemphasis on 
relatively short-lived extraordinary moments in our democratic experience, and proffers 
an alternative view of time as a journey, showing how each individual can grow more 
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The devoted democrat has but one plan: to provide all people with access to  
what they are entitled to, in the name of equality in both freedoms and rights. 
Stéphane Hessel  
 
 
Keep your hands on the plow! Hold on! 
Langston Hughes  
 
 
Oh Troglodytes! Your virtue has begun to be a burden to you. 








Very few would venture to resist democracy today. Whether it is “the best possible state” 
or “the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from 
time to time,”1 democracy seems to have become “a universal commitment” or the sole 
name to which “the only possible procedure of legitimization for a political regime lies in 
its reference.”2 From the Arab Spring to the 15M (quince de mayo) and the more recent 
Catalonia crisis in Spain, from Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter movements in 
the United States to a series of popular uprisings in South Korea, Hong Kong, Turkey, 
Ukraine, France, and Brazil, we have heard deafening voices over the past few years, 
demanding democracy or a more real democracy. Its appeal is enduring and worldwide. 
Democracy seems to have achieved “the status of being taken to be generally right.”3 
What we are now witnessing is perhaps the “apotheosis of democracy.”4   
																																																													
1 Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 
49; Winston Churchill’s speech delivered in the House of Commons on November 
11th, 1947 in Robert Rhodes James ed., Winston Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 
1897-1963, Vol. VII (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), 7,566. 
2 Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10 No. 
3 (1999), 5; Étienne Balibar, “Historical Dilemmas of Democracy and Their 
Contemporary Relevance for Citizenship,” Rethinking Marxism, Vol. 20 No. 4 (2008), 
525. 
3 Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” 4. 
4 David K. Kim and John L. Jackson, Jr., ”Democracy’s Anxious Returns,” The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 637 (2011), 7. Notice 
that Slavoj Žižek once observed that the protesters in Egypt wanted “what in other 
countries the Occupy movement was protesting against: ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’.” 
Likewise, some leftists thinkers, including Jodi Dean, tend to regard ‘democracy’ as 
being unworthy of re-appropriation because its association with political and 
economic (neo)liberalism. See Slavoj Žižek, “Trouble in Paradise,” London Review of 
Books, Vol. 35 No. 14 (2013) and Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal 
Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics (Durham: Duke University 




 Yet democracy seems to run into trouble these days. A number of emergent 
democracies may not have collapsed, but some have slid more toward nominal 
democracies with an autocratic tinge.5 Popular exhilaration for democracy has often 
evaporated into a more cynical disillusion accordingly. Meanwhile, people in the most 
advanced and well-established democracies have called into question the alleged 
superiority and credibility of their system. In the United States, for instance, it is often 
noted that Congress—the presumed most democratic branch of government—has long 
been dysfunctional, in which opposing major parties, perhaps too often, bring the 
legislative process to a complete standstill.6 A sizable number of unhappy citizens choose 
																																																																																																																																																																																					
backgrounds, have been striving to rethink and rework rather than dismiss the idea 
of democracy for their political cause. Among the leftists, for example, see Ellen M. 
Wood, Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995) and David Graeber, The Democracy Project (New 
York: Spiegel & Grau, 2013). John Dunn observes that “[t]o reject democracy today 
may just be … to write yourself out of politics.” John Dunn, Setting the People Free: 
The Story of Democracy (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), 41. Even Xi Jinping, 
President of China, uses the term democracy frequently to defend the Chinese model 
of governance or “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”  
5 Orbán’s Hungary, Putin’s Russia, Erdogan’s Turkey are living examples. For 
theoretical accounts of the topic of democratic consolidation, erosion, and recession, 
see Richard D. Anderson, Jr. et al., Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), Dan Slater, “Democratic Careening,” 
World Politics, Vol. 65 No. 4 (2013), Ellen Lust and David Waldner, Unwelcome 
Change: Understanding, Evaluating, and Extending Theories of Democratic 
Backsliding (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2015), and Larry Diamond, “Facing Up to the 
Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 26 No. 1 (2015), and other 
essays contributed to the same issue of the Journal of Democracy. 
6 According to the Gallup poll in October 2017, only thirteen percent of the 
respondents approve of the way Congress is handling its job [Electronic source: 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx]. Although public trust in 
Executive and Judicial branches is generally higher than that in Legislative branch, it 
is also true that modern-day Presidents are seen less as a uniting figure capable of 
standing above factionalism. Instead, they often unapologetically take a strategy of 
going partisan rather than simply going public. Cf. Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New 
Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007) and B. Dan 
Wood, The Myth of Presidential Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 




to participate in popular uprisings and protests in the name of democracy. But they have 
often placed much emphasis on the feeling of “being together” and “fighting together” 
per se so that all the ferocious fights sometimes look a distracting irrelevance, failing to 
convert the public clamor for changes into well-established political programs that can 
generate actual policy changes. One theorist has even lamented that many protesters these 
days “do not have a collective project.”7  
 Upon this odd coexistence of the lasting enthusiasm with democracy and the 
increasing disillusionment that runs parallel to such enthusiasm, a growing number of 
scholars and pundits have made a series of prognoses about the future of democracy, 
posing questions that evoke some sense of urgency: Can democracy keep thriving? Can 
we still believe in democracy’s progressive design? Is democracy going to decline, or has 
it already begun to fade? If so, is there any way to save democracy, or put it back on the 
right track? Or, do we need to conjure up any alternatives to democracy?  
 Many seem to be eager to know more about democracy: its place in history, its 
recent metamorphoses corresponding to the changed and changing conditions, and the 
chance of its demise and resilience. In this respect, those diagnosticians follow the path 
paved and trodden by democratic theorists of earlier generations such as Alexis de 
																																																																																																																																																																																					
judicial means for dealing with core political questions has disturbed many people 
not just because it is regrettable that they have expended excessive energies and 
too much attention on the most elitist and least democratic branch of government, 
but also because in so doing, they have effectively made the judiciary a central 
forum for sheer struggles for supremacy between the major parties. 
7 Ivan Krastev, Democracy Disrupted: The Politics of Global Protest (Philadelphia: 




Tocqueville8 and Francis Fukuyama,9 aiming to forecast—albeit perhaps less 
prophetically—the direction in which democracy seems to proceed.10  
 This particular intellectual and political atmosphere of the present, however, gives 
us a long pause. It is a pause for reflection upon what we know of democracy as well as 
what we know about it. Put differently, as radical outbursts of public anger in the name of 
democracy have become remarkably visible while at once public cynicism about 
democracy seems to run deeper, it is perhaps the right time to pose a different yet equally 
important question not from the position of diagnosticians afar but from that of a citizen: 
how do we feel about democracy—what do we do with our democracy and what does 
democracy do with us?  
 With this question concerning our felt knowledge experienced in the everyday 
democracy, this study aims to shift our attention from evaluating and designing 
																																																													
8 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2000). In fact, Democracy in America marked one of the earliest positive uses of the 
word ‘democracy’ in modern political and social theorizing. As one prominent 
historian points out, “it was largely thanks to his work that ‘democracy,’ the word, 
had come to stay in current American political parlance.” Paul Cartledge, Democracy: 
A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 297. 
9 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” National Interest, No. 16 (Summer 1989), 
which later developed into The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free 
Press, 1992). 
10 Latest notable examples include David Runciman, The Confidence Trap: A History 
of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to the Present (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013), How Democracy Ends (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 
Tzvetan Todorov, The Inner Enemies of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2014), 
Steven Levitscky and Daniel Ziblatt’s How Democracies Die (New York: Crown, 
2018), Yaschar Mounk, The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger 
and How to Save It (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), and Cass Sunstein 





democracies11 to understanding the collective mind of ordinary democratic citizens.12 It 
is a study of democracy, placing particular focus on a noun of agency, a democrat, rather 
than on a system of rule per se. My aim is to pursue and propose a democratic theory that 
can bring to the fore the lived experience of ordinary citizens for whom democracy is 
both an idea and a reality.13  
  My study is unapologetically eclectic whose approach can be characterized, 
broadly, as phenomenological, pragmatic, and thematic. I take a phenomenological 
approach to democracy insofar as I seek to highlight the embodied experience of ordinary 
citizens.14 I also deem my approach to be pragmatic as well in part because I start my 
arguments from the fact of a perceived democratic culture, which has rendered the age-
																																																													
11 My primary concerns are not with institutional arrangements compatible with and 
suitable for democratic ideals. For such an endeavor, see Heather Gerken, The 
Democracy Index: Why Our Election System Is Failing And How To Fix It (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009). Democracy indices widely used by empirical social 
scientists include the Democracy Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
See their website at https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index. 
12 As for the notion of understanding, I take a Weberian means to achieve an 
Arendtian end. For Weber, understanding involves the interpretive grasp of “the 
complex of meaning” [Sinnzusammenhang]. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An 
Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: University of California, 1978), 9. For 
Arendt, understanding eventually requires “[coming] to terms with or reconcile 
ourselves to reality, that is, [trying] to be at home in the world.” Hannah Arendt, 
“Understanding and Politics,” Jerome Kohn ed., Essays in Understanding 1930-1954: 
Formation, Exile, Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken, 2005), 308.  
13 In other words, this study concerns those to whom democracy is something utterly 
familiar and diffuse.  
14 Note that phenomenology began to direct significant attention in American political 
theory only in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Existential Phenomenology and 
Political Theory: A Reader (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1972), the first anthology of 
phenomenological writings pertinent to the study of politics in the English language, 
came out in 1972 edited by Hwa Yol Jung. In the following year, Maurice Natanson 
edited and published two-volume-collection, Phenomenology and the Social Sciences 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), whose second volume includes 
three entries on phenomenology and political science written by Hwa Yol Jung, Carl 




old debates about the best type of government virtually outmoded,15 rather than from any 
philosophical presuppositions about democracy.16 Most of all, this is a thematic study in 
that it centers on and revolves around a particular theme—frustration—all through the 
course of the research even while discussing distinct dimensions of democratic politics.  
 
FRUSTRATION ENDOGENOUS TO DEMOCRACY 
Why frustration? For frustration is the most characteristic experience common to 
ordinary democratic citizens. The word frustration comes from frustrari (to disappoint) 
and frustra (in vain). It indicates feelings of being balked and foiled, feelings that arise 
when original expectations of satisfaction are made null and void. It may sound odd or 
counter-intuitive. One would want to argue for the exact opposite: democracy guarantees 
that the greater number of people should not be frustrated. This is the gist of the majority 
rule, the argument goes, and that is why democracy is superior to other types of 
government.17  
 This view is not entirely without merit, especially at least at the collective and 
																																																													
15 To paraphrase Kant’s answer to the famous question posed by Reverend Johann 
Friedrich Zöllner, it is fair to say that we are living in an age of democracy, though 
not in a democratized world.   
16 See Richard Rorty, “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality,” in Richard 
Rorty Philosophical Papers Vol. 3: Truth and Progress (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998) 
17 For instance, Jeremy Bentham, especially from the 1820s onward, supported 
representative democracy because it was the only form of the government which 
would afford the best security for the interest of the larger public. See Philip 
Schofield, Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham (Oxford: 




abstract level. It would make perfect sense that if all cannot be satisfied, the society 
should make the majority feel satisfied at the expense of the minority’s frustration. Even 
if that is what democracy does, however, what ordinary citizens experience might be 
different. Two points deserve a brief remark.  
 First, what seems to be overlooked in the systematic explanation of the majority 
rule is the fact that the method of majority decision, as G. E. M. Anscombe once aptly 
pointed out, is not identical to “the principle of the decision’s being what the majority 
wants.”18 On the experiential level, for example, it is not uncommon that “the majority 
vote in the minority in a majority of cases.”19  
 Second, there seems to exist a paradox of fairness and equality: democratic 
citizens are more susceptible to frustration, not less, precisely because their desires, in 
principle, count equally in democracy. This paradox resonates with Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s 
perceptive critique of John Rawls’s portrayal of a well-ordered society. Rawls 
understands his ideal society as devoid of rancorous sentiments such as resentment and 
envy. For his proposed principles of justice ensure that everyone is treated equally and 
fairly. There would be no “destructive feelings,” presumes Rawls, because fairness and 
equality eliminate any occasions for those feelings. Dupuy accuses Rawls of his 
somewhat one-dimensional moral psychology. What Rawls has overlooked is the fact 
that those negative feelings arise not just from the failure of his justice system, but also 
from its very operation. In other words, fairness and equality, to some extent, are 
																																																													
18 G. E. M. Anscombe, “On Frustration of the Majority by Fulfillment of the Majority’s 





constitutive of those very feelings. For people now feel more entitled and can hardly 
attribute their own failure or loss to anything external to themselves.20 Likewise, if the 
desire of each citizen appears to have equal weight, the rejection of one’s desire would 
arouse more intense frustration, not less.  
 Now, it must sound more plausible to say that frustration is the most characteristic 
experience that pervades the everyday life of ordinary citizens. Yet my main focus is not 
on any frustrations taking place in democracy, but on democratic frustration. By that I 
mean to place special emphasis on the fact that there is frustration endogenous to 
democracy, frustration whose source is nothing but democracy itself. My primary 
concerns are precisely with this kind of frustration.  
 Democracy displays an ambitious vision that ordinary citizens are the author and 
builder of their common world. The principle of popular self-rule presupposes the 
presence of individual citizens capable of judgment, decision, and action. Democracy 
connotes not only popular participation but also an obligatory passion for autonomy, both 
																																																													
20 Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Avions-nous oublié le mal? Penser la politique a près le 11 
septembre (Paris: Bayard, 2002), Cited from Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways 
Reflections (New York: Picador, 2008), 87-89. For Rawls’s argument pertaining to 
this discussion, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1971), 142-145 and 532-541. For Rawls, the presence of resentment and 
envy, for instance, indicates that there are some problems in the basic structure of 
justice principles. Otherwise, believes Rawls, reasonable people would not resent the 
fact that they lose or fail, nor feel envious of others’ success. Jeffrey Green has 
recently expanded on Rawls’s theory and developed his own theory of “reasonable 
envy toward the superrich.” Unlike Dupuy and Žižek (and myself), Green’s primary 
concern in his attending to the question of envy is not with pointing out the blind 
spot of Rawlsian moral psychology, but with extending the logic of Rawls so as to 
conceptualize the role of envy in the implementation of Rawlsian justice. See his 
“Rawls and the Forgotten Figure of the Most Advantaged: In Defense of Reasonable 





individual and collective. Put differently, in a democratic society—which Pierre 
Rosanvallon, following Tocqueville, once described as a society of similar individuals 
[une société de semblables]21—individuals are thought to be free and equal agents who 
form ideas and beliefs, adopt goals and purposes, and act to pursue those purposes, not 
alone, but “in concert”22 with other fellow citizens.  
 Certainly, the promise of democracy has never been fully materialized. The ideals 
of freedom, equality, and autonomy, much glorified notwithstanding, have to date 
remained incomplete. Sometimes, such a glorification sounds mere ritualistic, rhetorical, 
and even hypocritical especially against the backdrop of harsh realities that do not live up 
to those ideals.  
 Yet democracy cherishes a peculiar culture of transmuting its incompleteness into 
potential for development and its hypocrisy into occasion for self-correction.23 This is 
how democratic citizens—to invoke and paraphrase Clifford Geertz—are suspended in 
webs of the meaning of democracy that they themselves have spun.24 In democracy, 
																																																													
21 Pierre Rosanvallon, The Society of Equals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2013), 12. See also Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), Vol. II, Part. IV, Ch. 2. 
22 Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1972), 143. 
23 This characteristic of democracy can be well discerned in the strategies that a 
number of democratic activists and reformers have often employed. One classic 
example is Frederick Douglass’s speech, “What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?” 
Philip S. Foner ed., Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings (Chicago: 
Lawrence Hill, 1999). 
24 Geertz once put it that “[t]he concept of culture I espouse … is essentially a 
semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs 
of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, the analysis of it 
to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one 
in search of meaning.” Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected 




people perceive themselves as free and equal agents and take their seemingly unattainable 
ideal of self-rule to be achievable and, therefore, worthy of sustained pursuit and 
commitment. Democracy, at the fundamental level, operates as “an ethical ideal”25 or “a 
noble dream.”26 
 That democracy allows for the gravitational pull of aspiration, or that it cannot 
shed its idealistic potential, is part of the enduring appeal of democracy I sketched above. 
Yet those persisting ambitions, hopes, and promises have also paved the foundation of 
disappointment and despair. Democratic citizens are “preoccupied with the prospect of 
failure.”27 This leads us to an acknowledgement that democratic citizens may well be 
placed in a particular systematic predicament. This commonplace predicament so 
incident to and typical of democratic life is what I term democratic frustration. It refers to 
a kind of frustration whose source is nothing other than democratic aspiration itself. 
 Democratic frustration is rather banal than unusual. However, it is not my 
intention to explore the multitudinous array of episodic emotional outbursts in the course 
of democratic activities and engagements only to confirm the fact that frustration is an 
																																																																																																																																																																																					
language-games à la Wittgenstein, a bundle of ideas and practices characterized by 
their public, conventional, yet open texture. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), §§ 23, 65, 66. 
25 James T. Kloppenberg, Toward Democracy: The Struggle for Self-Rule in European 
and American Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 4.  
26 Susan Mandus, “Democracy: A Nightmare or a Noble Dream?” The Tampere 
Lecture 2008 [Online Source: http://www.tampereclub.org/e-
publications/vol3_mendus.pdf]. 




empirical reality of democratic citizenship.28 My claim goes rather deeper. I propose to 
view frustration as the general tone of democratic life. It is a feeling but at once a 
background of feelings. In other words, I see frustration as a mood; not just a mood, but 
the defining mood of democracy.  
 It may sound too pessimistic at first glance that frustration is the condition of 
democracy. To some extent, it seems to be expressive of a general political fatigue 
originating from contemporary democratic politics, which sometimes looks so stale and 
sterile. Yet it should be noted that I do not mean to draw an entirely pessimistic 
conclusion that whatever democratic citizens do will ineluctably press them further and 
further into hopelessness. That frustration persists does not in itself constitute pessimism. 
To the contrary, I aim to show that the task before democratic citizens is how to manage 
their motivation and psychological costs by properly attending to and coming to terms 
with the mood of frustration. Otherwise, citizens can easily fall into a passive and cynic 
acceptance or a utopian escapism, the two most popular extreme strategies for relaxing 
the tension of frustration.  
																																																													
28 The list of political and civic activities cannot be exhaustive. Some activities are as 
highly intensive and demanding as running for office or organizing and mobilizing 
campaign events, protest movements, and other rallies and marches. Other more 
casual and less burdensome activities include casting votes to choose 
representatives, pressing, persuading, or imploring those representatives and other 
officials by having recourse to non-electoral means such as visiting or calling their 
offices, giving or cancelling donations to them, attending political events and 
meetings, signing petitions, displaying yard signs, and just talking with friends, 
neighbors, or strangers about politics and policy issues. Citizens may do all of these 
activities at local, state, national, or international levels. And, perhaps more 
importantly, a considerable number of citizens choose not to do any of these 
activities, at least most of the time. Their abdication from politics can be self-
imposed or socially imposed. See Ben Berger, Attention Deficit Democracy: The 




 In chapters two, three, and four, this study will examine democratic frustration 
along three different dimensions of democracy—communicative, symbolic, and temporal. 
Divided into three main chapters, it is organized as a combination of independent 
modules, each of which articulates a distinct aspect of democratic frustration as well as 
fleshes out the general points of the project. The common objectives are as follows: to 
elaborate what exactly is the situation in which ordinary democratic citizens are placed, 
to show why that situation is particularly frustrating, to discuss what conventional 
solutions are available and to what extent they are not satisfactory, and to argue for my 
own proposal and to explain why that could be a solution worthy of special attention. 
 The overarching goal of this study is to pursue an alternative course to both 
cynicism and utopian escapism. I aim to pave the way to properly understand democratic 
aspirations as being the source of both inspiration and frustration, and embrace and make 
most use of frustration as means through which democratic citizens can keep their 
aspirations alive while growing more attached to reality, not less, and becoming more 
attentive, inventive, and persevering. 
 By dwelling on, and coming to terms with, democratic frustration, citizens can 
better configure both their disenchantment with democracy and their aspirations for its 
fulfillment at the same time. I also highlight how this careful view of frustration allows 
democratic citizens to gain insights into the processual character of democratic desires 
and politics gleaned from brooding over their loss and failure. Living with frustration 




helps them to better attend to what they are, thereby intimating what they may become.29   
 Proffering a proper etiology of democratic frustration as well as normative 
suggestions as to how we can better manage such frustration, this research not only sheds 
light on a timely topic of democratic frustration, but also contributes to a growing 
conversation among political theorists and other scholars in the humanities and social 
sciences about the affective condition of democratic politics, realism and idealism, 
overheated partisan politics, populism, and popular hopes for democratic progress and 
grievances at its regress.   
 In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I will further discuss the theme of 
frustration as a defining mood of democracy, sketching its pervasive and critical meaning, 
and, then, explain why I take a trifocal approach, an architectonic theoretical tool I 
devise in this study, and briefly outline the main thrust of the following chapters. 
 
FRUSTRATION: MOOD AS WELL AS FEELING 
To regard frustration as a mood along with a feeling raises a number of questions. What 
is a mood? How is it distinguished from feeling or other terms that signify human 
sentiments such as emotion or affect? What does this view bring into focus?  
 As far as the purpose of this study is concerned, five exemplary conceptions merit 
																																																													
29 Certainly, “what we may become,” as Shakespeare’s Ophelia alludes to, may 
remain unknown even after “what we are” is revealed. William Shakespeare, The 
Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, Act IV, Scene 5: “we know what we are, but 




special attention: principle, drive, currents, ethos, and temper. I will discuss them briefly 
below. Montesquieu once used the term principle [principe] of government in a rather 
idiosyncratic way. A principle, according to him, is “that which makes [people] act.” In 
other words, they are “the human passions,”30 or the animating, motivational, and 
inspiring affections, which set people in motion. Montesquieu selected one principle for 
each of the correlative structures of government. For example, honor is the principle of 
monarchical government according to which people living in the monarchical 
government take action. In the case of democracy, on the other hand, virtue is the 
motivating principle.31  
 Max Weber’s magnum opus was intended to “discover the psychological drives 
[Antriebe] which led people to behave in a certain way and held them firmly in this path.” 
What he found out, as widely known, was Calvinists’ protestant ethic, or, to be precise, 
the role of an existential fear and trembling inspired by Calvinist predeterminism. This 
religious ethic, perhaps quite ironically, gave rise to the most methodical approach in 
secular everyday life, “turning [those believers] toward a rational life in the world, but 
																																																													
30 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 21. 
31 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 22-30. While praising this analysis as 
Montesquieu’s entirely original contribution to the traditional inquiry of the nature of 
government, Hannah Arendt later commented that honor (or love of distinction) and 
virtue (or love of equality) are two distinct yet equally fundamental and immediate 
feelings. Honor is a genuinely human sentiment because “men are distinguished, 
that is, different from each other by birth.” Virtue can also be a genuinely human 
sentiment given the condition of “living together with and belonging to a group of 




neither of this world nor for it.”32  
 Emile Durkheim famously popularized the term social facts, which consist of 
“manners of acting, thinking, and feeling external to the individual[.]” Social facts 
include “beliefs, tendencies and practices of the group taken collectively.” Some social 
facts “do not present themselves in [a well defined] form but which also possess the same 
objectivity and ascendancy over the individual.” Durkheim called this particular type of 
social facts “social currents.”33  
  While discussing the peculiar characteristics of modernity, Michel Foucault once 
suggested that we focus on “the attitude of modernity,” by which he meant “a mode of 
relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, 
the way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the 
same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task.” In other words, 
continued Foucault, this attitude is close to “what the Greeks called an ethos.”34 
 Finally, Joseph Krutch, an American writer, articulated the temper of the 
twentieth century in his book, The Modern Temper. He characterized the temper of the 
century as an anguish state of disharmony, ambiguity, and isolation. Krutch believed that 
this acknowledgment of despair was necessary for understanding modern culture and 
																																																													
32 Max Weber, “The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism” in Peter Baehr 
and Gordon Wells eds., The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism and Other 
Writings (New York: Penguin, 2002), 69-122. 
33 Émile Durkheim, “The Rules of Sociological Method” in Steven Lukes ed., The 
Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and Its Method (New 
York: The Free Press, 1982), 53-55. 
34 Michel Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?” Paul Rabinow ed., The Foucault Reader 





 These accounts show some affinities with my approach. Although I am skeptical 
of the Montesquieuian system of principle that assigns one passion to one type of 
government, I share in common with Montesquieu that I recognize the importance of that 
which sets people in motion. This interest in motivation, of course, resonates with the 
Weber’s theoretical orientation. With respect to its pervasive and objective characteristic, 
frustration can be compared to temper and social currents, although my focus is not 
necessarily on all-encompassing atmosphere of society at large. Frustration, on my 
account, shapes the attitudes, or we might say, ethos, à la Foucault, in a direct or indirect 
way.   
 That said, the best terminology suitable for characterizing the role and place of 
frustration is mood. Byung-Chul Han’s succinct categorization warns against the 
tendency of equating or conflating four different related yet distinct terms of human 
sentiments: mood, feeling, emotion, and affect.36 Mood or atmosphere [Stimmung], 
according to Han, “expresses a way-it-is[,]” representing “a state of being or state of 
mind [Befindlichkeit].” It has an objective character and is “static and constellative.” 
Feeling [Gefühl] refers to something objective as well, albeit to a lesser degree. It allows 
“duration” or “narrative length or breadth.” On the other hand, emotion [Emotion] and 
																																																													
35 Joseph Wood Krutch, The Modern Temper (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and 
Company, 1929). Cf. C. Wright Mills, “The Conservative Mood,” Dissent, Vol. 1, No. 1 
(1954).  
36 Han is critical of a number of recent studies unconcerned with, or less sensitive to 
the conceptual differences among these terms, one example of which is Eva Illouz’s 




affect [Affekt] “refer to strictly subjective matters[.]” Emotion is more fleeting than 
feeling; affect is even more momentary. Both are “expressions of subjectivity.” If feeling 
is “constative,” emotion is rather “performative” while affect is “eruptive.”37 
 Although Han’s analysis is in line with some of the empirical psychological 
studies,38 his languages mark the legacy of Martin Heidegger in whose work mood plays 
a quintessential role. In Being and Time, for instance, Heidegger explains that mood is 
neither wholly external nor entirely internal.39 He says: “A mood assails us. It comes 
neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside’, but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of 
such Being.”40 Mood is indicative of our thrownness [Geworfenhiet], a context in which 
we are already situated. It is something presupposed by intentional actions. It 
“[determines] the space of possible kinds of concern.”41 
																																																													
37 Byung-Chul Han, Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power 
(New York: Verso, 2017), 41-48. 
38 See, for example, Panteleimon Ekkekakis, The Measurement of Affect, Mood, and 
Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
39 Heidegger stresses the importance of mood when he attempts to challenge the 
age-long hierarchy between logos and pathos (or ousia and pathos). See, for 
instance, Plato’s Euthyphro (11a-b) where Socrates admonishes Euthyphro for 
continuously talking about mere affect or quality (pathos) of the problem while not 
seeing the nature or essence (ousia) of the problem. Since Plato, explains Heidegger, 
pathos in general has often been seen as “the utterly fleeting and ungraspable 
shadows of clouds flitting across the landscape.” Heidegger does not dismiss outright 
this characterization. Yet he is interested in how to “grasp mood positively as 
belonging to the essence of man,” or, as Jean-Paul Satre once put, as “a specific 
manner of apprehending the world.” See Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1995), 64-65) and Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions: Outlines of A Theory 
(London: Methuen, 1962), 57. 
40 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper & Low, 1962), 176. 
41 Matthew Ratcliffe, “The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life,” The 





 Heidegger’s study of mood is massive, including his lengthy and rigorous account 
of boredom as the foundational mood [Grundstimmung] that, according to him, prompts 
philosophical thinking. Here, I just focus on one element in his account of three distinct 
modes of boredom since his distinction can give us important insights into mood in 
general. Heidegger offers a tripartite distinction of boredom: “becoming bored by 
something,” “being bored with something,” and “profound boredom as ‘it is boring for 
one’.”42 The first kind of boredom is the one when there is a particular situation that fails 
to satisfy us. The second kind of boredom, on the other hand, is deeper because it is not 
the case that any particular thing that fails to satisfy us. Even if “there is nothing at all to 
be found that might have been boring about” particular things, claims Heidegger, one 
could still be in the situation of boredom, which would come to attention later. The third 
one is even deeper because boredom in this case is all encompassing. 
 Let us focus on the distinction Heidegger makes between the first and the second 
ones. This is essential for understanding my use of democratic frustration as well 
precisely because what I intend to emphasize by proposing to conceive of frustration as 
the mood of democracy is that democratic citizens are being held in the situation of 
frustration. Heidegger uses two illustrative examples (waiting a train at a quiet and 
uninspiring station and attending a dinner) to explain the difference between the first and 
the second type of boredom. An important and subtle difference is how he describes one 
would pass the time in response to the respective situations of boredom. 
 
																																																													




We read the timetables or study the table giving the various distances 
from this station to other places we are not otherwise acquainted with 
at all. We look at the clock—only a quarter of an hour has gone by. 
Then we go out onto the local road. We walk up and down, just to 
have something to do. But it is no use. Then we count the trees along 
the road, look at our watch again—exactly five minutes since we last 
looked at it. Fed up with walking back and forth, we sit down on a 
stone, draw all kinds of figures in the sand, and in so doing catch 
ourselves looking at our watch yet again—half an hour—and so on.43 
 
In this case of the train waiting, it seems obvious that one is bored by the situation and 
kills the time by doing unambiguously meaningless things. The second case, however, is 
quite different.  
  
… cigars are passed around again. We have already let them pass by 
once, but now we take a cigar. We are not getting sleepy, and yet—we 
smoke, not to become more sleepy, nor to be stimulated by the 
nicotine, but because smoking itself is a socially ideal way of passing 
the time, which is not to say that everyone who smokes is passing the 
time in so doing, i. e., is bored. Socially ideal—this is intended to 
mean that smoking is part of it all, one is encouraged to do so, and in 
this way—without our knowing it—an inconspicuous possibility of 
passing the time plays right into our hands. Passing the time is thus 
there in this situation too, though admittedly hard to find, and this 
precisely because it presents itself in such a public manner.44 
																																																													
43 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 93. 





Heidegger explains that “[p]assing the time is not lacking in this boredom either.” It is 
not “hidden or repressed[.]” But, interestingly, it is “transformed in a particular way[,]” 
as his cigar example indicates. 
 How can we extrapolate his perceptive analysis to my case of democratic 
frustration? I would suggest the following reading. Individual citizens might be frustrated 
by a number of events for a lot of different reasons. We can recognize it by looking at 
their emotional reactions: rage, impotent anger, despondence, et cetera. Absent those 
usual signs of frustration, however, one can still be held in the condition of frustration. In 
other words, it is plausible that citizens, perhaps without knowing at the moment, are 
expressing their deep-seated exasperation in a “transformed” and “socially ideal” way. 
Just like what the Heidegger’s guest did by smoking a cigar. Perhaps citizens dispute 
with other fellow citizens over pressing issues or participate in a mass protest. They may 
choose not to do anything, showing a nonchalant shrug to any democratic issues. 
Nonetheless, we should still be able to read their frustration or frustration permeated 
through the space in which they are placed. This does not mean that their actions (or 
inaction) are entirely disingenuous or mere perfunctory. What it means is frustration can 
be understood as a status in which democratic citizens find themselves situated, which 
implies the persistence of frustration at the structural level, not merely as an episodic 
emotional register. 




approach the condition of frustration in a more conspicuous way. I will look at how they 
adopt attitudes, orientations, and ethos and pathos with regard to it. The most 
symptomatic reaction to frustration is to escape it. Frustration breeds an impulse to seek 
immediate comforts or consolations, inviting extreme reactions. Two strategies prevail.  
 The first strategy is to remove or cut down high expectations and to be content 
with the status quo or to take an even more pessimistic view of democratic life so as to be 
prepared for the anticipated uneasiness. The second strategy is to make oneself deeply 
immersed in a utopian scheme of thoughts. As long as one keeps gravitating toward and 
clinging onto some of the heightened hopes and ideals, she may be able to hold the sense 
of frustration at bay, at least temporarily. These two immoderate extremes—one urges us 
to let go of much hope and the other makes us live by moving from dream to dream in the 
sense of drifting in utopianism—are the most popular avoiding strategies that could oust 
frustration from the view.  
 To escape the feeling of frustration may sound natural and optimal, but it is worth 
noting that such an endeavor misses out on the opportunity to properly understand and 
attend to the situation we are in. A lurking danger is a devastating twofold trend of 
cynicism and utopian escapism. Both can serve as subterfuges in which people may 
temporarily take refuge. Neither, however, is an effectual and sustainable solution. 
Instead, we need to foster a different strategy with which we can better cope with the 
indelible democratic frustration.  




the phenomenon of democratic frustration in part because most theorists have devoted too 
much attention either to analyzing idealistic arrangements of democracy or to describing 
the dispiriting reality of democratic politics. These alleged idealism and realism also 
reflect intellectual anxieties torn between utopianism and cynicism. The point is not that 
the former is too idealistic and the latter too realistic. The real danger is that the former is 
often a siphoning away of attention, a distraction from how to savor ideals as genuine 
possibilities in the everyday democracy, while the latter often distracts us from reality—
by accepting the limits of the given situation too quickly, often demoralizing any attempts 
to look at broader and deeper truth of the very situation.45 Thus, those two tendencies can 
degenerate into a devastating twofold trend of cynicism and utopianism. 
 
THROUGH A TRIFOCAL LENS, CLEARLY 
This study offers a threefold framework through which we can better understand 
frustration as endogenous to democracy. I call the overarching framework a trifocal 
approach because of its analogy to trifocals. Trifocals are a pair of glasses that have three 
regions that correct for near, intermediate, and distance vision. The lenses with different 
focal lengths remind us of what it means to have good vision—being capable of 
discerning objects visually at a short, medium, and long distance. Yet we normally rather 
																																																													
45 Reality is multifaceted. Studs Terkel once interviewed Virginia Durr who was a 
founding member of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare. When asked how 
did she become an activist, she said that the Depression changed it all. The following 
statement of hers would have been said by anyone: “It was the first time I had seen 
the other side of the tracks. I saw the world as it really was.” [Emphasis added.] 
Studs Terkel, Hope Dies Last: Keeping the Faith in Difficult Times (New York: The 




hold a holistic view of our vision (twenty-twenty or not) than keep ourselves conscious of 
the distinct capacities to see the objects at different distances unless we come to suffer  
from presbyopia or other clinical problems that demand for precise correction. 
 Likewise, the democratic life—a backdrop against which democratic frustration 
arises—has different reference points.46 Democratic citizens form and perform their 
agency in the different terrains of focus, structured by distinct expectations concerning 
diverse goals, ideals, and desires. Just like trifocals that offer a tripartite 
compartmentalization of lenses, I shall reduce my considerations to three dimensions of 
democratic life, offering a threefold analysis of democratic frustration: Communicative, 
Symbolic, and Temporal, each comprising four components: Subjectivity, Ideal, Source of 







46 Certainly, I take trifocals to be an analogy to my threefold framework, and no 
more. Notice that trifocals may sound anachronistic from the perspective of modern 
day ophthalmology and optometry. Many people with presbyopia would now prefer 
line-free progressive lenses to trifocals. Likewise, my focus on the three dimensions 
of democratic life does not mean to preclude myself (and others) from looking into 






Table 1 Trifocal Approach 
 
 The communicative dimension of democracy involves a variety of conversations 
and contestations into which ordinary citizens enter. This is where the relationship 
between the first person and the second person matters. Here, democratic citizens are 
thought to aspire to attain and exercise mutual respect. It is important, however, to 
recognize the fact that the democratic subject cannot but exist as a citizen-partisan in the 
realm of communication, holding her own superiority over her opponents and hoping to 
Trifocal Dimensions 
 
Communicative Symbolic Temporal 













of the People  
Fast tempo and the 
bifurcated temporality 




defeat them. In other words, it is common that democratic citizens tend to escalate 
partisan tensions by fanning the flames of mutual contempt, hatred, and aggression even 
while acknowledging that in democracy they are supposed to uphold the ideal of mutual 
respect. 
 This creates a particular condition of frustration. Again, I do not merely mean that 
individual citizens are likely to feel frustration in a particular episode of conversation. 
More fundamentally, frustration as a mood occupies the mind of democratic citizens. The 
two most extreme tendencies—to cease all efforts to talk to one’s opponents and to 
pounce on their words in every possible way—are indicative of frustration. How can 
democratic citizens keep motivating themselves to engage in democratic conversations in 
a way that mitigates too much aggression? I argue that moralist pleas for rationality, 
civility, and tolerance would not work very well precisely because those solutions do not 
properly understand the motivational aspect of the urge for superiority. Yet it is not 
desirable to promote the sense of superiority in a counter-productive form. Examining 
democratic communication as a site of frustration that invites a moral-psychological 
analysis of how to foster a better attitudinal strategy, I propose a theory of magnanimity, 
with which we can harness the motivational power of superiority while making it more 
compatible with and conducive to a sound and vibrant democratic politics. 
  The symbolic dimension of democracy involves the politics of the people. Here, 




continuing self-fashioning of the demos.”47 This is where the relationship between the 
first person singular and the first person plural matters. The people cannot appear in any 
immediate form. This indefinite nature of the people makes its representation both 
necessary and incomplete, which makes individual citizens in permanent tensions with 
the people. This tension creates a particular condition of frustration, which can be 
characterized by the tense dynamic of the need of individual citizens to invite and invoke 
the people at the risk of betrayal and suppression by the despair emanating from the 
inescapably incomplete and possibly false representation.  
 Two extreme solutions provide particular ways in which individual democratic 
citizens can shape their sensibilities toward the people by way of relaxing the tensions 
between themselves and the people. The first method, which I call a reductionist 
paradigm, views the people as the foundation of political authority while constraining the 
potential of popular energy. On the other hand, the second method, which I call an 
aspirational paradigm, valorizes the popular energy of ordinary people. The former is 
driven by the fear of the popular power while the latter is galvanized by the delight in 
communion with the people. Recognizing the fact that these two paradigms end up 
mutually reinforcing as well as the problem of erasing the tension between individual 
citizens and the people, I propose a theory of the sublime people as an interpretive tool 
with which we can better attend to the interplay between the individual citizen and the 
people. This particular aesthetic approach to the people highlights the pleasure of the 
sublime, which helps the citizen to invoke and engage in the people while elevating the 
																																																													
47 Sheldon Wolin, “The Liberal/Democratic Divide: On Rawls’s Political Liberalism, 




capacity of herself. In so doing, it paves the way that resists a worrying twofold trend of 
minimalism and populism. 
 The third and last dimension concerns the question of democratic time. The 
democratic subject takes the form of citizen-becoming. Previously, the focus was on the 
question as to how the citizen could form and exercise her democratic agency against 
potentially offensive others (the communicative dimension) and the people at large (the 
symbolic dimension). Here, what matters is the relationship between the democratic 
subject and time. The individual citizen is a temporally extended being. She might retain 
her “first-personal perspective and identify as the same subjective self from moment to 
moment,” but “over time, gradual change can accumulate such that [she] no longer stand 
in the same-self relation to a past self.”48 To think about oneself persisting and becoming 
through time involves understanding oneself from both the agential (first-personal) and 
observational perspectives. 
 When it comes to democratic time, however, citizens are prone to place 
overemphasis on relatively short-lived extraordinary moments at which they express their 
wishes, desires, and opinions through various means of participation, electoral or 
otherwise. The rest of ordinary time is often left unattended. In other words, democratic 
time has tended to be characterized as a series of vapid proceedings save only a few 
sweeping overheated moments. This binary shows some signs of particular temperaments 
with respect to time perceived as pervading in democracy—impetuousness on the one 
																																																													
48 L. A. Paul, “Subjectively Enduring Self” in Ian Phillips ed., The Routledge Handbook 




hand, and apathy on the other—which aggravates a twofold trend of voluntarism and 
deterministic defeatism. This chapter argues that the bifurcated view of democratic time 
robs democratic citizens of a temporal space suitable for self-growth or self-overcoming. 
I propose an alternative view of time as a journey, stressing that each individual “has its 
own time carries within itself its own temporal measure[,]”49 and that she can grow more 





49 Reinhard Koselleck, Sediments of Time: On Possible Histories (Stanford: Stanford 





CHAPTER 2:  The Communicative 
 
From Impudence Toward Magnanimity: 
Reclaiming an Aristotelian Sense of Superiority for Democracy 
 
 
There are seasons in every country, when noise and impudence pass current for worth. 
Alexander Hamilton 
 
It is not enough for me to win—the other must lose. 
Gore Vidal 
 
[T]hinking how obscurity rids the mind of the irk of envy and spite;  
how it sets running in the veins the free waters of generosity and magnanimity;  







Long before Donald Trump burst upon the political scene, parading shameless self-
flattery and disregard for others, Athenian democratic citizens once came under attack for 
their “effrontery and impudence.”50 The accuser was Socrates. In his peroration at the 
trial that resulted in his death,51 Socrates came to conclude that he lost the case not 
because his arguments were inadequate and unconvincing, but because he lacked 
effrontery and impudence, arguably the most conspicuous characteristics attributable to 
his fellow Athenians. By highlighting these characteristics, Socrates points out that 
perhaps contrary to the conventional wisdom of his time, the boldness and fearlessness of 
Athenian democratic citizens, often praised for promoting frank speech [parrhēsia] and 
daring acts, are not entirely worthy of acclaim. According to him, those dispositions can 
lead citizens toward shameless self-praise and disrespect for truth and justice.  
 Yet there is an irony. From the perspective of ordinary Athenians, it was Socrates 
who had the effrontery to disregard outright the authorities of his fellow citizen-judges. 
Notice that Socrates began his defense speech by flouting a social norm of the time—he 
																																																													
50 Plato, Apology, 38d. Translation by Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant. The 
original Greek terms are tólma and anaischuntia, which sometimes translate into a 
number of distinct yet related sets of words such as “impudence and shamelessness” 
(by Harold North Fowler) and “boldness and shamelessness” (by G. M. A. Grube). I 
will revisit the semantic and emotional affinities between tólma and anaischuntia in 
the following section. 
51 As Josiah Ober succinctly describes, “In 399 BCE, the Athenian citizen Socrates, 
son of Sophroniscus of the deme (township) Alopece, was tried by an Athenian court 
on the charge of impiety (asebeia). He was found guilty by a narrow majority of the 
empanelled judges and executed in the public prison a few days later.” Ober, 
“Socrates and Democratic Athens,” Donald R. Morrison ed., The Cambridge 





referred to the judges simply as “men of Athens” [andres Athenaioi], not as “judges” 
[adres dikastai]. Later, he gave the name of “judges” only to those who voted for his 
acquittal.52 Hence, Socrates displayed an arrogant contempt for the opinion of his peers 
precisely when he was castigating them for their shameless disrespect for him. It is ironic 
because Socrates does not seem to be lacking what he claims he is short of; his 
impudence could be well detected by his opponents. We can see a direct parallel to the 
Athenian impudence—which Socrates harshly condemns—in the attitudes of Socrates 
himself. In other words, Socrates’s mode of engagement may be no less impudent than 
that of his alleged opponents.53 
 If we set aside the oft-made juxtaposition between Socratic philosophy and 
democratic rhetoric or that between the philosopher and the sophist,54 what comes into 
																																																													
52 Socrates says that “in call you judges I give you your right name.” Compare his 
dictions in Apology, 17a and 40a. Harrold Tarrant also draws attention to the 
Socrates’s deliberate choice of the term “judges” for the particular occasion. See his 
note in Plato: The Last Days of Socrates (New York: Penguin, 2003), 221. 
53 In this respect, I do not invoke the kind of irony often associated with Socrates—
namely, Socratic irony—which calls attention to the dynamics of discursive relations 
in which the ignorance of a skillful questioner (Socrates) invites and induces others 
into making statements that would eventually lead them toward their own ignorance. 
The idea of irony in general and Socratic irony in particular deserve an independent 
comprehensive study. For more on the concept of eirōneia and the role of Socrates in 
the mutation of eirōneia into ironia, see Gregory Vlastos, “Socratic Irony,” Classical 
Quarterly, Vol. 37 No. 1 (1987). See also Melissa Lane’s disagreement with Vlastos in 
her “Reconsidering Socratic Irony,” Donald R. Morrison ed., The Cambridge 
Companion to Socrates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 237-259. 
54 The trial (and death) of Socrates has been deemed to be so momentous an event 
that it has ceaseless been subject to a series of thorough examinations by numerous 
scholars for the purpose of determining the nature of philosophy, politics, or both, 
often with an eye on the unbridgeable gulf and fundamental discords between the 
two. See, among others, Hannah Arendt, “Philosophy and Politics,” Social Research, 
Vol. 57, No. 1 (1990) and Leo Strauss, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science and Political 
Philosophy,” in Leo Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy (Chicago: 




clear view is an adversarial condition of political discourse into which both Socrates and 
his fellow contestants entered as democratic citizens. Likewise, ordinary democratic 
citizens routinely set foot in a polemical or antagonistic condition where they are 
confronted with their opponents who are almost always ready to assail them. In this 
impassioned situation, people are susceptible to impudence. Rather than reflect upon and 
attend to their own possibly unsound or biased reasoning and be contemptuous of 
themselves when they employ it, people are often not ashamed of being one-sided, 
uncivil, and self-centered, and instead too easily hold their opponents in contempt. Their 
penchant for victory defies humility, tolerance, and self-criticism. 
 Impudence⎯which has a Latin origin, impudēns⎯usually means shamelessness. 
My point is that ordinary democratic citizens are prone to shamelessly disregard those 
who have dissimilar and opposing views and perspectives. The primary reason I select to 
use the word impudence rather than shamelessness is twofold. First, as archaic55 as the 
former may sound, it does not instantly elicit such a narrow and peremptorily negative 
response as the latter normally does. Second, unlike shamelessness, impudence usually 
takes place against the backdrop of competing claims to superiority.  
 One might say that democratic citizens should refuse to talk of high and low in 
the name of equality. Every citizen owes one another mutual respect and fair cooperation. 
																																																													
55 The word impudence was more widely used until 19th century. For example, 
Richard Steele writes about impudence in the then popular British magazine The 
Spectator, placing it with a number of other colloquial expressions: "Impudence in an 
Englishman, is sullen and insolent; in a Scotchman it is untractable and rapacious; in 
an Irishman absurd and fawning. As the course of the world now runs, the impudent 
Englishman behaves like a surly landlord, the Scot like an ill-received guest, and the 
Irishman like a stranger, who knows he is not welcome." Robert Steele, The 




From this perspective, impudence can be seen as a simple failure—a failure to comply 
with the basic rules and norms of democracy. Yet it is not reasonable to readily assume 
that ordinary democratic citizens uphold the virtue of mutual respect expressing a sense 
of humility and civility. Nor is realistic to believe that they usually practice unwavering 
self-criticism prior to and in the course of confronting their opponents. Even if citizens 
acknowledge the fact that in principle, they cannot know for certain the nature of any 
political matter in its entirety, and that whatever values and perspectives they hold dear 
cannot be undisputable, this awareness of one’s partiality and fallibility does not 
automatically construct or confirm an intellectual and moral foundation of mutual 
respect.  
 In fact, democratic equality does not have to be incompatible with the sense of 
superiority; oftentimes, in practice, those two are intermingled. However vulgar and 
modest it may sound, democratic equality experienced in the everyday democracy is that 
each citizen is equally entitled to claim that she is right and her opponents are wrong, 
and, by extension, that her people, her party, and her views are superior to those of her 
opponents. In this down-to-earth version of democratic theory, the impulse to equality 
can supplement rather than supplant the sense of superiority. To paraphrase Edmund 
Burke’s remark, the haughtiness of disregard can combine with the spirit of equality.56 
																																																													
56 Edmund Burke in his famous speech on conciliation with the colonies states that 
“the haughtiness of domination combines with the spirit of freedom[.]” Here, Burke 
discusses the distinct nature of the southern colonies, especially with regards to their 
love of freedom. Burke argues that since white British subjects in the southern 
colonies are “masters of slaves,” freedom is to them “not only an enjoyment, but a 
kind of rank and privilege.” He clearly acknowledges the fact that “the superior 




 The comportment of democratic impudence, which implies the sense of 
superiority, is the unfortunate corollary of the ontological condition of antagonism 
conjoined with an epistemological tendency toward justifying beliefs that one wants to 
hold—as opposed to constructing a political view based on a thorough and unbiased 
examination of one’s preconceived ideas and beliefs. Thus, ordinary citizens can be 
rather impudent, disregarding dissimilar views and perspectives especially when they are 
politically aware and active in the face of stark opposition. To be impudent means to be 
intellectually and morally presumptuous, which can easily provoke others to anger, 
subject them to insult, and invite them into making claims that would lead them toward 
their own impudence. It seems clear that if citizens continue to inflame one another with 
impudence to an increasing extent, they will end up heightening mutual anger, hatred, 
and aggression in the realm of democratic communication. This downward spiral of 
impudence is conducive to a tense and vitriolic atmosphere of democratic politics. 
 Insofar as none or very few of us can escape blame for practicing and promoting 
the politics of impudence, this can be called a democratic phenomenon—a phenomenon 
that ordinary citizens clearly discern and commonly practice in the everyday democracy. 
That said, it is neither realistic nor entirely desirable to deal with this problem by simply 
																																																																																																																																																																																					
of dominance (slavery) that makes their love of freedom much more “high and 
haughty.” I would make an unorthodox Burkean argument that it is precisely the 
alleged absence of the system of dominance that now prompts the urge of enhancing 
self-esteem infused with the sense of superiority, which may place people in 
confrontation with their commitment to mutual respect. In doing so, I disagree with 
Thomas Paine who says in Common Sense that “[w]here there are no distinctions 
there can be no superiority; perfect equality affords no tempation.” See Edmund 
Burke, “Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies” in Francis Canavan ed., Select 
Works of Edmund Burke, Vol. I (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999) and Thomas 
Paine, Common Sense in Eric Foner ed., Thomas Paine: Collected Writings (New 




calling for more respect, civility, and decorum. It is unrealistic because ordinary 
democratic citizens are not capable of doing so unless they choose to rest content with a 
democratic politics devoid of much energy and vigor. They tend to care 
disproportionately more about their own views and positions or those bound up with 
them by ideological or emotional contiguity, cloaking their intense care in the trappings 
of impudence. It is not entirely desirable either because the suggested moralistic plea for 
behavior guided strictly by those lofty ideals of respect, civility, and decorum can bring 
about a politics that is markedly pallid and charmless, which is unable to offer excitement 
and enthusiasm necessary for active participation.  
 Then, the task before us is twofold. While recognizing the negative consequences 
of democratic impudence—that it is likely to create and perpetuate the condition of 
frustration in which citizens keep mutually escalating and thereby being fed up with 
contempt and hostility—we first need to refrain from dismissing it outright merely as an 
inordinate and repulsive vice, and to address such a phenomenon as an integral and 
enlivening part of democratic life. Second, if ordinary citizens are so inclined to 
democratic impudence, we should examine and attend to where indeed their proclivities 
and susceptibilities to impudence come from and seek out a viable strategy with which to 
extract a motivational and self-gratifying element from it while preventing or alleviating 
too much destructive aggression and obstinacy.  
 In this chapter, I aim to show that democratic impudence is indicative of the sense 
of superiority that ordinary citizens often assert and indulge in, and search for the ways in 




an unnecessarily overbearing pride and a searing disdain for opponents. The question is 
not about how to denounce or transcend the abiding sense of superiority in democracy, 
but about how to harness the motivational power of superiority while making it more 
compatible with and conducive to a sound and vibrant democratic politics. My solution is 
to turn to a related yet distinct form of superiority: magnanimity.  
 This chapter will proceed as follows. Section 1 pays special attention to two 
leading perspectives in contemporary democratic theory—liberal (deliberative) and 
agonistic—which, on my account, have failed to properly address the problem of 
democratic impudence. Section 2 proffers an anatomy of impudence as a pathos that 
shows a curious amalgam of base shamelessness and cheerful boldness, which gives the 
person enlivening energies as well as a belittling posture. Section 3 examines why it is 
both naïve and wrongheaded to attempt to solve the problem of impudence by doing 
away with it, and turns to the concept of magnanimity to remedy the situation. In what 
follows, I will base my arguments on, and derive their tenor from, to large extent, my 
reading of Aristotle—first his analysis of human pathē in general and 
anaischuntia/anaideia in particular, then that of akrasia, and finally that of 
megalopsychia—though I will also discuss other sources, both ancient and modern. 
Rather than pretend to give a comprehensive exegetical study of Aristotle, I would like to 
claim that his philosophy so understood can guide us to rethink and rework our 
contemporary difficulties that concern the vexing problem of democratic impudence. My 
novel reading of Aristotle in this purpose, in turn, provides a new insight into his theory 





BEYOND THE LIBERAL AND AGONISTIC MODELS 
Contemporary democratic theory has not yet provided us with a framework best suitable 
for clarifying and comprehending the problem of democratic impudence. Given that the 
recent years have witnessed the growing concerns with the alarming polarization and the 
rise of inflammatory expressions and impudent attitudes in the United States and beyond, 
it is unfortunate that leading perspectives in democratic theory failed to address the 
subject of democratic impudence.57 To fill this lacuna requires us to examine 
predominant tendencies in the study of democratic theory.  
 First of all, the liberal democratic model understands the politics of impudence as 
an aberration of democracy—not a problem incident to and typical of democracy per 
																																																													
57 A number of leading social scientists and journalists have claimed that America 
has been deeply divided over the past few decades by socio-cultural values and 
moral visions as well as political ideologies and preferences. For the recent political 
climate in which much of outrage and incivility has been animating democratic 
politics, see Jeffrey Berry and Sarah Sobieraj, The Outrage Industry: Political Opinion 
Media and the New Incivility (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), Diana Mutz, 
In-Your-Face Politics: The Consequences of Uncivil Media (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2015), Katherine Cramer, The Politics of Resentment: Rural 
Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2016). See also Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Red Families v. Blue 
Families: Legal Polarization and the Creation of Culture (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), and J. D. Vance, Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in 
Crisis (New York: Harper, 2016). For the ideological polarization of two major parties 
in the United States, see Nolan McCarthy, Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Polarized 
American: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016); 
for the asymmetrical polarization with congressional GOP being stretched rightward 
far significantly, see Edward Carmines, “Class Politics, American Style,” Perspectives 
on Politics, Vol. 9 Issue 3 (2011); for the development of party sorting and the roles 
of religion, media, and gerrymandering in the process of polarization, see eds. Pietro 
Nivola and David Brady, Red and Blue Nation (Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press, 
2006); and for party sorting more in detail, see Matthew Levendusky, The Partisan 
Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans 




se—while instead propagating an image of the idealized democratic self as deliberative, 
reflective, self-critical, and tolerant. From this perspective, democratic impudence 
appears to testify to the failure of establishing and complying with the basic rules and 
institutions of liberal democracy such as rational deliberation, tolerance, and mutual 
respect.  
 For instance, Rawls’s theoretical project for a “well-ordered society” presumes 
that democratic citizens “take part in social cooperation on a footing of mutual respect 
under appropriately equal conditions.”58 In the large scheme of the Rawlsian democratic 
society, citizens are believed to “desire to act on the natural duty to advance just 
arrangements.” It is as though their morality derive from “public principles of justice”, 
not from actual “ties of fellow feeling.”59 However “realistically utopian”60 his theory 
may seem, it remains less sensitive and attentive to how central the mutual exchange of 
impudence (not of respect) is to our actual democratic life. Habermas’s advocacy for a 
deliberative form of democracy idealizes “the attitude of communicatively engaged 
citizens,”61 which is expected to enable them to realize “civic autonomy” via 
unconstrained discourse. By pitting this particular attitude of mutual respect against that 
of competition that people embody “simply in the role of actors oriented to success,”62 
																																																													
58 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), xv. 
Emphasis added. 
59 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 415. 
60 This is how Rawls himself understands his own theoretical position. John Rawls, 
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 4. 
61 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory 





Habermas demands that citizens drop the latter attitude in favor of the former. Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, too, pay more attention to how liberal democracy 
proposes to design a set of better principles, or “fair terms of cooperation,” to resolve and 
accommodate moral conflicts than to the fact that ordinary citizens routinely involve in a 
number of non-deliberative activities in which they gear up for competition oriented to 
success and victory.63 Martha Nussbaum and Sharon Krause—whose respective works 
attend to and appreciate the role of passions and emotions in democratic deliberation 
much more explicitly and extensively than their Neo-Kantian counterparts—also 
endeavor to secure and valorize the ideal of equal respect.64    
 To be clear, I do not mean to dismiss such a normative claim as completely 
pointless. Nor do I deny both theoretical and practical utilities of thinking about and 
cherishing the ideal situation in which people may be guided to present themselves as 
decent and right-minded and treat other fellow citizens with full respect. It is by no means 
my intention to abandon the liberal democratic ideal of free and equal citizenship as such. 
																																																													
63 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1996) and Why Deliberative Democracy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), especially chapters 3-4. For the emphasis on an 
ethic of mutual respect, see also James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism 
in an Age of Diversity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995) and Charles 
Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in ed. Amy Gutmann, Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
Michael Walzer draws up a list of those non-deliberative activities including 
mobilization, demonstration, bargaining, lobbying, campaigning. See Michael Walzer, 
Politics and Passions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), chapter 5. My 
primary concern is not with elite politicians involving in these activities, but with 
ordinary citizens intellectually and emotionally responding and reacting to a number 
of different democratic issues. 
64 See Martha Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), especially chapters 5, 6, and 10 and 
Sharon Krause, Civil Passions: Moral Sentiment and Democratic Deliberation 




Yet I contend that any attempts to denounce the politics of impudence merely as a failure 
of upholding democratic values without understanding the reasons—existential, 
intellectual, and moral psychological—of its obduracy and recurrence would likely end in 
empty gesture. 
 The agonistic model of democracy, though it falters in its own way as I will 
explain shortly, proffers a better perspective, directing much attention to the antagonistic 
nature of political existence.65 Chantal Mouffe, for example, draws on Carl Schmitt’s 
understanding of the political when she claims that democratic politics “has to do with 
conflict and antagonism, not free discussion.” For Schmitt, as Mouffe understands 
correctly, “the criteria of the political … is the friend/enemy discrimination.”66 
Democratic politics is largely about the “formation of a ‘we’ as opposed to a ‘they’, and 
is always concerned with collective forms of identification[.]”67 William Connolly also 
sees this subject-formation or identity-construction in connection with a series of 
contesting differences. The struggle—agon—for political existence is decisive and 
pervasive.68 From this perspective, partisanship is normally presented to democratic 
																																																													
65 For the existential antagonism between friends and enemies in the realm of 
politics, see Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1996), Ellen Kennedy, “Hostis Not Inimicus: Toward a Theory of the Public 
in the Work of Carl Schmitt,” in ed. David Dyzenhous, Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s 
Critique of Liberalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998). 
66 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (New York: Routledge, 2005), 11. 
67 Ibid. 
68 See, among others, William Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1995) and Identity\Difference: Democratic 




citizens as a fait accompli.69  
 It is true that the agonistic model—especially its deep skepticism of a 
rationalized, consensus-based politics—helps us to better appreciate the ontology of the 
democratic self, whose political existence bears inherent and permanent conflicts.70 Yet 
the agonistic embrace of those inherent and incessant struggles—which is profoundly 
exemplified by Connolly’s call for an ethos of “agonistic respect”—seems to redouble the 
standard liberal model by lifting up the already elevated level of civic respect. Connolly’s 
strategy aims to foster more tolerant and more respectful citizens whose “chastened 
partisanship” enables them to arrive at “negotiations and settlements.”71 Albeit different 
from the liberal virtue of mutual respect, this “agonistic respect” too is “a reciprocal 
virtue,” a virtue “appropriate to a world in which partisans find themselves in intensive 
relations of political interdependence.”72 The problem, though, is that the reciprocal 
respect on an equal footing—agonistic or otherwise—is hard to achieve. If the liberal 
model displays its naiveté in believing or pretending that ordinary citizens can treat one 
																																																													
69 Although party affiliation is critical in most democracies, partisanship is more than 
simply following the party lines. As V. O. Key’s influential study on the one-party 
Democratic South suggests, even if we all belong to the same party, minute 
differences that divide us may aggravate (not mitigate) the intensity of competition 
and mutual hostility. See V. O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1949). I am indebted to Adolph Reed Jr. for this point. 
70 Bonnie Honig, another leading theorist of agonistic democracy, once opposed 
“[the] theories that displace conflict, identify politics with administration and treat 
juridical settlement as the task of politics and political theory”—which she called 
“virtue theories of politics”—to “[the] theories that see politics as a disruptive 
practice that resists the consolidations and closures of administrative and juridical 
settlement for the sake of the perpetuity of political contest”—which she called “virtù 
theories of politics.” See her Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), 2-5. 
71 Connolly, Identity\Difference, xxi. 




another as fellow moral and political agents equally, fairly, and rationally, the agonistic 
model—which has gained popularity by condemning the liberal model’s refusal to take 
into serious account heightened antagonism embedded in democratic politics—would 
rather be too aspirational insofar as it demands that ordinary citizens respect their 
enemies while clearly acknowledging and even welcoming a series of disputes and 
confrontations with them. It requires too much heroic or tragic a virtuosity to fight 
against and at once do justice to one’s foes.  
 The binary between the liberal model of democracy and its agonistic counterpart 
roughly overlap that between “political moralism” (or idealism) and “political realism”, à 
la Bernard Williams.73 Again, the greatest advantage of the agonistic model of democracy 
is its acutely realistic recognition of the ontological condition of democratic antagonism. 
Its realism, however, seems to go awry when it carries on with the ideal of equal mutual 
respect, which has been championed by its liberal deliberative counterpart. Though 
deeply sympathetic to the realistic appeal of the agonistic model,74 I contend that the 
agonistic model remains idealistic in its own way as it persists to valorize robust agonistic 
politics which requires heroic virtuous citizens who properly respect their enemies. Its 
radical proposal is hardly lived out. I argue that we need a realism that is even more 
deflationary and thereby achievable. By that I mean to focus more on actual emotional 
																																																													
73 Bernard Williams, In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in 
Political Argument (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), chapter 1. See also 
Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2008), Part I. 
74 See William Galston, “Realism in Political Theory,” European Journal of Political 
Theory, Vol. 9 No. 4 (2010) and Andrew Schaap, “Political Theory and the Agony of 




burdens and psychological costs that dissuade ordinary citizens from pursuing those ideal 
virtues of mutual respect, and stay adhering to those earthy realities without envisioning 
the ideal situation75—not merely of a liberal deliberative kind, but also of an agonistic 
sort.  
 The realistic democratic theory, on my account, begins with a keen 
acknowledgment that democratic citizens tend to flatter themselves and their group while 
appreciating the opportunity to regard their opponents as worthless. Empirical studies 
ranging from political psychology to cognitive science help us better understand the 
epistemic tendency of one-sidedness in the antagonistic condition of democracy, which is 
always rife with political divides, factional disputes, and polarized ideologies.76 People 
mostly stay close to like-minded fellows: “likes talk to likes.”77 In the constant presence 
of their opponents, they normally do not “seek out and assess information and 
																																																													
75 Insofar as I suggest that we need to orient ourselves more toward fear of the 
worst rather than hope for the best, I am in agreement with Judith Shklar’s anti-
utopian political thoughts. 
76 This epistemological problem of one-sidedness can be substantiated by 
groupthink, motivated reasoning, and other similar intellectual and psychological 
phenomena. For example, groupthink, which was conceptualized and popularized by 
Irving Janis, refers to a defective condition in which highly cohesive groups strive to 
reach unanimity in their decision without adequately taking into account alternative 
solutions. See Irving Janis, “Groupthink,” Psychology Today, Vol. 5 Issue 6 (1971) 
and “Groupthink and Group Dynamics: A Social Psychological Analysis of Defective 
Policy Decision,” Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 2 Issue 1 (1973). A recent study by 
Leonie Huddy, Lilliana Mason, and Lene Aarøe argues that the power of partisan 
identity generates action-oriented emotions that propel people into campaign 
involvement. See their “Expressive Partisanship: Campaign Involvement, Political 
Emotion, and Partisan Identity,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 109, No. 1 
(2015). 
77 Diana Mutz, Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 9. See also Miller McPherson, Lynn 
Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook, “Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, 
Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 27 (2001). I thank Matt Levendusky who directed 




interpretations”78 on their own with an open and self-critical mind. Instead, they 
selectively expose themselves to a friendly environment, relying upon partisan resources 
with which they can make sense of political issues at ease. The group—most notable 
examples include parties, factions, and identity groups—offers particular reasonings, 
cues, frames, and heuristics,79 and people process overflowing information with and 
through those partisan prisms. The decisions they make and the attitudes they form, 
therefore, depend largely upon the polemical situation in which they are placed.  
 This partisan epistemology is intertwined with partisan psychology or attitudes. 
																																																													
78 Paul Sniderman, “Taking Sides,” in Arthur Lupia, Matthew McCubbins, and Samuel 
Popkin eds., Elements of Reason (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 75. 
79 Much evidence from Philip Converse to Ilya Somin has suggested that ordinary 
democratic citizens are mostly ignorant of major political issues. For Converse’s 
argument that the majority of ordinary citizens show “non-attitudes” on most 
political and policy matters instead of holding any consistent and sophisticated belief 
systems, see his “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in ed. David Apter, 
Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964); Larry Bartels shows similar 
empirical findings, but he describes the phenomenon—that ordinary citizens lack any 
clear and coherent preferences—as “democracy with attitudes”. See his “Democracy 
with Attitudes,” in eds. Michael MacKuen and George Rabinowitz, Electoral 
Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003); For Somin, ignorance 
about politics is mostly rational. As for his argument with respect to rational 
ignorance or rational irrationality, see his Democracy and Public Ignorance: Why 
Smaller Government Is Smarter (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). 
However, the widespread public ignorance is not my primary concern. First, following 
V. O. Key, I basically contend that the lack of information commonly attributed to 
ordinary citizens originates to large extent from the purposefully vague and 
inconsistent pronouncements from political elites. Second, as Arthur Lupia and others 
have argued, I believe that ordinary citizens, while using heuristics, could act “as if” 
they were fully informed. See V. O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate: Rationality 
in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960 (New York: Vintage, 1966); Arthur Lupia, 
“Shortcuts vs. Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California 
Insurance Reform Elections,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88 No. 1 (1994) 
and see also Arthur Lupia and Matthew McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can 
Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), chapter 1 and Diana Mutz, “Political Psychology and Choice,” in eds. Russell 
Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior (New 




Within their partisan enclave, democratic citizens are prone to “strive to defend and 
maintain their extant values, identities, and attitudes.”80 To defend and advocate for a 
certain view in democratic politics means to perceive that view as superior to the rest, 
including some otherwise perhaps equally reasonable opinions. Citizens, thus, tend to 
strike a pose of superiority vis-à-vis their enemies insofar as they choose to stay active in 
democratic politics. Put differently, if they do not assume their superiority, it is more 
likely that they remain politically confused and inactive. When they are clear and active, 
they seek “directional” more than “accuracy” goals.81 Their top priority is to ensure that 
their opinions and desires are protected from the competing wishes of their opponents. 
Critical in the everyday democratic practice is an attempt to proclaim the validity and 
importance of their views while minimizing those of oppositional views. Studies show 
																																																													
80 Rune Slothuus and Claes H. de Vreese, “Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and 
Issue Framing Effects,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 72 No. 3 (2010), 632.  
81 Ibid. See also Ziva Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning,” Psychological 
Bulletin, Vol. 108, No. 3 (1990). “Motivated reasoning” is a process in which people 
choose certain facts among others seeing that they are more suitable to their 
predetermined beliefs and attitudes. “Belief echoes” touches a related but distinct 
phenomenon that even if people recognize the falsehood of the information they 
acquired, there is still the power of misinformation as it persistently affects how they 
think. See Emily A. Thorson, Belief echoes: The persistent effects of corrected 
misinformation, PhD Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2013. Although I draw 
here upon explanatory social science research, I generally, on a deeper level, follow 
Michael Oakeshott’s philosophy of experience: “Fact, whatever else it may be, is 
experience. … Fact is what has been made or achieved; it is the product of 
judgment. And if there be an unalterable datum in experience, it certainly cannot 
consist of fact. Fact, then, is not what is given, it is what is achieved in experience. 
Facts are never merely observed, remembered, or combined; they are always made. 
We cannot “take” facts, because there are none to take until we have constructed 
them. And until a fact is established, that is, until it has achieved a place in a 
coherent world, it is no more than an hypothesis or a fiction.” Michael Oakeshott, 
Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966 [1933]), 
42. What is noteworthy in the domain of democratic politics is that this experience of 





that not only do people dislike having their beliefs challenged, they are also “less inclined 
to seek new information after finding out that they were wrong.”82 Often being deficient 
in self-criticism, democratic citizens, wittingly or otherwise, seize on every occasion to 
preen themselves on the thought that they and their group are superior to their contenders. 
In this regard, the rise of inflammatory expressions and shameless attitudes discerned in 
American politics today is certainly not aberrational; it is at most a flamboyant extension 
of the typical democratic politics.83 
 Those empirical studies help us better understand the proclivities and 
susceptibilities of ordinary citizens to impudence. Here, the task of political theory, as 
David Mayhew once pointed out, is to offer “ontological illumination”—not merely 
“normative illumination”—which provides us with “a window to the nature of political 
reality.”84 If it is the norm rather than exception that democratic citizens often find their 
																																																													
82 Steven Sloman and Philip Fernbach, The Knowledge Illusion: Why We Never Think 
Alone (New York: Riverhead Books, 2017), 192; Thomas Leeper and Rune Slothuus, 
“Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Public Opinion,” Advances in Political 
Psychology, Vol. 35. 
83 In democracy, politicians and activists often exaggerate the urgency of the 
present-day situation by propagating the idea that what they are witnessing now is 
an imminent catastrophe caused by their opponents, and that nearly blind support of 
them is necessary to prevent cataclysm. The current political landscape in the United 
States, for example, has often been portrayed as unusually inflamed, embittered, 
and torn asunder, but one could find not so much different conditions in the recent 
past, let alone socio-political divisions in the distant past. For example, recall “the 
clashing cultures of the 1990s ⎯ urban riots, rural militia companies, and bombed-
out federal buildings … the insurgents of the 1994 congressional election[.]” Mary P. 
Ryan, Civic Wars Democracy and Public Life in the American City during Nineteenth 
Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 1. For the broader cultural 
changes over the past decades, see James Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to 
Define America (New York: Basic Books, 1991), What’s the Matter with Kansas? How 
Conservatives Won the Heart of America (New York: Henry Holt, 2004). 
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adversaries—and themselves as well, if they remain honest—being impudent and 
shameless in the face of stark opposition, we need to attend to what makes the 
comportment of impudence—which displays the sense of superiority in the form of 
determined disregard or contempt for dissimilar or antipodal views and perspectives—so 
appealing and enduring as well as exasperating.  
 That said, simply launching a normative condemnation of the unfortunate 
corollary of the ontological, epistemological, and psychological conditions of democracy 
while calling for bringing more virtues and virtuosity into the realm of democratic 
politics can be beside the point.85 For example, Edward Shils claims that civility helps 
citizens to show “esteem and deference to another person,” refraining them from 
aggression and intimidation. It urges people to pursue a common good while keeping 
their partisan interests in check. Benjamin Barber puts emphasis on civility as well, 
believing that civility promotes “reciprocal empathy and mutual respect.” His strong 
democracy demands active participation, and such a participation requires the virtue of 
civility. Along the same lines, Jean Elshtain argues that shame “requires symbolic forms, 
veils of civility that conceal some activities and aspects of ourselves,” which is therefore 
an important part of “democratic habits and dispositions” that make respectful democratic 
intercourse possible.86 
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promising works in recent literature on shame, shamelessness, and civility. 
86 See Edward Shils, The Virtue of Civility (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1997); 
Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984), 223; Jean B. Elshtain, Democracy on Trial (New 




 Those remedies can be called allopathic insofar as their moral treatments tend to 
impose the means that have opposite effects to the symptom—civility, shame, and so on. 
The allopathic approach, however, has failed to properly address the recurring pattern of 
democratic impudence. Although it is true that the politics of impudence and 
shamelessness can escalate mutual hatred and aggression, it is worth noting that 
embodying the heightened sense of superiority itself is a feature not a bug87 in democratic 
politics. Absent the sense of superiority, citizens likely remain politically confused and 
stay inactive and passive. The point is not to replace impudence with those lofty virtues. 
It is to scrutinize the mechanism of impudence—its emotions, operations, and 
implications—and make it more conducive to a sound democratic politics.  
 In this respect, this study departs from, or takes some relief from, the popular 
normative trend in political theory toward the construction of political ethics that calls to 
civil manner and moral behavior. Instead, I shall offer a homeopathic remedy to the 
problem of democratic impudence, a remedy that admits the need for gratifying the sense 
of superiority—the very substance that causes the problem in the first place—and seeks 
an alternative way to satisfy the desires for superiority while relieving the nuisance of the 
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THE PATHOS OF IMPUDENCE: AN ARISTOTELIAN ANATOMY 
The objective of this section is twofold. First, by carefully reading Aristotle’s account of 
anaischuntia/anadeia and other related feelings and emotions, I aim to offer an in-depth 
analysis of impudence.88 Second, in so doing, I also direct much attention to my realistic 
or deflationary reading of Aristotle’s political theory, which does not focus so much on 
his teleological ethical project—which centers on the questions of how to actualize the 
potentialities of human soul and how to bring into existence true human happiness 
[eudaimonia]89—as on his penetrating gaze at diverse human behavior and its moral-
psychology.  
 The most typical reading of Aristotle’s ethics and characterology would 
emphasize the capacity of deliberate choice [prohairesis] and practical wisdom 
[phronesis], with which we could wish the right object at the right time and choose the 
right means to achieve them. Yet the genius of Aristotle as a political thinker does not lie 
only in his teleological ethico-political project, but also—and perhaps more evidently, in 
my view—in his perceptive understanding of moral and political phenomena 
																																																													
88 These are two words for impudence or shamelessness in attic Greek, paired, 
respectively, with aischunē and aidos. Christina Tarnopolsky and others pointed out 
that although the latter is more archaic than the former, the differences had been far 
less significant and these terms had begun to be used interchangeably by the time of 
Plato and Aristotle. See Christina H. Tarnopolsky, Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants: 
Plato’s Gorgias and the Politics of Shame (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010) and Douglass Cairns, Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame 
in Ancient Greek Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
89 See W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London: Routledge, 1995[1923]), Ch. 6; Carns Lord, 
“Aristotle,” in eds. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, History of Political Philosophy 




[phainomena] per se. Phainomema refers to what appears to us in experience.90 In this 
regard, Aristotle’s political theory is experiential and empirical—though not 
empiricist91—in that he never loses sight of the political reality. Keenly acknowledging 
the fact that it is almost impossible to “stimulate the many towards being fine and good 
[kalokagathia],” Aristotle admits that however unfortunate it may seem, most people 
“live by their feelings[.]”92 To pay due attention to Aristotle’s realism means to see his 
analysis of things “that are human,” of which feelings [pathē] as well as the states of 
characters [hexeis] are important part. 
 My reading of Aristotle helps us to better understand the mechanism of 
impudence, examining its negative relationship with the experience of shame [aischunē], 
its near relationship with courage [andreia] and daring [tólma], and a peculiar 
condescending bearing it carries. Impudence arises in a particularly partisan social 
context, where we, intentionally or otherwise, are prone to hurt the feelings of certain 
group of people while sparing those of others. From a first person perspective, our 
																																																													
90 In Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle claims that phainomena are “evidences and 
examples” for ethical inquiry. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1216b27. Certainly, it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss Aristotle’s methodological use of 
phainomena. Notice that G. E. L. Owen explains that Aristotelian phainomena may 
include our opinion and belief as well as observed facts and the data of perception. 
W. D. Ross in the original Oxford translation often renders the word phainomena by 
“observed facts.” Martha Nussbaum advances a more robust conclusion that his use 
of phainomena reveals his methodological point that there is no “sharp Baconian 
distinction between perception-data and communal belief” and what exists is just “a 
loose and inclusive notion of experience.” See Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of 
Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), Ch. 8. 
91 The distinction between empiricism and empiricalism is from Richard Flathman, 
when he defines Michael Oakeshott’s inclination toward to the latter. See Flathman, 
Pluralism and Liberal Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 
111. 




impudence may remain unknown to ourselves, or we realize it but often do not fully 
reflect upon it. It is the comportment we take as we feel empowered, inspired, and 
assertive. As a second or third person, however, we often accuse our interlocutors and 
disputants of their impudence, pointing to their shameless and provocative assertion.  
 To begin with, impudence can be understood by way of its negative relationship 
with shame. For Aristotle, shame [aischunē] is “a kind of fear of disrepute”93 that comes 
as a result of disgraceful actions. Although it is often treated much like a virtue in the 
sense that the person prone to shame can also be considered “intermediate”94 as opposed 
to two immoderate extremes, shame does not seem to be proper to the virtuous for two 
reasons. First, the virtuous would never voluntarily carry out any disgraceful actions from 
which a feeling of disgrace springs. It might be “a good thing conditionally: if a good 
person were to do this, then he would feel shame.”95 In this hypothetical situation, we can 
imagine a good person susceptible to the experience of shame. Second, shame is not 
properly spoken of as a virtue since it is more like a feeling than a state of character.”96 
When he says this, Aristotle is juxtaposing “a feeling” [pathos] with “a state” [hexis]. 
Pathos is a term that has “connotation of passivity” in a sense of “being affected.” It 
could refer to “an attribute (an affection) or an event/experience (an affect),”97 but is 
clearly distinguished from a state of character.  
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94 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1108a34. 
95 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1128b30. 
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 Within the system of Aristotelian ethics—which is essentially a science of 
virtues—impudence [anaischuntia] as a derivative of shame may seem to merit little to 
no attention. For it is nothing but the absence of shame—the lack of an already 
marginalized pseudo-virtue. It seems clear that impudence is even less proper to the 
virtuous. Again, they would not engage in any reprehensible activities. Even if they do, it 
is still very unlikely that they feel no shame at their own disgraceful actions. Those who 
feel no shame are unreservedly bad. There seems to be no way to gloss over the baseness 
of impudence. Perhaps this is why Aristotle includes anaischuntia into the list of feelings 
that are utterly base. He states that “[not] every action or feeling admits of the mean. For 
some have names immediately connected with depravity [phaulotes], such as spite, 
impudence [anaischuntia], envy, and, among actions, adultery, theft, homicide. All these, 
and others like them, are so called because they themselves, and not their excesses or 
deficiencies, are bad [phaulos].”98 
 However, it is misleading to conclude that we can distinguish some people of 
lowly character from others. Again, impudence is not a character but a pathos, which 
implies that there are particular conditions against which people may or may not be 
unusually susceptible to impudence. Aristotle claims that people usually “[feel] shame 
toward those whose opinion [they take] account of.” The point is that there exists an 
audience whom they think highly of and care about; the very audience is “those who are 
going to be with them and those watching them[.]”99 What Aristotle pinpoints is a 
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partisan or tribal attitude revealed in the feelings of shame or the lack thereof. One brief 
conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of impudence by way of its negative 
relationship with shame, therefore, is that whether or not we are prone to impudence 
depends to large extent on the nature of the audience we converse, cope, and fight with.   
 The marginal place of impudence in the scheme of Aristotelian ethics is beyond 
dispute. Yet the analysis of impudence paired with shame leaves us with some important 
questions. What exactly is the affective and emotional experience of impudence? If 
impudence falls on the domain of pathos, which means the realm of “things accompanied 
by pleasure or pain[,]”100 what kind of pleasure or pain does impudence generate? What 
are the effects of impudence on the person who has that bearing as well as on his 
contenders? In other words, what is to expect of the politics of impudence? In order to 
answer these questions, we need to see more carefully how this particular pathos comes 
into play in reality, instead of placing impudence at the bottom of the Aristotelian 
taxonomy of virtues.  
 At first glance, one would claim that the first question has already been answered. 
As shown above, anaischuntia is a derivative of aischunē; hence the experience of 
impudence also concerns a particular perturbation of the mind arising from the 
apprehension of an evil at hand in the experience of shame. In other words, the emotional 
experience of impudence is certainly the same feelings that shame is all about—the fear 
of disrepute. The only difference is that in the case of impudence, those feelings are 
experienced not by their presence but by their absence. This explanation, however, 
																																																													




sounds almost absurd. What does it mean that the impudent person is being affected by 
the absence of that particular fear of disrepute? Does this mean that he feels the 
nonexistence of the very pain? How can we describe his affective experience of the non-
feeling? It seems that in this way, we cannot sufficiently identify what exactly is 
experienced at the moment of impudence. But there is one clue to better address this 
problem, which requires a further reading of Aristotle’s account of courage.  
 Courage [andreia] is certainly one of the most admirable virtues in the large 
scheme of Aristotelian ethics. Interestingly, however, Aristotle finds an overlap between 
impudence and courage in that both display a sense of fearlessness. That overlap, strictly 
speaking, is illusory because the former reveals a particular type of wrongheaded 
fearlessness while the latter is clearly the laudable one. Further, the truly courageous 
person is not entirely fearless. Put it precisely, he is the one who fears “for the right 
reason, in the right way, and at the right time[.]” As a virtuous man, he “feels and acts in 
accordance with the merits of the case, and as reason requires.” Nonetheless, Aristotle 
still acknowledges the fact that “some people extend the term ‘courage’ to cover [the case 
of impudence], since [the impudent person] has a degree of similarity to the courageous 
person, in that the latter is also a sort of fearless person.”101   
 This “transference of meaning”102 might be of no interest to those who faithfully 
uphold the orderly system of Aristotelian virtues. Yet it is Aristotle’s point as well that 
such a transference transpires as places where the virtuous coexist with—and are almost 
																																																													





always outnumbered by—those who are not virtuous. He seems to suggest that the lure of 
impudence arises from its pretension of holding qualities that courage is meant to offer 
such as confidence and pride. Like “rash cowards,” who attempt to make themselves 
appear to be courageous but do not actually “stand their ground against what is fearful,” 
the impudent person might be driven and guided by a mistaken impulse. But the 
perceived similarity between courage and impudence gives evidence for the latter’s 
appeal. Impudence as a pathos does not have to be negatively defined as the absence of 
shame; it can be understood by way of its alleged emotional contiguity to courage. 
 The confidence-inspiring element of impudence can be reaffirmed by my first 
example: Socrates’s condemnation of his fellow Athenian citizens for their “tólma and 
anaischuntia.” As was indicated in one of the footnotes prior, it is debatable how to 
translate those terms into the right English equivalents. For instance, this phrase has been 
rendered into “effrontery and impudence” (by Tredennick and Garold Tarrant), 
“impudence and shamelessness” (by Harold Fowler Hugh), or “boldness and 
shamelessness” (by G. M. A. Grube). What merits special attention is the fact that the 
association of tólma and anaischuntia demonstrates that there exist semantic, discursive, 
and emotional affinities between being over-daring and being impudent.  
 Tólma usually refers to daring aggression.103 In Aeschylus’s trilogy of Oresteia, 
for example, tólma is first mentioned when Agamemnon is about to sacrifice Iphigeneia: 
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But when [Agamemnon] had donned the yoke of Necessity, with veering of 
mind, impious, unholy, unsanctified, from that moment he changed his 
intention and began to conceive that deed of uttermost audacity 
[pantotolmon].104 
 
Similarly, both Sophocles and Euripides use the same term to describe Odysseus’s 
blameworthiness.105 In Philoctetes, Odysseus urges Neoptolemus to contrive some evil 
acts. He fully acknowledges the honest and noble nature of the son of Achilles, but 
presses this young man to cajole and cheat the mind of Philoctetes nonetheless: 
I know, my son, thy honest nature shrinks  
From glozing words and practice of deceit; 
But (for ’tis sweet to snatch a victory) 
Be bold [tólma] to-day and honest afterwards.  
For one brief hour of lying [anaides hémeras] follow me;  
All time to come shall prove thy probity.106 
																																																													
104 Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 218-222. 
105 For the dramatic change in depicting the image of Odysseus as an immoral 
demagogue by the late fifth-century tragic writers, which is a marked departure from 
the Homeric identification of him as a moderate leader, see Silvia Montiglio, From 
Villain to Hero: Odysseus in Ancient Thought (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2011). 
106 Sophocles, Philoctetes, 82-85. This translation is done by F. Storr from the Loeb 
edition. David Grene’s rendition is as follows: 
“I know, young man, it is not your natural bent 
to say such things nor to contrive such mischief. 
But the prize of victory is pleasant to win. 





Notice that boldness is tied with impudent deeds. Boldness associated with impudence 
offers confidence and power to set in motion a daring act. The juxtaposition of two 
different translations of tólma also suggests that to be bold means to bear up with 
difficulties to do something. The very boldness is in the service of disgraceful deeds. In 
Euripides’s Hecuba, there is a scene where Odysseus let Hecuba—the Trojan queen now 
enslaved by the Greeks—know the decision of her daughter Polyxena’s sacrifice and 
admonishes her to “endure it [tólma tad].” This callous and unethical nature of 
Odysseus’s words is confirmed by the immediately following chanting of the chorus 
leader: “Alas! how cursed is slavery always in its nature, forced by the might of the 
stronger to endure unseemly treatment.”107 
 When Plato’s Socrates characterizes “tólma and anaischuntia” as arguably the 
most notable attributes of democratic citizens, this should be read in the nexus between 
impudence and over-daring (or a perverted and pejorative form of courage). It is no 
surprise that Plato later in his Republic critically assesses the refashioning of the meaning 
of impudence in democracy: democratic people call “insolence good breeding, anarchy 
freedom, extravagance magnificence, and impudence [anadeia] courage [andreia].”108 
Plato would say that impudence deceives people by appearing to be other than it actually 
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give me yourself, and then for all the rest 
you may be called most scrupulous of men.” 
Note that Grene’s translation of anaides hémeras is more straightforward. 
107 Euripides, Hecuba, 326-332. 




is. Nonetheless, it is still true that people often equate one thing with another, calling, as 
Shakespeare once put, “honorable boldnes impudent sawcinesse,” and vice versa.109 
 As shown above, the experience of impudence can be explicated through the 
analysis of its relationship with shame on the one hand, and that with courage or daring 
on the other. Impudence is a pathos that presumes a certain degree of partisanship, which 
enables one to stay empowered and motivated while causing harm to his ability to feel 
the proper shame before his opponents. In other words, impudence displays one’s status 
brimming over with the feelings of confidence and daring, which would lead to his 
shameless disregard for whom he comes into conflict with. His impudence, which is self-
aggrandizing viewed from his first person perspective, can infuriate and exasperate 
others. The reason that impudence can provoke others to anger is that it invites and 
induces competing claims to superiority. For this, Aristotle’s Rhetoric offers an insightful 
perspective.  
 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle defines aischunē as “a sort of pain and agitation 
concerning the class of evils, whether present or past or future, that seem to bring a 
person into disrespect,”110 which sounds not very far from the definition he makes in the 
ethical works. Yet, with regard to anaischuntia, he drops one delicate hint for a richer 
interpretation. He states that “[let] anaischuntia [be defined as] a belittling about these 
same things.”111 Belittling here is oligōria, which is an action whose emotional 
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manifestation cannot be reduced to the lack of the pain concerning disrespect. It can be 
substantiated and instantiated in a range of different ways, but it comes with a perception 
of one’s own dominance and superiority vis-à-vis one’s perceived inferior. Aristotle, 
elsewhere in the same treatise, explains what he means by belittling more in details. 
According to him, belittling is “an actualization of opinion about what seems worthless.” 
It includes apathetic indifference to “whatever amounts to little or nothing,” but it also 
carries with it a more active gesture of disregard and denigration. Aristotle highlights that 
“there are three species of belittling: contempt [kataphronēsis], spite [epēreasmos], and 
insult [hybris].”112 
 It is worth noting that belittling—contempt, spite, and insult—is a relational term 
that presumes an asymmetric, hierarchical, or partisan human relationship. It requires a 
concrete opposite party toward whom one embodies the pathos of superiority. What the 
impudent person is said to belittle is not just the feelings of shame or fear of disrepute. It 
also bespeaks the particular way in which he belittles his audience, conceiving of his 
place as superior to them. The audience has to be regarded as worthless. It does not 
necessarily mean that the impudent person has genuinely and indisputably firm grounds 
for establishing his superiority over the given audience. The point is that his acts can be 
seen as if he thinks he were superior to them. In other words, his impudence is 
emblematic of a superior outlook, and can be construed as a way that he feeds off his 
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self-assurance and self-importance. In belittling his perceived inferior, he can exult in the 
asserted sense of superiority.  
 Reading Aristotle’s account of anaischuntia in conjunction with other related 
concepts such as aischunē, andreia, tólma, and oligōria, we can now better understand 
what is experienced when people become impudent. First, impudence is a form of 
expressing a sense of superiority or a kind of self-assertion rising from an excess of 
energy. Impudence can be motivational as it is empowering and inspiring. The lure of 
impudence stems from this self-magnifying and enlivening character, which could 
explain why people are inclined and vulnerable to impudence. Second, insofar as 
impudence is indicative of the desire to belittle the opinion of another—and thereby 
bringing down that person in general—it tends to provoke the anger of the other party. It 
is displeasing to behold and deal with such impudence since the asserted superiority of 
the impudent may be seen as a threat to the opposite party. These two points—impudence 
is conducive to self-aggrandizement and it makes incursions into the tranquility of the 
other party—are different aspects of the same phenomenon.  
 Two literary examples should suffice to illustrate this point. The first example 
comes from the work of Shakespeare, where we can find one of the notable earliest 
registers of the English word impudence. The passage below is from his well-known play 
entitled All’s well that ends well [1623], which affirms the cheering connotations of 






 Art thou so confident? Within what space 
 Hop’st thou my cure? 
HELEN 
 The greatest grace lending grace, 
 Ere twice the horses of the sun shall bring 
 Their fiery torcher his diurnal ring, 
 Ere twice in murk and occidental damp 
 Moist Hesperus hath quenched her sleepy lamp, 
 Or four and twenty times the pilot’s glass 
 Hath told the thievish minutes how they pass, 
 What is infirm, from your sound parts shall fly, 
 Health shall live free, and sickness freely die. 
KING 
 Upon thy certainty and confidence, 
 What dar’st thou venture? 
HELEN 
 Tax of impudence, 
 A strumpet’s boldness, a divulged shame 




 Seared otherwise—nay, worse of worst, extended 
 With vilest torture, let my life be ended.113 
 
 This is the scene where Helen, the daughter of an acclaimed doctor, attempts to 
persuade the ailing King of France to accept an offer of her treatment. Originally 
pessimistic, the King is eventually convinced by Helen’s confidence. The relationship 
between Helen and the King presumes an overtly and objectively asymmetrical hierarchy 
in which she is naturally given a modest estimate of her own worth and expected to 
submit herself to the power of her superior. Helen’s posture of confidence, which may 
imply her potential non-compliance or resistance, appears to be impudent only against 
her assigned lowliness and submissiveness. When she asserts her eagerness at the risk of 
her life, we can see her impudence in action, parading as a curious amalgam of base 
shamelessness and cheerful boldness. This distinctive semantics of impudence helps us 
elaborate the meaning of Helen’s transgression of the expected boundaries drawn for 
restricting her from going beyond the confines of the assigned submissive role. For 
Helen, impudence and active agency seem inseparable. 
 The second example is from an English translation of Homer’s Iliad, which was 
completed about half a century after the publication of All’s well that ends well. The 
translator was the octogenarian Thomas Hobbes who deliberately chose the word 
																																																													




impudence for anaideia—a Greek term that is the private of aidos [shame].114 The very 
first pages of Iliad presents Achilles rising against Agamemnon, accusing him of 
prioritizing his greed over any other matter including the task of safeguarding his own 
soldiers. The reason that soldiers are dying of plague, according to the seer, is that “the 
god’s enraged because Agamemnon spurned his priest [Chryses], he refused to free his 
daughter, he refused the ransom.” Agamemnon—though he would later grudgingly agree 
to give “the young girl Chryseis” back to her family—seems to be concerned mostly 
about his own prize: “my prize is snatched away!”115 Here comes Achilles snarling at 
Agamemnon rendered in the Hobbes edition:  
 
 O impudence! Achilles then replied,  
 What other of th’ Achaeans willingly,  
 Will, when you only for yourself provide, 
 Go where you bid, or fight with th’ enemy?116 
 
 Elaine Scarry drew special attention to this particular passage by juxtaposing the 
Hobbes’s translation cited above with that of Robert Fagle’s which is more modern, 
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popular, and literary. Her point is to stress Hobbes’s careful choice of impudence over 
shamelessness.117 Whereas shamelessness—the word selected by Fagle—“designates a 
state of moral deficit that could occur at any level of the political hierarchy, from its 
lowest rung to, as here, its highest[,]” claims Scarry, impudence “is an allegation that is 
normally reserved for a subordinate, for one with less majesty and status than the person 
making the accusation.” Hobbes’s rendition, therefore, means to capture the tension 
between Achilles and Agamemnon: “Hobbes, in choosing to use the word impudence to 
describe King Agamemnon, has conspired with Achilles to reverse the normal 
understanding of power lines.”118  
 Scarry’s perspicacity in highlighting the political hierarchy within which the 
emotion and practice of impudence can make sense notwithstanding, her simple 
characterization of Achilles as Agamemnon’s inferior can be misleading. Clearly, 
Agamemnon is the king and commander. Yet it is also true that Agamemnon, as George 
Kennedy once briefly pointed out, is rather “Achilles’s inferior in fighting, in fame, and 
in birth.”119 That Agamemnon is under the accusation of being impudent, pace Scarry, 
does not necessarily mark the subversion of the entire hierarchical structure. What 
appears to be unequivocal instead is that Achilles is being provoked by the perceived 
impudence of Agamemnon. Achilles understands that he has been treated as insignificant 
																																																													
117 Fagle’s translation of the passage is as follows: “Shameless—armored in 
shamelessness—always shrewd with greed! How could any Argive soldier obey your 
orders, freely and gladly do your sailing for you or fight your enemies, full force?”  
118 Elaine Scarry, Thermonuclear Monarchy: Choosing Between Democracy and Doom 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2014), 219-220. 
119 See his footnote n. 12 in Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse 




and unworthy and vents out his anger as a legitimate response. By making the very 
castigation of Agamemnon for his impudence, Achilles holds him in contempt, 
challenging his alleged superiority. In turn, this would invite Agamemnon’s disdain for 
his opponent, giving rise to a vicious spiral of impudence. 
 The lesson I draw from the examples of Helen and Achilles is not that impudence 
is “the vice of the saucy underling who doesn’t offer an appropriately studied 
deference.”120 The point is that impudence is the mark of competing claims to superiority, 
which buttresses or undercuts the alleged background hierarchy. In democracy, those 
claims to putative superiority become more tentative, wrangled, and subtler. Although 
democratic citizens normally discredit any monolithic and permanent status hierarchy, 
they still understand their political views and those of their opponents in terms of high 
and low, or of noble and despicable. Assuming their own superior status, in other words, 
citizens do not have to abandon the precept of democratic equality entirely. Formal 
equality recedes into the background—but not into complete oblivion. Citizens can treat 
their opponent as an inferior while giving a perfunctory nod to democratic equality. 
Equality is coupled with, and adumbrated by, the consciousness of the pleasing sense of 
superiority. This reassuring sense of superiority manifested in the comportment of 
democratic impudence is provocative and belittling. It is no surprise that Aristotle 
understands that the elevation of impudence—contempt and insult, among other things—
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can cause serious faction [stasis] and disturbances in politics.121  
 
MAGNANIMITY AS A HOMEOPATHIC REMEDY 
Drawing heavily on Aristotle, among others, this chapter has shown thus far that although 
impudence may seem to deserve absolute rejection as a classic example of baseness, it is 
in fact an ambivalent pathos, which has both positive and negative valences. My reading 
of Aristotle has suggested that like courage [andreia], impudence provides over-daring 
confidence. The association of impudence and belittling [oligōria] has helped us 
understand how competing claims to superiority can invoke, assert, or disturb a certain 
hierarchy, provoking each other to anger and heightening mutual tension and aggression. 
 Notwithstanding that impudence may escalate mutual contempt and hostility, 
simply denouncing the politics of impudence and insisting on bringing more shame, 
deference, or decorum into the sphere of democratic politics might not be the best 
solution. For democratic citizens do not seem to dispense with impudence without 
seriously undermining its motivational power. Further, according to Aristotle, impudence 
is a problem of vice or akrasia.122 It means that even if we can experience the moment of 
																																																													
121 Aristotle, Politics, 1302a16-1302b16. Aristotle acknowledges the potentially 
destructive effect of kataphronēsis and hybris. Although more of his examples center 
on the relationships between the ruler and the ruled in a non-democratic regime, he 
explicitly states that the causes of a drastic and often violent change both “in 
constitutional and in royal governments must be deemed to be the same[.]” 
Aristotle, Politics, 1311a22-25. 
122 Akrasia is normally translated into incontinence or the weakness of will. I retain 
the term akrasia as it is throughout for two reasons. First, the word incontinence 




recognition or self-criticism and become much more uncomfortable with our own 
impudent behavior, that does not necessarily prevent us from knowingly acting in the 
similar way. If it is hard to force us to feel a pang of shame at displaying the 
comportment of impudence in a particularly heated condition of democratic politics and 
is even harder to make us bring to an end the politics of impudence, we should perhaps 
develop a different strategy—a strategy that is rather homeopathic than allopathic. By 
that I mean that the problem of impudence can be mitigated and well managed by 
steering the superiority-promoting power—or dunamis, to use Aristotle’s own term123—
so that we can re-channel and re-direct the sense of superiority to better ends.  
 Recall that in Rhetoric, Aristotle enumerates three actions related to the 
demonstration of anaischuntia, each of which presumes more explicitly the need for 
asserting one’s sense of dominance and superiority: contempt, spite, and insult. All of 
these will likely lead us to wrongdoings. An impudent or shameless person is one of the 
classic examples of wrongdoers: 
																																																																																																																																																																																					
urination and defecation. Second, not only did Aristotle not have a robust conception 
of “will” in the way we moderns do, placing exclusive focus on will can also be wrong. 
123 The term dunamis, as we have already seen above, is often understood as 
potentiality in its relation to actuality [energeia], which refers to the power of a thing 
to be in a different and more complete state. However, dunamis can be understood 
simply as the power to produce changes, whose exercise is described as a movement 
or process [kinēsis]. With respect to feelings, Aristotle often explains that “we are 
said to be moved” [kineisthai], not “to be in a certain state” [diakeisthai]. That which 
enables us to flow into a certain emotion can be discerned as a particular capacity 
[dunamis]. Then, we can first say that impudence points to the particular situation in 
which the shame-inducing dunamis, without which we are incapable of feeling 
shame, has gone awry. Or, more interestingly, we may also want to ask whether 
there would be possibilities that impudence is in fact a kind of an intricate affective 
situation in which we are affected by the meddling dunameis of the related species—
capacities that concern the sense of superiority. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 




Let wrongdoing [to adikein] be [defined as] doing harm willingly 
in contravention of the law. Law is either specific [idion] or 
common [koinon]. I call specific the written law under which 
people live in a polis and common whatever, though unwritten, 
seems to be agreed to among all. … Now everything they do 
willingly they do not do by deliberate choice [prohairesis], but 
whatever they do by deliberate choice they do knowingly[.] … 
Vice [kakia] and weakness [akrasia] are the reasons why people 
make the choice of harming and doing bad things contrary to law; 
for if certain people have one or more depravity, it is in relation to 
this that they are in fact depraved and are wrongdoers; for 
example, one is ungenerous with money, another is indulgent in 
pleasures of the body, … another shameless through contempt 
[oligōria] for public opinion[.]124 
Impudence can be seen as an unpleasant threat to others. Why do we—those who are as 
yet not virtuous enough—keep giving in to the pathos of impudence, then? 
 The answer given by Aristotle is vice and akrasia. In order to fully understand his 
answer, we need to attend to his discussion of the human soul. Aristotle assumes that the 
human soul consists of two distinct parts—one part is for reason [logon ekon] and the 
other for the non-rational [alogon]. He then makes subdistinctions for each part. The non-
rational part of the soul is divided into the merely vegetative section, which is “the cause 
of nutrition and growth.” The other subdivision of the non-rational part of the soul 
consists in “appetites [epithumia] and desire in general.” And this is the realm where non-
rational desire “conflicts with and resists [reason].”  
																																																													




 The rational part of the soul is twofold as well: “one that has reason to the full 
extent by having it within itself, and another [that has it] by listening to reason as to a 
father.” The former is purely intellectual and the latter concerns human character. It is 
worth noting that Aristotle states that the appetite element of the non-rational part of the 
soul “does seem to partake in reason” insofar as it “both listens to reason and obeys it.”125 
We might suggest, therefore, that his dual model could be seen as a kind of a tripartite 
classification of the human soul with a middle domain that can encompass the second 
subdivisions of each realm.  
 In fact, both vice and akrasia present a puzzle. The vicious person must be guided 
by reason. For he is said to act on deliberate choice [prohairesis], which makes him not 
different from the virtuous person on this particular matter. Both the virtuous, the vicious, 
and the continent126 act on their rational decision. Yet the vicious person, on the other 
hand, cannot be guided by reason precisely because he does not live in accordance with 
reason. In this respect, he must be dominated by the non-rational part of his soul. What 
that means, therefore, is that the vicious person is governed in part by the rational part 
while at once being governed by the non-rational part. He decides to act viciously based 
on his deliberate choice. His rational part of the soul is severely affected in such a way 
that his decision serves to satisfy his non-rational desires. 
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the nonrational part of the soul is separable from the rational counterpart, Aristotle 
says “it does not matter for present purposes.” He leaves it open whether these two 
parts “distiguished as parts of a body” or “they are two only in account, and 
inseparable by nature, as the convex and concave are in a surface.[”] For the further 
discussion of the subject, see his On the Soul, 413b13-32, 
126 Like shame, continence is not a virtue. “Continence is not a virtue either, but is, 




 The akratic person acts on his non-rational desire, not on his deliberate choice.127 
So it seems more simple to point out that he is controlled by the non-rational part of the 
soul. For this person to be akratic, however, the rational part of his soul must not cease to 
function because akrasia presupposes and presumes the presence of knowledge. It 
concerns actions that he has knowingly done against his best judgment.128 Socrates would 
not agree with this argument. For him, it is absurd to suppose that a wise man ever acts 
against his best judgment.129 Those who are called akratic are simply ignorant, argues 
Socrates.130 Yet, what appears to be true at the level of appearances [phainomena] is that 
the akratic person “knows what he does is bad, but does it because of what affects 
[pathos] him[.]”131 The main task before Aristotle was to reconcile the dispute between 
the Socratic insight—that akrasia is an illusion—and the common beliefs [endoxon]—
that even some intelligent person [phronimos] often seems to be akratic. Aristotle retains 
the interpretive space for akrasia by suggesting two conceptual divides: the division of 
the universal and the particular and that of actuality [energeia] and potentiality 
[dunamis]. He argues that it is possible that the akratic person has “knowledge of the 
universal but not that of the particular,”132 and that he has knowledge while not attending 
																																																													
127 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1111b13-15. 
128 Aristotle discusses akrasia at length in the seventh book of Nicomachean Ethics. 
His account of vice is far less extensive. 
129 Plato, 358d. 
130 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1145b24-27. 
131 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1145b12. 





 If the impudent person is akratic, what conclusion can we draw from this here? 
That means the person acts on desires to disregard and disdain other people while 
knowing that the very action he is taking might not be the best one. Whereas the 
intemperate person, an example of the vicious person in Aristotle’s discussion, is “led on 
by rational choice, believing he ought always to pursue the present pleasure,” the akratic 
person “thinks the opposite[.]” The question is why he would “pursue it nevertheless.”134 
The main lesson from Aristotle’s akrasia comes down to the problem of actualization. 
The actualization of one potentiality would diminish the actualization of others.135 Even 
if one holds a certain belief—such as that democratic citizens should to be respectful, 
self-critical, and tolerant when interacting with other fellow citizens whose views and 
perspectives are dissimilar and opposing to theirs—he can fall prey to impudence because 
according to his perception [aisthēsis]136, the pleasure from impudence may appear to be 
much more immediate. In the very enjoyment, he may anticipate that some regrets will 
come. But that does not mean that he can easily stop yielding to impudence. 
 The Aristotelian philosophy of pathos offers a useful theoretical tool with which 
we can better address the question of democratic impudence. That democratic citizens are 
																																																													
133 The most striking examples are those who are “asleep, mad, or drunk.” Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, 1147a13. 
134 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1146b22-24. 
135 See Justin Gosling, “Mad, Drunk, or Asleep? – Aristotle’s Akratic,” Phronesis, Vol. 
38, No. 1 (1993). 





susceptible to the pathos of impudence does not mean that citizens are characteristically 
impudent or shameless. It does not have to be the case that citizens are a kind of person 
for whom impudent conduct emanates from a certain fixed disposition. That people might 
be simply akratic—not even necessarily be vicious—to be inclined to impudence means 
that they are not entirely free of moral constraints. My final aim is to seek an Aristotelian 
remedy to the problem of impudence, acknowledging the empowering and motivating 
element of impudence and seeking out different strategies with which to keep motivation 
and self-conceit alive while preventing or alleviating too much destructive aggression and 
obstinacy.  
 Again, this remedy is homeopathic rather than allopathic in that it searches for a 
way to negotiate—not to repress or reprove—the feelings of superiority. The point is that 
we need to pay more sustained and explicit attention to the issue of how to address and, 
to some extent, pander to the half-hidden desires for superiority. As we have seen earlier, 
there seem to be the real urges within us for self-promotion or reassuring self-worth, 
which are often spouted via the comportment of impudence. Rather than disregard or 
suppress those haunting desires for superiority, my strategy is to find the way to harness 
the pleasing and motivational power of superiority while directing that toward better 
ends. For this particular purpose, I finally draw on Aristotle’s analysis of magnanimity.137 
																																																													
137 I am indebted to Anne Norton for our conversation regarding the idea of 
magnanimity. Though it was not about Aristotle nor about its relevance in terms of 
taming impudence, our conversation led me to think further about the particular 
moral psychology of magnanimity. Norton once claimed that magnanimity is 
democracy’s peculiar virtue: “The practices of a liberalism triumphant in the 
common-place points to the capacity of demoracy to exceed itself. If we look for a 




 My suggestion may seem odd at first. For Aristotle, magnanimity literally means 
“greatness of soul” [megalo-psychia]. He even states that magnanimity is “a sort of 
adornment [kosmos] of the virtues”138—the complete virtue and excellence in the fullest 
sense. The magnanimous man, the virtuous man of all, is the person who “thinks himself 
worthy of great things and is really worthy of them.” Put simply, “he is the best 
person.”139 Then, it looks almost absurd to turn to this greatest virtue—which would 
probably remain as an unachievable goal140—in the course of searching for a realistic 
remedy to the politics of impudence. There seems to be too wide a gulf between 
magnanimity and impudence. Whereas the magnanimous person deserves high praises, 
the impudent and shameless person is at most half-base. To demand that ordinary citizens 
cultivate the virtue of magnanimity would be a bridge too far.  
 Furthermore, there are some ambiguities of Aristotle’s account of magnanimity in 
the Nicomachean Ethics. Let alone the vexing question of whether magnanimity is 
ultimately a theoretical virtue or a moral virtue141, scholars and commentators have long 
																																																																																																																																																																																					
an ethic that asks for more. Lack is the origin, desire the proper impulse, of 
democracy. Magnanimity is its peculiar virtue.” Anne Norton, Republic of Signs: 
Liberal Theory and American Popular Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993), 174.  
138 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1124a1. 
139 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1123b2-3, 28. 
140 Aristotle himself says that “it is hard to be truly magnanimous[.]” Nicomachean 
Ethics, 1124a3. 
141 The most notable contenders of each claim are R. A. Gauthier and Harry Jaffa. 
See their respective works: R. A. Gauthier, Magnanimité: L'ideal de la grandeur dans 
la Philosophie Païenne et dans la Théologie Chrétienne (Paris: Librairie Philosophique 
J. Vrin, 1951) and Harry Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study of the 
Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the “Nicomachean Ethics” (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1952). See also Susan D. Collins, Aristotle and the Rediscovery of 




expressed their discontents with his notion of magnanimity due in part to its tenor of 
arrogance and aloofness. For instance, W. D. Ross understands that “as a whole the 
picture [of the magnanimous man] is an unpleasing one.” It bespeaks “somewhat nakedly 
the self-absorption which is the bad side of Aristotle’s ethics.”142 After quoting a lengthy 
passage on magnanimity from the Nicomachean Ethics, Bertrand Russell comments that 
“one shudders to think what a vain man would be like.”143 W. F. R. Hardie also points out 
that since “nothing is great” for the magnanimous man, he gives an impression of 
“looking down on human affairs[.]”144 H. H. Joachim and Angela Hobbs even suggest 
that Aristotle is being humorous or flippant in his account of magnanimity while Jacob 
Howland sees Aristotle’s implicit criticism of the magnanimous man.145 
  While acknowledging both conceptual and discursive difficulties that the study of 
Aristotelian magnanimity might bring forth, I aim to propose a different reading of 
Aristotle—a reading that does not center on his notion of magnanimity as the crown 
virtue that is the pinnacle of Aristotelian human excellence nor on the magnanimous 
man’s alleged deficiencies. Instead, my primary concern is with the pathos of 
magnanimity that can serve as a backchannel to gratify the haunting desires for 
																																																																																																																																																																																					
Howland, “Aristotle’s Great-Souled Man,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 64, No. 1 
(2002), 29-31. 
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superiority. Much emphasis, in other words, shall be placed on the images and emotions 
that the pathos of magnanimity evokes and sets in motion. For this particular task, I 
suggest that we ought to pay special attention to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where his more 
earthy and modest account of magnanimity is put forward.146  
 One passage from the Rhetoric shows an obvious departure from Aristotle’s 
general theory of magnanimity as a unitary and complete moral virtue. It is from the 
section where he offers his stereotypical portrayal of young people. In general, young 
people are described as impulsive and optimistic. They are “prone to desires and inclined 
to do whatever they desire.” In his ethical works, Aristotle locates his discussion of the 
attributes of the young within the context of feelings. For example, he underlines that 
“the feeling of shame is suitable for youth” because young people “live by their feelings 
[pathei], and hence often go astray[.]”147 For youth, therefore, shame seems to be a good 
emotional deterrent. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle elaborates further on the subject. A few 
more qualities are ascribed to this specific age group. Most notable is his explicit 
reference to magnanimity.  
 Aristotle claims that although young people are concerned with honor, they “love 
victory more[.]” For they “long for superiority and victory is a kind of superiority.” In 
this context, he bluntly states that “they are magnanimous[.]”148 Anyone who is familiar 
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as the first hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being with one another.” See his 
Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 178. 
147 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1128b16-20. 




with his definition of magnanimity found in his ethical works cannot but pause here and 
ask: what can this possibly mean that those young people who are impulsive and 
pleasure-loving deserve to be called magnanimous? The reason we can attribute the 
magnanimous properties to those young people is that they, explains Aristotle, “think 
[themselves] worthy of great things in magnanimity[.]”149 Yet nowhere in his ethical 
works does he imply that the self-understanding of greatness alone can justify the name 
of magnanimity. As we have discussed above, the magnanimous man is the person who 
“thinks himself worthy of great things and is really worthy of them.” The person must 
hold some qualities objectively discernible by others. In painting young people as 
magnanimous in the Rhetoric, then, Aristotle seems to violate his own definition of 
magnanimity. This tension, however, offers an important occasion for rethinking about 
the concept of magnanimity.  
 Perhaps one would want to make Aristotle’s account of the young’s magnanimity 
congruent with his earlier discussions of the very concept in the ethical works by simply 
refusing to treat the young as magnanimous in the strict sense of the term. In 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle mentions those who “imitate [the magnanimous man].” 
They clearly lack the virtue but still think “themselves worthy of great things,” which he 
understands cannot be justified.150 Like those imitators, young people also think 
“themselves worthy of great things,” and we know that Aristotle leaves the question 
unanswered whether those young are truly virtuous. The answer is most likely to be 
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negative, mainly because those young people are described as living by their feelings, not 
guided by their virtues. Can young people be taken as imitators, then? The problem, 
though, is that Aristotle seems to tolerate young people’s ungrounded claim to 
magnanimity while peremptorily dismissing the self-evaluation of the imitator.  
 There exists one meaningful difference between the young and the imitator that 
merits further attention. The imitator in his example are those who possess material 
wealth, power, or other sorts of goods, and it is the fact of their ownership of such things 
that would make them misread their magnanimity.151 The young described in the 
Rhetoric, however, do not represent any particular economic or political classes. When he 
explains that young people are magnanimous, that statement cannot be regarded as 
describing any distinct characteristics attributable only to one or a few subdivisions of the 
age group. Unlike those imitators, who at least have a great deal of something that 
separates them from the rest of the population, young people do not necessarily have 
anything that can possibly prove that they are better or higher than other groups of 
people. To what extent is it plausible to call those young people magnanimous, who do 
not even have anything whatsoever that makes them distinguishable clearly from others? 
The incongruity between Aristotle’s account of the imitator and that of young presents a 
puzzle. 
 Yet perhaps therein lies one Aristotelian answer. The real reason that we can call 
the young magnanimous—in other words, the reason that Aristotle’s two different 
accounts of magnanimity can be considered not necessarily erroneous or inconsistent—is 
																																																													




that young people are potentially magnanimous. Seen this way, it is much more 
convincing to say that their desires [epithumia] for superiority make them potentially 
magnanimous. Read Aristotle’s explanation for the magnanimity of young people again: 
And they are magnanimous; for they have not been worn down by life 
but are inexperienced with constraints, and to think oneself worthy of 
great things in magnanimity and this is characteristic of a person of 
good hopes.152 
Here, we can see that young people, by virtue of being young, are depicted as 
“inexperienced” or “having not been worn down by life,” which is a sign of potentiality 
revealed in the form of incompletion. Young people desire and long for superiority; and it 
is worth noting that according to Aristotle, even the fully magnanimous person, who must 
perfectly exercise the virtue of magnanimity to the full, still “wishes [bouletai] to be 
superior.”153 That rational wish [boulēsis], which presumes the faculty of deliberation, is 
the developed form of sheer desire [epithumia]. What potentiality [dunamis] is to 
actuality [energeia], the desire of the young for superiority is to the rational wish of the 
fully magnanimous person to be superior. In portraying the young as magnanimous, 
Aristotle in all likelihood describes and attends to the phenomenon that they exhibit the 
pathos of magnanimity, which is another form of the sense of superiority.  
 Turning to magnanimity, to be clear, I do not mean to demand that ordinary 
citizens start conducting themselves with the utmost propriety and nobility. Within the 
																																																													
152 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book II, Chapter 12, Section 11. The last part of the cited 
passage, “this is characteristic of a person of good hopes,” was rendered by J. H. 
Freese as “a feeling which belongs to one who is full of hope.” The Greek original is 
“touto de euelpidos [hopeful or cheerful],” where touto de introduces an explanation 
of the significance of the preceding statement.    




Aristotelian understanding of human pathei, both impudence and magnanimity concern 
similar species of pleasurable activities: self-aggrandizement and confidence-inspiration. 
Aristotle states that “[t]he pleasures enhance the activities, and what enhances an activity 
is proper to it; and what are proper to things different in species are themselves different 
in species.”154 It reassures us that we can address the problem of impudence productively 
by nudging people into embodying the sense of magnanimity to the extent that they are 
gratifying their own urges for superiority but not in the form of contempt, disrespect, and 
belittling. Rather than continue to intensify the already heated disputes fraught with 
scurrilous mutual assaults, I argue that we should learn and embody an attitude of 
magnanimous composure or disregard. 
 Like impudence, magnanimity is indicative of the sense of superiority—perhaps 
in full blossom. It is enlivening, self-aggrandizing, and delightful. If democratic citizens 
are magnanimous in the sense we discussed above, it means that they may still be biased, 
prejudiced, self-centered, and arrogant, pointedly disregarding their opponents. Unlike 
impudence, however, magnanimity does not tend to provoke the anger of the other party. 
Nor does it propel its bearers to subject their opponents to insult. In magnanimity, 
democratic citizens appear to be less flappable, less flammable, and less obstinate in 
relation to their opponents precisely because in this case, the sense of superiority can be 
confirmed and promoted not by hounding and pouncing on their confrontational 
opponents, but by, at least to large extent, accepting and making light of their losses and 
injuries.  
																																																													




 The key is this idiosyncratic composure in conjunction with the sense of 
superiority, which makes it possible to strike an engaged yet detached pose with respect 
to confrontational others. Imbued with the sense of magnanimity, even while dwelling on 
their prowess and self-conceit, the magnanimous citizens do not initiate or promote the 
downward spiral of the politics of impudence. They rather remain undamaged or at least 
less affected by those who are taking a swipe at them. Magnanimity rids their mind of 
immoderate anger and spite. Albeit detached, on the other hand, they would never retreat 
into the state of pusillanimity. Since their longing to be superior puts them in constant 




We began our inquiry with an acknowledgement that democratic citizens often fall prey 
to impudence. Democratic impudence is at once an ontological (or existential), 
epistemological (or intellectual), and psychological (or attitudinal) phenomenon, the 
phenomenon that ordinary citizens often display their contempt or shameless disregard in 
relation to those who hold dissimilar and opposing views and perspectives. This chapter 
has suggested that such phenomenon is a sign that testifies to the existence of our urges 
for superiority stirred up and stimulated in the antagonistic condition of democratic 
politics. The negative consequences of the politics of impudence seem obvious. It would 




and engagement, which would result in the vicious spiral of a tense and vitriolic politics.  
 Nonetheless, instead of perpetuating the popular belief that ordinary citizens can 
and should practice mutual respect in place of reciprocal impudence, we have sought a 
different yet much more viable and productive strategy to honestly announce and assert 
the sense of superiority while at once hedging against severe reactions to it. My proposal 
appreciates and embraces the Aristotelian pathos of magnanimity—which shows an 
undeniable departure from the standard Aristotelian teleological ethical project but is still 
in line with his realistic political theory—that directs us to see how democratic citizens 
can savor the feelings of superiority while preventing a much more worrying trend of 
mutual aggression and hostility. To conclude, I shall re-emphasize the main contribution 
of this chapter by way of locating its place in relation to the most notable works in recent 
scholarship on democratic ethos, emotions, and attitudes.  
 First, Christina Tarnopolsky and others have attempted to rethink and rework the 
politics of shame, focusing self-critical—instead of conformist—repercussions of 
shame.155 Drawing largely on Plato’s Gorgias, Tarnopolsky sheds light on a particular 
horizon opened up by shame. She warns against “the desire to banish shame from [one’s] 
collective psyche and polity” as shame can lead us in two different directions: one “in the 
direction of conformity and flattery” and the other in the direction of “critical reflection 
and respect.” Tarnopolsky pursues the latter possibility with her formulations of “Socratic 
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affective experience citizens should embrace and further cultivate as it prompts them 
to self-critical reflection of potentially controversial matters such as racial injustice 
and inequality. See Christopher J. Lebron, The Color of Shame: Race and Justice in 




respectful shame” and “Platonic respectful shame” as opposed to “flattering shame.”156 
 Granted Tarnopolsky’s close reading of Gorgias, it is hard to be sanguine about 
transformative possibilities opened up by the politics of shame in terms of precipitating a 
more open, reflective, yet engaged democratic politics. As I have argued above, people 
may be immune to shame in the face of stark opposition, and even if they do experience a 
moment of awakening that shame is said to offer, that does not necessarily mean that they 
will ultimately succeed in putting their self-reflection, self-criticism, and moral and 
political deliberation into effect.157 Instead, as long as they choose to stay active and 
engaging in democratic conversations rife with sharp antagonism and deep 
disagreements, they are prone to reassure themselves by promoting self-importance (or 
group-importance) in the trappings of impudence. In fact, pace Tarnopolsky, the 
dialogues between Socrates and Callicles staged in Gorgias can be read differently. 
Callicles in the end refuses to discuss with Socrates anymore, snarling at the philosopher 
that he “couldn’t care less about anything [Socrates says].”158 The increased emotional 
																																																													
156 Tarnopolsky, Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants. 
157 See the following remarks by Callicles and Socrates, respectively. Callicles: “This 
man [Socrates] will not stop talking nonsense! Tell me, Socrates, aren’t you 
ashamed, at your age, of trying to catch people’s words and of making hay out of 
someone’s tripping on a phrase?”; Socrates: “This fellow [Callicless] won’t put up 
with being benefited and with his undergoing the very thing the discussion’s about, 
with being disciplined.” Plato, Gorgias, 489b and 505c. 
158 Gorgias, 505c. Callicles dismisses Socrates’s request to continue their 
conversation: “Couldn’t you go through the discussion by yourself, either by 
speaking in your own person or by answering your own question?” Gorgias, 505d. 
The dialogues between Socrates and Callicles boils down to the question about the 
way people are supposed to live. Socrates advocates the life spent in philosophy 
while Callicles the life engaging in manly activities (speeches, oratory, and other 
activities in politics). Is Callicles ashamed of pursuing his way of life one-sidedly and 
narrow-mindedly? It’s not clear. Nor is clear either that he would become much more 




burdens and psychological costs may have made Callicles (and can likewise make 
ordinary democratic citizens in real life) withdraw from the heated engagement in fear of 
causing or receiving offenses.  
 Other scholars take a rather critical position on the trend in restoring shame as a 
democratic virtue. Most notable is Jill Locke’s recent work on “unashamed citizenship.” 
Locke aims to free democratic subjects of guilty feeling about shamelessness or 
incivility. Whereas scholars writing on shame and civility explore the positive effects that 
such emotional and attitudinal restraints put on democratic engagement,159 Locke is more 
prone to raise the concerns of the negative effects of shame as a restraint against “the 
ideal of self-representation, self-fashioning, or a healthy democratic skepticism toward 
tradition and custom or hierarchy[.]”160 For Locke, democratic life would benefit not so 
much from valuing shame as from invigorating shamelessness precisely because shame 
as “an anchoring sensibility” tends to “discipline particular subjects in their personal, 
social, public embodiments,” while making them “weaker, more timid, less confident[.]” 
In other words, shame enforces a common set of values that contains “social disturbance 
that meaningful democratic ideal of equality and self-fashioning necessarily bring 
about.”161 Likewise, calling for civility also serves to protect the norms and interests of 
those who feed on the existing social hierarchies. Instead, Locke’s call for “unashamed 
																																																																																																																																																																																					
points out the immunity of Socrates to shame and the challenge offered to him by 
Callicles. See Green, “The Shame of Being a Philosopher: Critical Response to 
Tarnopolsky,” Political Theory, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2005). 
159 See page  45. 
160 Jill Locke, Democracy and the Death of Shame: Political Equality and Social 
Disturbance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 23. 




citizenship” reclaims and embraces the somewhat shameless self-worth and pride of the 
oppressed as a genuine ethos of democracy.162  
 My attention to the empowering element of impudence may resonate with 
Locke’s study of “unashamed citizenship” precisely in that her study attempts to rescue 
democratic shamelessness (or impudence, in my diction) from too simplistic and 
moralistic condemnation while appreciating the empowering element of it. Yet, unlike 
Locke, I do not tend to oversimplify the lived experience of ordinary democratic citizens 
into a particular type of democratic politics defined as disruptive resistance to the status 
quo of hierarchical domination. Critical for Locke are her bifurcated and vertical 
understanding of social identities between the privileged and the disadvantaged as well as 
her careful ascription of the attribute of shamelessness exclusively to the latter. In so 
doing, Locke re-appropriates the pejorative—shameless or unashamed people—for the 
radical position she intends to defend.163 Albeit sympathetic with her reconstruction of 
shamelessness as a strategy suitable for a particular type of transformative politics, 
especially when we have witnessed enduring structural domination—for instance, “white 
supremacy, empire, heteronormativity, capital, and misogyny,” as Locke enumerates164—
I contend that the full richness and complexity of the lived experience of ordinary citizens 
																																																													
162 Arlene Saxonhouse, too, emphasizes shame as entailing “a reverence for the old,” 
which can be at odds with democratic egalitarianism. See her Free Speech and 
Democracy in Ancient Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
163 In a way, Jeffrey Green takes a similar strategy when he re-interprets the 
vulgarity of ordinary citizenship as second-class citizenship. See Green, The Shadow 
of Unfairness: A Plebeian Theory of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016). 




cannot be squared perfectly with the simple opposition of the hierarchical domination and 
the aspiration toward its subversion. Shamelessness, in particular, is not merely that 
which underlings alone are accused of and they could or should flaunt in turn. Nor can 
we boost it without reservation worryingy lest we be trapped in a downward spiral of 
disregard and aggression.  
 On the question of impudence, I have instead attempted to offer a different theory 
that understands democratic citizens primarily as a participant in and a sufferer of 
competing presumptuous claims to superiority in the face of deep-seated differences and 
disagreements. My focus is more on this mundane conversational situation where citizens 
are encouraged to display impudent attitudes, regardless of their overall personal traits. 
Some may be thought to be a person of a placid disposition while another is much more 
temperamental and pugnacious. Some might be intellectually more sophisticated than 
others. But the point is that democracy offers plenty of occasions in which ordinary 
citizens hardly exercise a sufficient level of self-criticism, civility, and tolerance, 
especially vis-à-vis those who they are wont to disagree, and instead tend to shamelessly 
disdain, despise, or detest them—even when they acknowledge that what they are doing 
can be in part disgraceful. Then, it behooves us to think about how to induce and keep 
alive ordinary citizens’ active participation and at once to prevent too virulent and 
embittering a politics without having recourse to the unrealistic and ineffectual normative 
calls to mutual respect and decorum.  
 In her recent seminal work, Teresa Bejan painstakingly secures the conceptual 




coexist with and even communicate our contempt for others’ most fundamental 
commitments while continuing the conversation.”165 Bejan understands that calls for 
civility can often function as a subtly aimed twofold political message that is intended 
either for silencing, instead of facilitating, public disagreement for the sake of security 
and diversity (Hobbes’s civil silence model) or for facilitating public debate only among 
those who are ready to appreciate the views of their opponents (Locke’s civil charity 
model). In celebrating the ethic of civility, in other words, what we often do is to keep 
our differences private in fear of causing a series of stridently antagonizing 
disagreements, or to “[congratulate] ourselves on our open minds and sound views, while 
conversing exclusively with those who already agree with us.”166  
 Bejan endorses neither. Nor does she abandon the ethic of civility entirely. 
Instead, she thoroughly defends civility of a peculiar kind: “mere civility” based on the 
model of Roger Williams. Williams, the founder of the famously inclusive colony of 
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, was a religious radical who openly loathed and 
condemned those whose religious views are dissimilar from his, which included many 
protestant sects, American Indian pagans, Jews, Muslims, and Catholics. Yet he at once 
tolerated those groups, bringing them to the conversation. What demands more than 
anything of democratic citizens with respect to the question of civility, according to 
Bejan’s Williams-inspired theory of “mere civility,” is not to keep quiet (pace Hobbes) 
nor to muster enough respect for our opponents (pace Locke), but simply to refuse to stop 
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(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 159. Emphasis added. 




the conversation with others from continuing. For that, she calls for “the mental 
toughness necessary to manage and mind the gap between what we would have others 
think—of us, and in general—and what they actually do.” It is the toughness, “requiring 
[us] to cultivate, among other things, insensitivity to others’ opinions[.]”167 
 I am deeply sympathetic with the Bejan’s project carefully attending to the 
problem of coexistence with confrontational others. Her main interests seem to overlap 
mine in terms of holding a realistic expectation that each democratic citizen cannot 
overcome his or her own partiality, and that democratic politics will always be rife with 
mutual disrespect, contempt, and hostility unless we proactively and prophylactically 
choose to extirpate the seed of real disagreements. What seems to be missing, or at least 
what remains underappreciated, in her work, however, is the question of what it means 
for ordinary citizens to be confident in front of others while being not overbearing to 
silence or provoke their disputants. My reappraisal of Aristotelian pathos of magnanimity 
calls more honest and careful attention to the sense of superiority in order to better 
address this very question. 
 Again, it is of utmost importance not to confuse or conflate my aim to cherish the 
sense of magnanimity in one’s mind with a much more aspirational pursuit of the 
idealistic virtue of “civic magnanimity” or “civic friendship,” which demands—often 
seasoned with Thomist or liberal deliberative spices168—liberality, politeness, a sense of 
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168 For the Thomist interpretation of Aristotelian virtue of magnanimity, see Mary M. 
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equality, and humility. I have argued that those ideals are too high in nature to be relied 
upon for actual political communities so that we need to arrange for a lesser goal. 
Idealistic virtue can be easily felt as a burden to ordinary citizens, which would forestall 
rather than facilitate their active participation.169  
 My goal has been to seek a realistic solution. First, it is important to nourish the 
sense of superiority among democratic citizens so that they can stay motivated and 
inspirited to entering the realm of antagonistic democratic politics. Second, what we can 
realistically hope for is to cultivate a decent assurance, which is the natural attendant of 
magnanimity distinguishable markedly from a more incendiary type of self-confidence 
shown in the comportment of impudence. My account of the pathos of magnanimity does 
not guarantee nor aspire to the situation in which ordinary citizens could celebrate 
differences without reservation and condemn disrespect outright. Instead, the sense of 
magnanimity, or a particular affective and moral-psychological condition it helps create, 
allows citizens—while aiming at showing their own superiority—to deal with daily 
conflicts and antagonism without forfeiting their composure. For the significance of 
superiority for the magnanimous persons lies in their tendency to making light of the 
																																																																																																																																																																																					
on Political Science, Vol. 37 No. 4 (2008). For the liberal deliberative re-appropriation 
of the virtue of magnanimity, see Gutmann and Thompson, Why Deliberative 
Democracy, 82-87, 186-187. One example of this highest virtue given by Gutmann 
and Thompson is Nelson Mandela whose benevolence is indicative of his willingness 
to accept the perpetrators of injustices in the spirit of reconciliation. More modest 
version of civic magnanimity is described as “a commitment to seek a common 
perspective at a deeper level of morality” or that to seek “the rationale that 
minimizes rejection of the position [one opposes].”  
169 Montesquieu once aptly described the nature of virtue that weighs people down in 
his story of Troglodytes: “[O]h Troglodytes! Your virtue has begun to be a burden to 
you [votre vertu commence à vous peser].” Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La 




difficult situation by shrugging off those accusations and attacks coming from their 
opponents. This equanimity can suspend the seemingly inexorable spiral of impudence 




























CHAPTER 3: The Symbolic 
 
The Sublime People: 




I know of nothing sublime which is not some modification of power. 
Edmund Burke 
 
I never said that the vox populi was of course the vox Dei. It may be;  
but it may be, and with equal probability, a priori, vox Diaboli. 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
 
True sublimity must be sought only in the mind  







The concept of the people, however often misunderstood or traduced, is arguably the 
most important notion in contemporary democratic theory and practice. All that we have 
observed about democratic regime and culture—popular sovereignty, participation, 
representation, popular movement, or democratic equality—presuppose the framework of 
the democratic people. 
 Turning to the second mode of democratic frustration, this chapter focuses on the 
symbolic dimension of democratic politics in which individual democratic citizens find 
themselves as a citizen-sovereign, participating in “the continuing self-fashioning of the 
demos.”170 To call this dimension of democracy symbolic, I aim to emphasize the 
centrality of the people and popular sovereignty in democratic imaginations; arguably, 
the people are the most authoritative idea, sign, and event of democracy. Due to the 
indefinite nature of the people, individual democratic citizens display what might be 
called a symbolic mind, a mind that is open and accustomed to references to the people 
that often remain allusive, allegorical, and rhetorical.  
 The term symbolic also intimates that my analysis engages in part with the 
conception of the symbolic order and its relation to the real, à la Lacan,171 in the sense 
that there is the dimension of democracy centering on the languages of the people that 
shapes the ways in which individual democratic citizens perceive and perform their 
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subjectivity and agency, even while ‘the people’ itself remain indeterminate and 
inaccessible. In other words, the order of the people influences the vicissitudes of 
citizens’ democratic life, leaving them in a lurch between distinct sensibilities, attitudes, 
and imaginations. 
 This chapter begins with two observations. First, although ‘the people’ is an 
everyday term in democracy, it is easily obscured as soon as we start to speculate. For the 
people never appear in any immediate form. There can only be a claim of the people, as 
Jason Frank has aptly pointed out,172 but no claim is tantamount to the people themselves. 
Its indefinite nature warrants a series of acts of representation in many forms: symbols, 
statements, movements, or stories as well as political representation. The necessity of 
representation implicated in the idea of the people or popular sovereignty seems to be at 
war with the unrepresentable nature of the people, thereby placing individual democratic 
citizens in permanent tensions with the people. These tensions can be characterized by 
the tense dynamic of the need of individual citizens to invite and invoke the people at the 
risk of betrayal and suppression by the despair emanating from the inescapably 
incomplete and possibly false representation. This is a particular condition of frustration 
in which citizen-sovereign are situated. 
 Second, there exist two predominating understandings of the people in 
contemporary democratic theory and practice: namely, a reductionist paradigm and its 
aspirational counterpart. These leading paradigms show, respectively, particular images 
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of, attitudes toward, and assumptions about the democratic people. Whereas the former 
has reduced the meaning of the people to a minimum, the latter has proclaimed the 
transformative role of the popular power. One regards the people as an abstraction, 
thereby liquidating the unnecessary illusion around its register, the other celebrates its 
radical and rejuvenating effect. What we have been witnessing is the simultaneous 
presence of the reductionist obduracy and the aspirational call for oppositional popular 
politics that valorizes the manifestation of the people. Most extreme versions of each 
paradigm would be commonly understood as minimalism and populism, respectively. I 
take both to be more an impulse than an ideology.173 Certainly, not every democratic 
theorist or citizen would readily endorse either minimalism or populism. Yet they 
nonetheless adopt one of the two paradigms easily without going too extreme in either 
direction.  
 It is important to remember that both paradigms often aim to neutralize the 
productive meaning of the critical distance between individual citizens and the people. 
The reductionist paradigm attempts to internalize the distance by dislocating the people in 
the realm of abstraction while the aspirational paradigm tends to erase the distance by 
prompting individual citizens to immerse themselves in the movement of the people. 
Both reductionist and aspirational paradigms rightly recognize the uniquely supreme 
power of the people. What each paradigm emphasizes, however, differs drastically. The 
former puts individual citizens in awe of the abstract people, instilling a sense of 
trembling fear of any unsettling popular forces of the claimed majorities. The latter is 
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rather driven by, and riding on, a sort of empathetic delight and restlessness stemming 
from the valorization of the popular energy of ordinary people, while promoting a sense 
of self-righteousness. Each model shows its own affective foundation of what it thinks 
should be the mission of democratic politics.  
 The problem of the reductionist paradigm, as will be discussed to the full below, 
lies in its too much inhibition, or a preemptive aggression, on the radical potential of the 
people, which withholds individual democratic citizens from exercising their power as 
citizen-sovereign to participate in “the continuing self-fashioning of the demos,” to 
reiterate the phrase by Sheldon Wolin quoted above. The aspirational paradigm 
stimulates individual citizens to work on the “self-fashioning of the demos,” but lacks a 
heightened awareness of the tensions between individual democratic citizens and the 
people and of the significance of the critical distance between them, which in fact is the 
key to a critical, ongoing, and regenerating process of the “self-fashioning of the demos.” 
 What I seek to offer in the following pages is a particular type of aesthetic174—
both reflective and affective—appreciation of the democratic people as an alternative to 
the two leading paradigms. Drawing heavily on Kant, among others, I argue that the 
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people as opposed both to the rational reduction of the people to a minimum and to 
the intemperate celebration of the alleged presence of the people. By aesthetic I 
broadly mean that my approach concerns the way we imagine, feel, and make sense 
of the democratic people and its relation to our own political subjectivity. A. G. 
Baumgarten, who is deemed to be the father of modern aesthetics, coined the term 
aesthetica or Ästhetik for designating the critique of taste as well as indicating the 
science of perception by senses. See Paul Guyer, “18th Century German Aesthetics,” 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007) [Electronic source: 
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people can be seen as an object of sublime, and that the sublime people allows us to 
attend to the vexing yet dynamic—communicative, processual, and dialectic—
relationship between individual democratic citizens and the people, and, therefore, better 
understand what it means to be citizen-sovereign. Put differently, the sublime people 
provides individual democratic citizens with some space in which they embrace 
frustration while harnessing the accommodating power of frustration to further generate 
and guide democratic aspirations. By highlighting the importance of the interplay 
between individual citizens and the people, I also demonstrate that the sovereign power 
of the citizen-sovereign should be exercised not by impetuously giving a sovereign 
outlook to the claimed people, but by keeping possibilities of the continuous regeneration 
of the people.175 
 
BEYOND THE REDUCTIONIST AND ASPIRATIONAL PARADIGMS 
Democracy “is nurtured by illusion,” writes Robert Wokler. He emphasizes that the 
unfulfilled promise of democracy is “mysteriously compelling,” which is “deemed both 
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government is “to multiply and challenge governmental claims to represent the 
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sovereign.” Bryan Garsten, “Representative government and popular sovereignty,” in 
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unattainable in theory and at the same time inescapable in practice.”176 Wokler’s 
observation is astute. For democracy to be accurately and realistically understood, we 
ought to pay special attention not only to the unattainable nature of democracy, but also 
to its inescapably enduring appeal.177  
 Among those seemingly unattainable yet inescapably appealing democratic 
promises does outstand its most fundamental principle that the people—and no others—
rule. Democracy simply means that “the people hold power and exercise rule.”178 This 
promise, however, is what democracy may not be able to fully deliver in part because it 
has never been entirely clear who the people are and what it means for them to rule. We 
need a legitimate collective body to establish fair and equal terms of a democratic rule. 
But they could only be legitimate through the system yet to be created. It is “a paradox of 
politics,”179 often discussed under the rubric of “boundary problem.”180 The problem has 
																																																													
176 Robert Wokler, “Democracy’s Mythical Ordeals: the Procrustean and Promethean 
paths to popular self-rule,” in Geraint Parry and Michael Moran eds., Democracy and 
Democratization (New York: Routledge, 1994), 21. 
177 To lay the foundation of a properly realistic democratic theory that does not defy 
idealism outright has been one of the overarching themes of this project. Here, I 
would like to emphasize yet again that a realistic account of democracy should not 
end with debunking those unrealistic democratic ideals such as popular self-rule. It 
ought to pay equal attention to how those ideals, despite their implausible nature, 
still gain wide currency as an aspiration in the everyday democracy. This is part of 
democratic reality. Empirical political scientists have long condemned the outdated 
unrealizable democratic ideals, but often overlooked the meaning of the enduring 
appeal of such ideals. See, for instance, the latest example: Christopher Achen and 
Larry Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive 
Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).  
178 John Dunn, Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy (London: Atlantic 
Books, 2005), 51. 
179 Bonnie Honig, “Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in 




attracted a number of philosophers to examine who comprises the people—or, in other 
words, who is included, and perhaps more importantly, who is excluded181—but the 
analytical and normative issues with respect to the boundary of the people are not my 
main focus. Nor is my primary concern with endorsing any of the commonly suggested 
methods of a democratic rule or ranking them—statist, pluralist, deliberative, 
participatory, plebiscitary, direct, to name a few.182  
 Instead, I bring into focus that ordinary democratic citizens more or less 
understand and enact popular sovereignty, and that the people are the central source of 
democratic imaginations and a range of widely varying practices in democracy. 
																																																																																																																																																																																					
180 For the boundary problem, see, among others, Allen Buchanan, “Political 
Legitimacy and Democracy,” Ethics, Vol. 112, No. 4 (2002), Robert Goodin, 
“Enfranchising All Affected Interests and Its Alternatives,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2007), Sophia Näström, “The Legitimacy of the People,” 
Political Theory, Vol. 35, No. 5 (2007), Sarah Song, “The Boundary Problem in 
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Theory, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2007), and Arash Abizadeh, “On the Demos and Its Kin: 
Nationalism, Democracy, and the Boundary Problem,” American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 106, Iss. 4 (2012). 
181 Margaret Canovan once stated that the notion of the people is far from clear, and 
is “boringly familiar but at the same time problematic in all sorts of ways.” 
Recognizing the multi-faceted nature of the problems that concern the notion of the 
people, this chapter pays particular attention to a distinctive political and aesthetic 
relation of individual democratic citizens to the people as the most authoritative 
mark of democracy, especially the ways in which each citizen can make best sense of 
their democratic agency, engaging with the popular power. In this respect, it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate both spatial and temporal boundaries 
of the historically constructed people(s) determined by particular historical relations 
of gender, race, ethnicity, generation, et cetera. For the critical account of how 
narratives of “peoplehood” are constructed in identitarian terms initiated by political 
entrepreneurs, see Rogers Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of 
Political Membership (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For the view of 
the people as an ongoing “process,” playing out in time, See Paulina Ochoa Espejo, 
The Time of Popular Sovereignty (University Park: Penn State University Press, 
2011).  
182 See Patchen Markell, “The Rule of the People: Arendt, Archê, and Democracy,” 




Individual citizens involve the politics of the people—both positively and negatively. 
They are confronted with the people both as an idea or a matter, in text or on street, and 
at a certain juncture or over time. In so doing, they perform their democratic agency. 
Their affective relationship with the people is presupposed in one way or another by their 
intentionally directed action or inaction. Their customary languages of the people are 
structured deeply in affective fashion, which would be exemplified by the two most 
widely shared explanations for the meaning of the people.183  
 First, there is a penchant for imagining the people as an abstraction, profoundly 
exemplified by what I call a reductionist paradigm.184 The people at large in democracy 
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are thought to be the sovereign power, but that term is usually qualified by an impetus to 
restrict the extent of this sovereignty; the people are generally held to be the constituent 
sovereign, not the governmental one.185 Democracy, updated in modern terms, takes a 
form of representation. In other words, modern democracy enacts democratic rule via 
representation at the price of reducing and abstracting the people to the mere justification 
of power. The people are, thus, “the ultimate source of political authority,” but not its 
“wielder.”186  
 The notion of the people, imagined as the constituent power, plays a double role. 
It first gives the perception of unity, and, second, a new modern outlook with which to 
escape blame for ordinary people according to which democracy was long condemned as 
the most unstable, vulgar, and potentially tyrannical form of rule. By making the 
democratic people recede behind the manifold ways in which representation is 
accomplished, in other words, the reductionist model successfully inhibits or places strict 
controls on ordinary people as popular political energy. Put differently, those 
reductionists have established the symbolic order of the people as an abstract foundation 
in fear of—or with disgust at—ordinary people who they believe can be the host of 
endemic democratic diseases.187 
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3.1 (Winter 2013), Daniel Lee, “Sources of Sovereignty: Roman Imperium and 
Dominium in Civilian Theories of Sovereignty,” Politica Antica (2012). 
186 Bernard Yack, Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 2012), 98.  
187 This democratic disease has been widely discussed by different generations of 
scholars. Herodotus mentioned in Histories—through the mouth of Megabyzus—that 




 Second, since antiquity, there is a lasting tradition that conceives of the people as 
non-elites or commoners. I call this perspective, distinguished from the first one, an 
aspirational paradigm.188 From this point of view, the greatness of democracy lies in its 
																																																																																																																																																																																					
have knowledge, who have neither learnt nor for themselves seen what is best, but 
ever rush headlong and drive blindly onward, like a river in spate?” Histories, Book 
III, in The Loeb Classical Library: Herodotus II (London: William Heinemann, 1928), 
107. Similarly, Plato singled out license [exousia] as one of the outstanding 
characteristics of democracy. Plato, Republic, 557b. Isocrates also regards it 
lamentable that democratic citizens enjoy the sense of entitlement to do whatever 
they please, listing, among others, saying everything [parrhesia], license [akolasia], 
and lawlessness [paranomia] as central features of democracy. Aeropagiticus, in The 
Loeb Classical Library: Isocrates II (London: William Heinemann, 1929). Modern 
political thinkers such as James Madison and Baron d’Holbach often accused 
democracy of its inherent propensity to chaos, tyranny, or anarchy, which should be 
tempered and prevented in advance. See James Madison, “Paper No. 10” in Terrence 
Ball ed., Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay: The Federalist with 
Letters of “Brutus” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Likewise, John 
Adams in his letter to John Taylor once put conventional wisdom commonly shared 
among his contemporaries: “Remember Democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes 
exhausts and murders itself.” John Adams, “Letter to John Taylor, December 17, 
1814” in George W. Carey ed., The Political Writings of John Adams (Washington, 
D.C.: Regnery, 2000), 406. Even when “the undoubted advance of democratic 
political forms” took place in the mid and late 19th century, as Albert Hirschman once 
put, there existed “a diffuse mood of skepticism and hostility” against the people. 
See Albert Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, and Jeopardy 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 19-27. See also Jason Frank, 
“Democracy and Disgust,” J19: The Journal of Nineteenth-Century Americanists, Vol. 
5, No. 2 (2017) and Rebekah Sterling, “Irregular Motions: Democracy and the Mob” 
[Unpublished; Presented at the annual meeting of the WPSA in April, 2014]. 
188 The term ‘aspirational’ is from Melvin Rogers, “The People, Rhetoric, and Affect: 
On the Political Force of Du Bois’s The Soul of Black Folk,” American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 106, Iss. 1 (2012). The aspirational camp includes populist democrats 
and radical democrats. The former group tends to emphasize the centripetal power 
of the people via—usually, although not always—a single charismatic leader, and 
thus is supportive of a strong presidency that transcends and unifies divided factional 
interests and political wills. The people as a unified entity may well be identified with 
this leader rather than to be mediated or reflected upon by him or her. See Ernesto 
Laclau, On Populist Reason (New York: Verso, 2007), Benjamin Arditi, Politics on the 
Edges of Liberalism: Difference, Populism, Revolution, Agitation (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2007). See also Nadia Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured: 
Opinion, Truth, and the People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), chapter 
3. Notice that Michael Kazin, an American historian of populism, places emphasis on 
the positive aspect of populist politics by focusing more on the power from below. 
See Kazin, The Populist Persuasion. The latter group, on the other hand, is generally 




proposal of an egalitarian polity that would dismantle—if not eliminate—the hierarchical 
rule of epistemic, political, and economic superiors over ordinary people. It ought to be 
ordinary citizens and not extra-ordinary elites who should rule. In fact, representative 
democracy or formal democracy can be seen at best as an unsavory compromise and at 
worst as an oxymoron.189 For all the usual trappings of representative democracy—
routinized horse-trading among elites, dominant cultures that shape citizens as passive 
recipients rather than active participants in politics, or sheer busyness of every day 
created by the division of labor between professional politicians and ordinary citizens—
insulate ordinary citizens from democracy’s real and transformative possibilities.190 
Democracy, therefore, cannot function within the frame of representative democracy, at 
least not without serious impoverishment, as long as it keeps obstructing the exertion of 
																																																																																																																																																																																					
the people by pointing to either the spontaneously emerging ensemble of acting 
multitude, marginalized ordinary people, or those who have no part. See Michael 
Hart and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New 
York: Penguin, 2004), Sheldon Wolin, “Democracy: Electoral and Athenian,” PS: 
Political Science and Politics, 1993, and Jacques Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” 
Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics (New York: Continuum, 2010). 
189 Jacques Rancière once put that although “today representative democracy may 
seem to be a pleonasm,” it is really “an oxymoron.” See his “Democracy, Republic, 
Representation,” Constellations, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2006), 298.  
190 For the theoretical analysis of how most advanced representative democracies 
have become more oligarchic than democratic, which invites radical reconsideration 
of the ideas and institutions of democracy, see John McCormick, The Machiavellian 
Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Jeffrey Green, 
“Liberalism and the Problem of Plutocracy,” Constellations, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2016), K. 
Sabeel Rahman, Democracy Against Domination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017). Among important empirical studies in the context of American democracy 
that could be paired with those normative works above mentioned include Larry 
Bartels, Unequal Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) and 
Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress and a Plan to Stop It 
(New York: Twelve, 2012). For an analysis in the field of economics, see also Thomas 
Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2014), where he documents the rising inequality originating from capital’s natural 




popular political energy.  
 The proponents of this aspirational paradigm envision the image of the people as 
the true bearer of radical potential of democracy. Accordingly, democracy itself has to be 
redefined. A more real democracy comes to exist as disruption when the people long 
dismissed, marginalized, and suffocated by the powerful elites appear to challenge the 
existing hierarchical political order.191 What the people so understood symbolizes is a 
popular anger against the allegedly inegalitarian order and those who safeguard and are 
safeguarded by the very order. 
 These two mutually conflicting paradigms have been dominating in contemporary 
democratic theories and practices. We might say that they are competing over ideological 
hegemony if that means the system of thought that determines the whole body of 
practices and expectations, including concerns about our senses and assignments of 
energy.192 My emphasis is not, however, on the juxtaposition of the two views as absolute 
antithesis to each other as many theorists seem to have pointed out. For example, Paulina 
Ochoa Espejo has recently summarized those leading perspectives on the people by 
																																																													
191 See, amongst others, Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 581-606 and “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of 
Democracy” in Peter Euben, John Wallach, and Josiah Ober eds., Athenian Political 
Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1994). Wolin’s theory of fugitive democracy centers on “the ingenuity of 
ordinary people in inventing temporary forms to meet their needs.” This Wolinian 
democratic politics is normally repressed under the hierarchical rule but could 
emerge, at least on occasion, for the sake of redressing the grievances of ordinary 
people. For the recent account of global movements that call for a more direct 
democracy, see Marina Sitrin and Dario Azzellini, They Can’t Represent US!: 
Reinventing Democracy from Greece to Occupy (New York: Verso, 2014). 
192 See Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (Oxford: 




naming them as “a hypothetical account of the people” that is “held by many liberals” 
and “the historical account of the people” that is often espoused by populists and 
others.”193 Although I do not mean to deny the virtue of her succinct characterization that 
neatly sorts out the leading views of the democratic people, I would still disagree on 
calling them hypothetical and historical since the languages invite misunderstanding. On 
the one hand, it is one thing to regard the people as an abstract foundation and another to 
treat it as a construct of mere speculation, which the term ‘hypothetical’ seems to 
connote. On the other hand, to argue for the active role of the people as an impetus for a 
popular politics does not necessarily mean that the people have to be a factually 
documented—or ‘historical’—group of democratic subjects. Either way, the idea of the 
people is clearly part of democratic reality, which requires a particular interpretation. 
The people can never fully be ossified into pure abstraction, but can also never be 
embodied into mere literalness.  
 For the purpose of this chapter, it is worth noting that the two mutually unyielding 
sides, each of which is for the other a wrong interpretation of the people, serve as an 
enemy for the other whose growth each ends up encouraging. Why and how? First, the 
two paradigms share the most fundamental assumption that the people are the largest, and 
the most powerful entity ever conceivable in democracy. It is formidable. That which is 
formidable—by definition, as its Latin origin, formidare, indicates—inspires fear and 
respect or dread and reverence. Second, since, as Derrida once pointed out, there is no 
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signifier that can communicate a specific intended meaning without allowing a glimmer 
of other associations,194 the idea of the people intended as the former carries with other 
significations as well, often provoking, unwittingly or otherwise, those who hold a 
different meaning. The reductionist paradigm centers on its fear of the norm-erosion-
driven popular power,195 which is really the driving force behind its taxidermy of popular 
sovereignty. The aspirational paradigm gives a new transformative and revivifying 
outlook to the popular energy while receiving, happily, the communion with the people. 
Its fear is rather about the disabling or paralyzing effect of the reductionist fear itself.196 
Each appears to the other to be the mere postulate of its counter-paradigm that aims at the 
revaluation or transvaluation, to use a Nietzschean term, of the negative characterizations 
of what their opponents are prone to fear. In so doing, each ends in proving further 
evidence of the criticism of their enemy without sufficiently understanding and attending 
to the critical contents.  
 My theory of the sublime people helps us to see these paradigms, taken together, 
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195 They have respect for the form-giving power of popular sovereignty. What they 
fear is the fact that the popular power can “delegitimate those same forms.” See 
Judith Butler, ““We the People”: Thoughts on Freedom of Assembly,” Alain Badiou, 
Pierre Bourdieu, and Judith Butler et al., What Is A People? (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2016), 51. 
196 The reception of the popular power by Robespierre and his opponents can be one 
extreme example. Robespierre says: “A people does not judge as does a court of 
law. It does not hand down sentences, it hurls down thunderbolts; it does not 
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as conducive to the customary schemes and languages of the democratic people while 
pointing to the need for building an alternative perspective. Prior to discussing how the 
theory of the sublime people offers a novel understanding of the democratic people, we 
should examine the structure, mechanism, and dynamic of sublime, most meticulously 
analyzed by Immanuel Kant.  
 
THE SUBLIME: OBJECTS, PROPERTIES, AND EMOTIONS 
The sublime is an old and massive concept. It has a long history going back at least as far 
as Peri hypsous written by Longinus,197 an ancient text forgotten for a long time until it 
was reintroduced and became widely circulated among European men of letters, 
especially after the publication of its French edition by Nicholas Boileau Despréaux in 
1674.198 The Greek noun from which the idea of sublime originates, to hypsos, means 
height. In Peri hypsous, Longinus sets out to examine the height of logos—speeches and 
writings.199 Although his treatise belongs to the tradition of didactic technical writing on 
																																																													
197 A manuscript of Peri hypsous is conventionally credited to the author called 
Longinus, a rhetorician and literary scholar of the first or third century because the 
name “Dionysios Longinos” is ascribed on the contents page in the reference 
transcript. 
198 Nicholas Boileau Despréaux is widely recognized as one of the central figures who 
brought Longinus back to light through his translation, although a number of Latin 
editions and at least one Italian edition already existed prior to his French edition. 
Costelloe states that “Boileau transforms the Latin evaluative qualifier sublīmis into a 
substantive neologism — sublime/sublimité — to reflect the original Greek noun[.]” 
Timothy M. Costelloe, “The Sublime: A Short Introduction to a Long History,” 
Timothy M. Costelloe ed., The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3-4. 
199 Longinus, On the Sublime, trans. James A. Arieti and John M. Crossett (New York: 
The Edwin Mellon Press, 1985). What triggered Longinus to write this treatise was, 




rhetoric, it is not geared towards teaching the art of persuasion by speeches [peithein tois 
logois]. Instead, his primary focus is to address the ways in which the sublime is 
manifested as height and conspicuous excellence in great speeches and writings. By 
investigating a variety of texts from the most popular political speeches of the time such 
as Demosthenes’s orations, Plato’s philosophical dialogues, Herodotus’s and 
Thucydides’s histories, and the Septuagint, Longinus theorizes how the audience can be 
astounded and overwhelmed rather than merely persuaded by the force of the sublime.200 
 In the eighteenth century, during which time modern aesthetics emerged and 
flourished, however, there was a significant shift of attention from the sublime style to the 
sublime materials or objects. Notable were the contributions by British literary scholars 
and philosophers such as John Dennis, Joseph Addison, John Baillie, and Alexander 
Gerard, who sought out to analyze empirical properties of material objects related to the 
sublime experience rather than the stylistic qualities of speeches and writings.201 In one of 
his famous Spectator articles, Addison, for example, directs much attention to the 
“stupendous works of Nature” such as “an open champaign country, a vast uncultivated 
																																																																																																																																																																																					
infertility [of speeches and writings] has hold over our life.” See section 44. 
200 Longinus was mainly concerned with style and the revealing power of language. 
For example, five kinds of sources for the sublime are, according to Longinus, “a 
solid thrust of conception,” “an intense and enthusiastic emotion,” “a sort of molding 
of figures, both figures of conception and those of style,” “noble phrasing,” and “the 
way things are put together in worth and loftiness.” But, in short, what constitutes 
the sublime is the greatness of the mind [megalopsychia] of authors. See sections 
8.1 and 9.2. 
201 An excellent introduction to the eighteenth century British aesthetic studies on 
the sublime is Emily Brady, The Sublime in Modern Philosophy: Aesthetics, Ethics, 
and Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), Ch. 1. For the German 




desert” or “huge heaps of mountains[.]”202 The central feature of these natural objects is 
characterized as their absolute magnitude. It is their incomparable vastness and 
unchallenged power that makes present of the sublime experience. Baillie makes a 
similar point when he states that  
 
A flowery vale, or the verdure of a hill, may charm; but to fill the soul, and raise 
it to the sublime sensations, the earth must rise into an Alp, or Pyrrhenean, and 
mountains piled upon mountains, reach to the very heavens…203 
 
 No less attention is paid to sublime emotions. Baillie points out that the immensity 
of external objects, in fact, “dilates and elevates the soul,” exciting in us “a noble 
enthusiasm of grandeur,”204 or what Longinus calls “an intense and enthusiastic emotion” 
[sphodron kai enthousiastikon pathos].205 The sublime, therefore, involves a distinctive 
relation between the sublime object and a particular aesthetic experience in the subject, 
																																																													
202 Joseph Addison’s “On the Pleasures of the Imagination” [Monday, June 23, 1712], 
in Andrew Ashfield and Peter Bolla eds. The Sublime: a reader in British eighteenth-
century aesthetic theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 62. It does 
not mean, however, that the interests in the sublime style and language ceased to 
exist. For example, Rob Goodman has recently argued for the importance of the 
rhetorical sublime based on his close reading of Edmund Burke on the deliberative 
value of immoderate speech. See Rob Goodman, “The Deliberative Sublime: Edmund 
Burke on Disruptive Speech and Imaginative Judgment,” American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 2 (2018). 
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evoking a particular set of emotions. This aesthetic field, engendered around the sublime 
object and subject, is worth special heed.  
 It is perhaps Immanuel Kant who developed the level of discussion of the sublime 
with the highest philosophical rigor. Kant’s most extensive and matured theory of the 
sublime, demonstrated in his “Analytic of the Sublime,”206 proffers the best framework 
according to which we later propose a particular way of understanding the democratic 
people as an object of the sublime.  
 Kant associates the sublime with emotions like awe and astonishment, but 
famously emphasizes the sublime emotion as “negative pleasure.” The implication is 
twofold: first, it is an indirect or derivative feeling incited in the sublime experience; 
second, our mind is “not merely attracted by the object, but is also always reciprocally 
repelled by it.”207 This point, in fact, resonates with Burke’s characterization of the 
sublime as “delightful horror.”208 It is well known that Kant’s philosophical account of 
																																																													
206 Although Kant’s “Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime” 
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developed account of the sublime. It ranges from twenty-third to twenty-ninth 
sections of his Kritik der Urteilskraft, which was published in 1790. All page 
references are to Paul Guyer’s English edition, Critique of the Power of Judgment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), followed by the pagination of the 
standard German edition of Kant’s works, Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, edited by 
the Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later 
Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900- ). All bolds are original. Italics are mine. 
207 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 129/5:245. 
208 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Idea of the Sublime 
and the Beautiful (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). This negative valence of 
the sublime emotion was not properly developed in Kant’s 1764 essay mentioned 
above, which signifies Burke’s influence on Kant. Burke’s Enquiry was originally 
published in 1757, but its German edition, which Kant read with great interest, came 




the sublime is largely influenced by Burke’s monumental study of the subject, A 
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Idea of the Sublime and the Beautiful. Kant 
explicitly cites and critically assesses Burke’s Enquiry in his theory of the sublime, which 
is not always common in his writings. Burke’s physiological theory of the sublime also 
points to the negativity of the sublime emotion.  
 Yet there are significant differences between the two thinkers. Burke accentuates 
the physicality of this aesthetic experience. According to Burke, there has to be some 
object “at certain distances” from the subject in order that the subject is ready for 
“delightful horror.” Delight is conceptually distinct from pure pleasure as it is 
fundamentally associated with pain. When “danger or pain press too nearly they are 
incapable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible.”209 But if we recognize a 
physical threat from a certain distance where our safety is guaranteed, or, in other words, 
where we do not suffer the immediate danger, the very circumstance excites the idea of 
pain, danger, or terror.210 Out of the absence or the removal of the immediate pain or 
danger does arise the sublime emotion. Hence the sublime as a “species of relative 
pleasure.”211  
 Kant does not ignore the virtue of the Burkean empirical and corporeal account of 
the sublime. He also recognizes that “all representations in us, whether they are 
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objectively merely sensible or else entirely intellectual, can nevertheless subjectively be 
associated with gratification or pain.” Nonetheless, Kant goes beyond Burke’s account 
because, strictly speaking, it is not correct “if we call some object of nature sublime” 
without considering the conflicting interplay of imagination and reason.212 Burke 
certainly shifted “the discourse of the sublime away from the study of natural objects and 
towards the mind of the spectator.”213 And he acknowledged the fact that it is only after 
having become an idea through a representation in the imagination does the terrible incite 
the feeling of sublime.214  
 But for Kant, Burke’s problem is that his sensorial account focuses primarily on 
the physical distance between the subject and the object as the constitutive condition of 
the sublime. While highlighting the sublime as “the strongest emotion which the mind is 
capable of feeling,” Burke stresses the external condition in which the sublime 
experience would occur.215 What is missing is a thorough account of the internal 
condition of the sublime experience, or, in other words, attentive reading of the inner 
dynamic between imagination and reason, which would offer a richer view on the 
dynamic between the subject and the object. Kant maintains that this negligence of Burke 
leads him to fail to understand how the sublime experience makes present the limits of 
the subject and its own efforts to meet the very difficulty. For Kant, what is essential in 
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danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible 
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the sublime experience is an introspective turn that ends up making the subject turn back 
to its own mind, which is the place in which the true sublime resides. 
 How exactly, then, does this conflicting interplay of imagination and reason take 
place? According to Kant, we call sublime “that which is absolutely great” [schlechthin 
groß]. When he says something is absolutely great, he means that is “great beyond all 
comparison.”216 Not unlike Burke, Kant begins with a rigid distinction between the 
sublime and the beautiful: 
 
The beautiful in nature concerns the form of the object, which consists in 
limitation; the sublime, by contrast, is to be found in a formless object insofar as 
limitlessness [Unbegrenzheit] is represented in it, or at its instance, and yet it is 
also thought as a totality.217  
 
This succinct statement merits close attention as it bespeaks the gist of Kant’s theory of 
the sublime. For Kant, it is not the case that we find the beauty from small objects and the 
sublime from huge objects. As was shown above, what is properly sublime, which is 
absolutely great, “cannot be contained in any sensible form.” We are challenged by what 
is absolutely great since it is formless, which “surpasses every measure of the senses.”218 
Since it is insensible or supersensible, no quality is directly represented in the mind of the 
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subject. Instead, limitlessness is represented through the failure of the very presentation 
[Dastellung] of the quality. The sublime experience, therefore, begins with the experience 
of “the subject’s own incapacity” [Unvermögen] or inadequacy [Unangemessenheit].219  
 Kant distinguishes “the mathematically sublime” from “the dynamically 
sublime.” The former concerns what is absolutely great in magnitude, the latter in power. 
In the case of “the mathematically sublime,” when the faculty of imagination involves 
two actions, that is, apprehension [Auffassung] and comprehension [Zusammenfassung], 
it is the failure of comprehension, or the capacity to represent the object as a whole, that 
is revealed at the failure of imagination during its efforts to portray the absolutely great. 
In comprehension, unlike in apprehension, “there is a greatest point beyond which it 
cannot go.” The sublime object makes available to reflection this limit of comprehension. 
In this regard, because of the inadequacy of the faculty of imagination, the sublime 
concerns, states Kant, “only ideas of reason [Ideen der Vernunft].”220  
 This does not mean, however, that the sublime experience could and should be 
understood as solely belonging to the domain of pure concepts such as the Whole or 
Totality. A feeling of the sublime originates from the reflection of the sensible through its 
failure, where the imagination becomes frustrated yet expanded, by means of reason. As 
shown in the cited passage above, the concept of totality can also be thought, or, to be 
precise, thought in addition to it [hinzudenken]. In that particular way, the sublime 
experience involves an aesthetic representation of limitlessness. This experience of the 
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limit and limitlessness ultimately produces “an emotionally moving satisfaction.”221 That 
feeling is “a feeling of displeasure from the inadequacy of the imagination … and a 
pleasure that is thereby aroused at the same time from the correspondence of this very 
judgment of the inadequacy of the greatest sensible faculty in comparison with ideas of 
reason[.]”222 The overall satisfaction is indicative of the fact that “imagination and reason 
produce subjective purposiveness through their conflict [Widerstreit].”223 
 Much the same can be observed for “the dynamically sublime.” Kant also deals 
primarily with the representation of the sublime in nature, but here the major concerns are 
with what is absolutely great in power. His own examples are as follows: 
 
Bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into 
the heavens, bringing with them flashes of lightening and crashes of thunder, 
volcanoes with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes with the devastation they 
leave behind, the boundless ocean set into a rage, a lofty waterfall on a mighty 
river, etc., make our capacity to resist into an insignificant trifle in comparison 
with their power. But the sight of them only becomes all the more attractive the 
more fearful it is, as long as we find ourselves in safety, and we gladly call these 
objects sublime because they elevate the strength of our soul above its usual level, 
and allow us to discover within ourselves a capacity for resistance of quite another 
kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-
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powerfulness of nature.224  
 
The first half seems to be no different from Burke’s account of “delightful horror” as a 
pleasure coming from the “removal of the immediate danger.” However, in the last part 
of the passage, Kant attributes the reason we call such fearful objects sublime to the fact 
that our mind is uplifting when imagination, in spite of its failed attempt to present and 
face the fearful situation, ends up being enabled to entertain it. So, Kant’s philosophy of 
the sublime, regardless of its difference in kind, underscores the peculiarity of the 
sublime experience as the affectively charged affirmation of our cognitive and existential 
limits and our own struggle to come to terms with those limits, which ultimately leads us 
into his important remark of subreption.  
 Kant contends that there is a certain subreption in action in the sublime 
experience. Subreption means a substitution of one with the other.225 Then, what 
substitution does Kant discuss here? What exactly is ultimately revealed in his recourse 
to “the voice of reason,” which is inseparable from, and also in fact essential to, the 
elevation of the imagination? It is the faculty of the mind itself that undergoes its own 
failing but at once surpasses the usual standard of senses. That said, when Kant defines 
that the sublime are that in comparison with which everything else is small, it is not his 
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the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World [Inaugural 
Dissertation],” in David Walford ed., Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770 (Cambridge: 
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primary point that there are absolutely immense and vast objects exterior to the subject, 
to whose sublimity the subject cannot help but submit itself in awe. Rather, Kant revises, 
or even inverts, the mismatch between the immense sublime object and the infinitesimal 
subject by arguing that “nothing can be given in nature … which could not be diminished 
down to the infinitely small” in comparison with ideas of reason. Sublime is our own 
vocation [Bestimmung], demonstrated by our reason, awakened and galvanized by the 
incapacity and inadequacy of imagination at the limit.226 The feeling of the sublime, often 
projected onto the object, then, is nothing but “respect [Achtung] for our own vocation, 
which we show to an object in nature through a certain subreption.” The sublime 
experience creates a field in which the latent faculty of the subject is revealed and 
confirmed, resulting in the empowerment and uplift of the subject. Hence Kant’s 
conclusion: “true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the one who judges, not in 
the object in nature.”227 
 
THE SUBLIME PEOPLE AND REPRESENTATION: A KANTIAN STYLE 
Now that we have discussed Kant’s view of the sublime in general, it is time to address 
its application to the question of the democratic people. Although the sublime is often 
considered to be primarily germane to our experience of nature or the work of art, there is 
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Sublime Offering,” Jean-Luc Nancy et al. Of the Sublime: Presence in Question 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 44. Italics mine. 




good reason to construct the very concept as a means for rethinking about the democratic 
people and democracy as well. In fact, any aesthetic experiences are already in part 
political in the first place, as long as such an experience involves a constitutive narrative 
that shapes the way we feel, imagine, and make sense of our own subjectivity in relation 
to others and the world. Aesthetics, as Jacques Rancière contends, refers to “a certain 
modality, a certain distribution of the sensible.”228 Highlighting the aesthetic horizon that 
the democratic experience of the people opens up, therefore, can be a fecund way to 
establish an alternative framework with which we can better understand the affective 
structure of our democratic subjectivity and agency.229 
 My overriding emphases are on the ways in which we can judge the democratic 
																																																													
228 Jacques Rancière, “The aesthetic dimension: Aesthetics, Politics, Knowledge,” The 
Aesthetic Turn in Political Thought, ed., Nikolas Kompridis (New York: Bloomsbury, 
2014), 263. For Rancière, politics “is aesthetic in principle.” Disagreement: Politics 
and Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 58. 
229 Notice that drawing upon Kant as a source of democratic theory, I do not aim to 
reinforce the traditionally recognized Kantian political philosophy if this means that 
Kant’s political philosophy is ultimately all about (practical) reason. The traditional 
view situates his political philosophy as an appendix in the context of his systematic 
metaphysics of morals. From that point of view, the place of the sublime is at best 
marginal, a mere passage that bridges between aesthetics and morality, and, by 
extension, politics. My democratic reading of Kant, however, focuses less on the 
nature of practical reason and its quintessential role of Kantian morality and politics 
per se. Nor do I take some of the common routes to a postmodern inversion of the 
traditional Kant, demonstrated by Jean-François Lyotard, and, to a lesser extent, 
Gilles Deleuze. Unlike Kant, who affirms the superiority of reason, Lyotard and 
Deleuze turn to the very rupture as a site for radical heterogeneity or the materiality 
of sensation. What is revealing for them is rather the absolute alterity (Lyotard) or 
the vital power of rhythm (Deleuze). See Paul Guyer, Kant and the Experience of 
Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), especially chapter 6 and 
Jean-François Lyotard, “Presenting the Unpresentable: The Sublime,” Artforum, Vol. 
20 No. 8 (1982), “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” in The Inhuman: Reflections 
on Time (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), Lessons on the 
Analytic of the Sublime (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). Gilles Deleuze, 
Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 




people as sublime by way of doing justice to, and reflecting upon, both fear and delight, 
or anxiety and excitement, that the people provoke, on how the liminal experience of the 
sublime can offer critical insights into the interplay between the subject (individual 
citizens) and the object (the people), and, finally, on how my Kantian rendition of the 
sublime people overall can help us to better attend to and come to terms with the indelible 
condition of frustration owing to the aesthetic representation of the people as 
unrepresentable. 
 What does it mean to judge the democratic people as sublime, and how can the 
sublime people as an interpretive framework deepen our understanding of democratic 
life, allowing us to critically assess the two prevailing paradigms discussed above? Let us 
begin with a simple acknowledgment that within the symbolic order of democracy, the 
people are limitless with regard to measure and formidable with regard to power, which 
makes the people perfectly qualified as an example of the Kantian sublime.230 In 
democracy, the people are deemed to be the only legitimate foundation of power. It is the 
people that is the greatest and irresistibly forceful category ever conceivable in 
democracy. The people convey an impression of superiority and completeness. It is the 
superiority and completeness that spring from the status of the sole fountain of political 
power.231 Alexis de Tocqueville once described the status of the people in the democratic 
world as “the cause and aim of all things, everything comes from them and everything is 
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absorbed in them.”232 Kant, too, discussed the transfer of the supreme authority from 
monarchs to the people by noting that “[t]he consequence was that the monarch’s 
sovereignty wholly disappeared (it was not merely suspended) and passed to the people, 
to whose legislative will the belongings of every subject became subjected.”233 The 
people appear to be supreme beyond all comparison to the eyes of “metaphysical 
democrats.”234  
 This vestigially metaphysical—or politico-theological—sense of the people has 
not vanished even in the reductionist paradigm. The people are normally understood as 
the sovereign—albeit rather colorless and lifeless in the reductionist rendition.235 Here, 
the people need to be beholden. The implication, especially with respect to the 
relationship between individual citizens and the people, is twofold. First, the reductionist 
paradigm assigns the people—imagined and employed as an abstraction—a regulative 
function so that individual citizens stand in awe of the order that the people symbolize. 
Second, the concept of the people so understood is defined, designedly, by not being 
geared toward promoting the popular energy of actual ordinary people. The symbolic 
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Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 481/6:341.  
234 Marcel Gauchet, La Religion dans la démocratie: Parcours de la laïcité (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1998), 8, quoted from Warren Breckman, Adventures of the Symbolic: 
Post-Marxism and Radical Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 
176. 
235 Richard Tuck uses the metaphor of the sleeping sovereign in his new book, 
deriving from Hobbes’s discussion of a sovereign democracy in De Cive [On the 
Citizen]. The point is that for Hobbes, the governing activities of citizens—those 
which were considered essential for ancient democracies—are not central to 
democracy at all. See Richard Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention of 




order of the abstract people rather helps arouse fear and disgust236 in the minds of the 
citizen against any attempts of the appropriation of the people for the sake of those who 
are lacking the sense of complete wholeness. The interests of common people, even 
though they are most likely the majority population, can still be seen as factional and 
partial. To use a classical distinction, the sovereignty of the people [ho dēmos] should not 
be confused with the supremacy of the common people [to plēthos].237 That said, it is not 
entirely correct to say that the reductionist paradigm urges individual democratic citizens 
to sever connections with the people. Instead, the citizen, as a beholder, is thought to be 
already actively included in the structure of the people. Or, in other words, the people, at 
this abstract level, incorporate every individual indiscriminately; popular sovereignty is 
taken diffusively. 
 This reductionism is driven by fear originating in a harsh confrontation with the 
people as an awe-generating sublime material. By choosing to revel in the reductionism, 
however, those who subscribe to the reductionist paradigm fail to recognize and attend to 
the people as a sublime object. They are unable to maintain critical distance necessary for 
the aesthetic experience of the sublime. Kant states that for an object to be judged as 
sublime, the subject should be able to consider the object as “fearful without being afraid 
of it[.]”238 What it means is that one should fully acknowledge the formidable power of 
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“Democracy and Disgust,” 402. 
237 Richard Bourke, “Introduction” in Richard Bourke and Quentin Skinner eds., 
Popular Sovereignty in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 6. 




the people that would make her resistance seem completely helpless—hence she still has 
fear of the people—yet should not be afraid of it, believing that she and the people are not 
necessarily hostile to each other. Only then can she experience the people as sublime. The 
reductionist paradigm does not allow this space befitting the subtlety of the sublime 
experience. The feeling of awe attributed to the abstract people would degenerate into the 
sheer terror once the people became released from the abstraction taken up by unruly 
ordinary people, tending to cause disruption. Here, the fear of the people effectively 
forecloses any possibilities of promoting the positive sensibilities of individual 
democratic citizens toward any concrete body of the people as the source of popular 
politics. Instead, they take the unitary version of the sovereign people—which 
symbolizes a unified community, the Constitution, the nation, or simply the political 
order itself239—as a means to contain the exertion of the popular energy of the common 
people rather than to galvanize and release it.240 In other words, the reductionist paradigm 
provides citizens with a strong perspective from which they can be markedly skeptical 
and contemptuous of the popular outbursts that would likely disrupt the existing order. 
Reductionism, therefore, can easily take shape as passivity and turn individual 
democratic citizens into passive bystanders, leaving the terms of democratic politics 
																																																													
239 Sieyes once put, “in a political society, a people, a nation, are synonymous 
terms.” Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes, “Contre la ré-totale” quoted from Yack, 
Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community, 214. See also Rogers Smith, 
Stories of Peoplehood and Political Peoplehood: The Roles of Values, Interests, and 
Identities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), especially chapters 5 and 6 
on American peoplehood. 
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defined and imposed by political elites. It does not require citizens to abandon their belief 
in popular sovereignty. It only demands that they hold the belief in the broadest and the 
most abstract fashion. Therein lies the power and danger of this paradigm. 
 Consider a classic example from the early modern era. Thomas Hobbes once put 
that “in every commonwealth, the People Reigns.” In what exact sense can the people 
rule in every commonwealth? What about monarchical or oligarchic polities? The key to 
understand his point is his characterization of the people, which resonates deeply with the 
reductionist paradigm. For Hobbes, the people—as opposed to crowd—are “a single 
entity with a single will.” It is an abstraction. In monarchies, therefore, “the People” still 
“exercises power [imperat]”241 precisely because “the King is the people.”242 Likewise, 
Hobbes’s parliamentarian contenders such as Henry Parker, the author of Jus Populi, 
																																																													
241 It could be translated into will as in the case of sovereign will [summum 
imperium]. 
242 See Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 137. There are meaningful disagreements among scholars whether or to what 
extent early modern theorists of sovereignty can be considered democratic. For 
conflicting views on Hobbes’s account of democracy, for instance, see Richard Tuck, 
“Hobbes and Democracy” and Kinch Hoekstra, “A Lion in the House: Hobbes and 
Democracy,” both in Annabel Brett, James Tully, and Holly Hamilton-Bleakley eds., 
Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). Notice that Hobbes’s primary concern was not with 
endorsing monarchy per se, but with establishing a theory of absolute sovereignty. 
See his following statement: “… throughout my discourse it has been my aim ... not 
to give the impression that citizens owe less obedience to an Aristocratic 
commonwealth or a Democratic commonwealth than they owe to a Monarchical 
commonwealth. For though I have deployed some arguments in the tenth chapter to 
press the point that Monarchy has more advantages than other forms of 
commonwealth (the only thing in this book which I admit is not demonstrated but 
put with probability), I say everywhere explicitly that every commonwealth must be 




argued that the Parliament is, in fact, the people.243 We can replace King and Parliament 
with the Constitution, the political order, the democratic norm, et cetera. The logic still 
stands. What we see is the pattern in democratic thinking that makes the people enshrined 
in the highest principle of democracy while at once draining it of its vital potentials. As 
an abstract justification for the legitimate constitutional norm, the people rather appear as 
figurative reference, reverential gesture, and historical commemoration. Appealing to the 
people still takes place in the reductionist culture. The terms, however, are always 
innocuous and consensual. 
 Holding the reductionist view, which seems to metastasize political passivity, can 
be self-defeating especially when the interests of entrenched elites are persistently 
furthered by institutional constraints on popular power in representative democracy.244 
The unitary and abstract notion of the sovereign people and strictly representative 
institutional arrangements can put individual citizens in an irritating situation as they see 
democracy secretly allowing the powerful and the privileged to dominate ordinary 
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(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), chapters 4 and 5. 
244 One of the reasons that ordinary citizens often find themselves frustrated at the 
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Exclusion: The Right to Vote in the United States, United Kingdom, and France,” 




citizens while failing to fulfill even the very minimum presumption that reductionists 
cannot but hold: democracy provides individuals with “a sufficient chance to win and a 
sufficiently large payoff in the future rounds.” This “prospect of alternation” is believed 
to make it possible that one “can be governed by different others in turn,” thereby being 
able to be “represented some of the time,”245 which does not correspond to the everyday 
democratic experience of individual citizens. If they witness instead the glaring 
incongruity developed between their de jure sovereignty and de facto subjection, their 
respect for the formal democratic order—which is driven by their fear and disgust against 
the tendency of norm-erosion by popular uprisings—may have to be recalibrated. 
Otherwise, their somewhat legitimate fear can degenerate into blind deference to any 
authority as long as it is sanctioned by the norm of popular sovereignty broadly 
understood, irrespective of the exclusion of broad segments of the population from 
enjoying democratic agency. Their respect for the abstract people—popular sovereignty, 
the Constitution, the order, et cetera—can be deceptive, “[hiding] existential 
subjection.”246 
 The aspirational paradigm, on the other hand, aims to contest and challenge the 
undemocratic authority in the name of actual people.247 Yet the actual people, too, are a 
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construction that commands a particular definition, delimitation, and characterization. 
This counter-paradigm cannot be immune from some figurative and synecdochical 
elaborations on the people. Their elaborations are anti-elitist, often led by anti-elitist 
elites. The people as “an aspirational category,” thus, become “a site for symbolic action 
where new configurations of self, society, and the characteristics of both might be re-
imagined.”248  
 What the aspirational paradigm offers is a reconstruction of the image of the 
people. The people are deemed not merely as the “origin” of the existing political order, 
but rather its “undoing.”249 Here, the idea of the people as non-elites intersects rather than 
opposes the idea of the people as the constituent power, forming a momentum for a lively 
popular politics. That comes with a sweeping reorientation of sensibilities toward 
ordinary people and popular energy. The main strategy is to argue for an overcoming of 
the consciousness of representation in opposition to the existing political authority. 
Individual democratic citizens are encouraged to think as if they can instantaneously 
experience the people as such by empathizing with, or even identifying themselves with, 
the actual people so created. All mediations appear to be superseded in the alleged 
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presentness of the real people. In other words, representations are supplanted by an 
experience of communion.250  
 The aspirational paradigm rightly attends to the formidable and unparalleled 
power of the people—characteristics that would make the people a sublime object. At 
first glance, unlike its reductionist counterpart, the aspirational paradigm seems to secure 
the space where one can consider the people “as fearful without being afraid of it.”251 Yet 
this approach, too, fails to maintain the critical aesthetic distance necessary for the 
sublime experience by nullifying the radical otherness that the people can provoke. Also, 
the presentness of the claimed people takes precedence over the infinite and inexhaustible 
characteristics of the people. Dispelling the fear of the people altogether by conjoining 
individual citizens and the people, the asipirational paradigm provides an opportunity for 
individual democratic citizens to feed on excitement and self-righteousness proceeding 
directly from their communion with the supposedly real (and therefore just) people. In so 
doing, however, the space of possibilities has narrowed.  
 As the aspirational paradigm conceives of people as essentially recalcitrant to the 
political establishment of representation, it calls for a disruptive and immediate politics 
that can suspend the motions of the everyday politics. This move may seem to be 
productive and even necessary especially when representative democracy largely remains 
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the fear of being touched—can be transformed into its opposite when they are placed 
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centralist, elitist, non-participatory, and managerial.252 Yet it comes with costs: the 
promotion of the mythical idea of the unmediated people, which would distract individual 
democratic citizens from the laborious democratic task of persuading other fellow 
citizens and shifting public opinion over time. 
 If reductionists in the end are likely to promote the highly individualist 
contemporary democratic culture by refraining from taking popular actions, their 
aspirational counterparts, unwittingly or otherwise, fall under the opposite yet similar 
myopic narcissistic spell by taking unreservedly assertive actions immersing themselves 
in the movement of the claimed people. The chances become higher especially in the 
current circumstances with the advanced technological and cultural outlets for both 
individualist hedonistic withdrawal and the various kinds of self-gratifying instant 
activism.253 Whereas the hypersensitivity of the reductionist model toward the fear of the 
popular energy results in an allergic reaction to, and disengagement from, popular 
politics, the aspirational model rather makes the relationship between individual citizens 
and the people too much reflexive, instantaneous, and decisionistic rather than 
communicative, processual, and dialectic.  
 The sublime people attempts to harness the motivating power of the warranted 
fear both from the reductionist hypersensitivity and from the aspirationalist self-
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indulgence. In order to clarify my distinct position, it seems necessary to examine the 
recent rediscovery of the sublime with regard to its relevance for radical democratic 
politics, perhaps most profoundly exemplified by Jason Frank’s account of Burke and 
“the radical democratic sublime.”254 As I use the term sublime strictly in the Kantian 
sense and put much emphasis on what the sublime experience does to the democratic 
subject, such an analysis, albeit rather brief, seems indispensable.   
 Frank draws an important lesson from Burke that political authority is grounded 
in the affective bonds as much as it is held by the law and institutions. Although Burke’s 
conservative political philosophy was based on his praise of a natural aristocracy against 
an unruly democracy,255 both Burke and Frank share in common a critical view of the 
determined inattention of political rationalism to the aesthetic dimension. For both of 
them, the sublime, at the intersection of politics and aesthetics, functions as an affective 
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device for legitimizing political authority. Certainly, Burke famously assigned the 
sublime eventually to “a story of continuity—a myth of traditional British Constitution 
dating back to Magna Carta[.]” Yet Frank is correct to point out that it is also true that 
revolutionary spectacles—in other words, “that which rupture[s] the continuity of 
experience and tradition”256 that Burke so harshly criticized in his antirevolutionary 
writings257—contain the chief qualities of what Burke’s own earlier aesthetics attributes 
to the sublime: “novelty” and “astonishment.” Burke shied away from democracy 
precisely because he understood the way in which “the people’s authority … might rely 
upon a pervasive sense of its own sublimity[.]”258 Frank, after carefully documenting the 
evolution of Burke’s aesthetics of the sublime, formulates “the radical democratic 
sublime” as an affective and aesthetic foundation for the making of a radical democracy 
by locating the sublimity in the grandeur and spectacles emanating from the rupture as a 
new democratic beginning. 
 Frank attributes the radical democratic sublimity to the “polyvocality” of the 
people. Like Walt Whitman, he associates “popular voice with the sublime” and discerns 
“this sublimity as an aesthetic resource of democratic regeneration.”259 His vision of 
“aesthetic democracy” firmly resists the dominant tendency of treating democratic life 
only as statistically recognizable and completely subordinated to the institutional process 
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of representation. Relying upon Whitman’s account of the “autopoetic” people, Frank 
highlights the sublime potentialities of “force and power of immediacy,” which prove to 
be the only antidote to “the complicity of compromise, institutional mediation, and 
political deliberation.”260 The people so understood are multitudinous and spontaneous, 
and always in the process of becoming, while “remaining forever a people that is not … 
yet.”261 This aestheticization of the people as an unmediated power seems to be an 
antidote to the reductionism that I mentioned earlier, or to what Whitman called “the 
growing excess and arrogance of realism,”262 pervading the democratic theories and 
practices, then and now. However, Frank’s celebration of the Whitmanian people as well 
as his left Burkean account of the sublimity of popular spectacles displays a problem that 
is similar to what I pointed out earlier as the major shortcoming of the aspirational 
paradigm. 
 The problem is not that he is replicating one of the popular strategies of resistance 
by flaunting the “vulgar” and “promiscuous” people and re-appropriating the pejorative 
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for the radical position he intends to defend.263 The real problem comes from his attempt 
to embrace the poetic overcoming of the representational limitation. Certainly, Frank 
understands that Whitman emphasizes the necessity of poetic mediation that can 
crystallize popular voices.264 But the people so created are still thought to hold the power 
of immediacy, diametrically contrasted with the power created through the conventional 
representative mechanism. That said, Frank seems to simplify the difficult situation in 
which democratic citizens are placed, the situation he himself has earlier pointed out as a 
dilemma that “the people have been at once enacted through representation … and in 
excess of any particular representation.”265 But if we attend to this dilemma by assigning 
the sublimity to the presence of the unmediated people whose “autopoetic” power can 
express itself directly to individuals “without mediation, without conditions, without 
distance,”266 we may end up evading the very dilemma by opening the door (perhaps 
unintentionally) for a more utopian conception of the immediacy of the people.267   
 How Frank constructs his version of aesthetic democracy by using the notion of 
																																																													
263 Frank pays careful attention to why and how Whitman actively embraced the 
vulgar characteristics of the people instead of establishing a vision of the detached 
lawgiver-like poet. The problem of reviving and reinforcing the anti-democratic 
frame, which is inherent to some of the radical democratic theories, see Sterling, 
“Irregular Motions: Democracy and the Mob.” 
264 On this point, I would like to thank Jason Frank for his comments on the earlier 
version of this chapter. 
265 Frank, Constituent Moments, 3. 
266 Frank, Constituent Moments, 198. 
267 Pierre Rosanvallon once accused the yearning for the immediate presentation of 
the people of its tendency toward  “l’impolitique, the unpolitical, by which [he 
means] a failure to develop a comprehensive understanding of problems associated 
with the organization of a shared world.” Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of 




sublime also merits critical assessment. His focus is almost exclusively placed on the 
awe-generating characteristic of the sublime object. For example, popular uprisings can 
be understood as sublime because of its massive scale and disruptive, and therefore, 
astounding spectacles. Therefore, Frank’s theory of “the radical democratic sublime,” 
while aiming at upending the conventional but debilitated institutional representative 
democracy, boosts the aspirational communion with the claimed people. In so doing, 
however, his radical resistance to the reductionist ideology can fall prey to being 
appropriated as a further development of the dichotomy that the very ideology is based 
on. He cares not so much about what the sublime experience does to the subject as what 
constitutes the sublime object. Frank’s radical democratic sublime, in this particular 
sense, calms rather than expands and incites our democratic imaginations. 
 What my rendition of the Kantian sublime people demands is a restoration of the 
distanced stance. I claim that we need to underline the necessity of representation 
implicated in the idea of the people or popular sovereignty and its inevitably incomplete 
and infinite nature more carefully. We tend to think that writing, far from speech,268 is 
only a secondary device for expressing what we already think and will, but it is often 
writing process itself that gives birth to our thoughts. We exchange different things, 
believing that they must share exactly the same values, but in fact it is our act of 
exchange itself that creates such values. Likewise, contrary to the belief that 
representation is a means to translate—or mistranslate—the pre-existing will of the 
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utterance of an internal will, a will otherwise unknown.” Anne Norton, Republic of 
Signs: Liberal Theory and American Popular Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago 




people, it is in fact the representational structure itself that gives rise to the democratic 
people. To understand that representation is necessary and it ends necessarily in failure 
requires us to abandon the misleading idea that the people somehow exist prior to and 
beyond the representative scheme of politics.269 
 Certainly, this is hardly a new idea. From Hobbes to Claude Lefort and Edmund 
Morgan, a number of political thinkers and historians have pointed out the problem in a 
wide variety of ways. Lefort famously states that in democracy, the “locus of power is an 
empty place.”270 It resonates with Morgan’s rather blunt historical account. Morgan notes 
that unlike a monarch who is “a visual presence,” the people “are never visible as 
such.”271 Thus, “[b]efore we ascribe sovereignty to the people, we have to imagine that 
there is such a thing[.]”272 In other words, “the people do not exist except through 
approximate successive representations of itself.”273 That is why democracy has to 
“[involve] the symbolic creation of an artificial body of the people.”274  
 Again, it may sound odd because representation simply signifies “a making 
present again,”275 which presupposes the existence of something that is being represented. 
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But, as Hobbes explained quite clearly, representation can be formative. The represented 
is preceded by representation. In the sixteenth chapter of Leviathan, he states that “A 
Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, 
Represented[.]” And it is “the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, 
that maketh the Person One.”276 As far as our purpose is concerned, what is important 
here is not so much to about his notion of unity as about the fact that “the representation 
involved here is not so much mimetic, but actively imaginative as in drama and 
liturgy[.]”277  
 The sublime people directs our attention precisely to this imaginative element of 
representation. Every claim to the people—reductionist and aspirational, institutional and 
extra-institutional, legal-procedural and poetic—is an act of imaginative representation, 
which is attended by the experience of “the subject’s own incapacity” to fully make 
present of the people.278 What that means is that when the individual citizen conjure up, 
encounter with, or participate in, the democratic people, there comes an opportunity of an 
aesthetic experience in which she see that the people are not entirely sensible, surpassing 
the limit of her imagination and conventional thoughts. It betrays that her ready-made 
picture of the people is utterly inadequate, coming to a realization that how incapable she 
is of representing the people as a whole. It is the failure of her imagination and 
comprehension.  
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 What is represented in the failure of imagination vis-à-vis what is absolutely 
great, as we learned from Kant, is their limitlessness. This failure—the failure of 
presentation [Dastellung]—is due to the limitlessness [Unbegrenzheit] of the people. 
Here comes, first, “a feeling of displeasure from the inadequacy of the imagination,” 
alongside “a pleasure … from the correspondence of this very judgment of the 
inadequacy[.]” This twofold aesthetic experience of the limit and the limitlessness 
eventually engenders “an emotionally moving satisfaction.”279 This is a uniquely sublime 
experience to which the people can provoke. To be precise, this is what the sublime 
experience does to the individual citizen. 
 My theory of the sublime people permits a careful review of a vibration, “a 
vibration … a rapidly alternating repulsion from and attraction to” the democratic 
people.280 It calls for a drawing up a more accurate balance sheet of fear and delight. 
Unlike the two leading perspectives that encounter with the people either with fear or 
with excitement, but not in both ways, the sublime people proposes a reading that makes 
use of both sensibilities or attitudes and gives the democratic people its due while 
acknowledging the challenges it gives rise to. Insofar as the limitless magnitude and 
power of the people are concerned, the fear of the people can be well warranted. It cannot 
be dismissed outright simply as ideological manipulation. The boundless, abysmal, and 
unsettling nature of the people may incur authentic fear and anxiety, fear of uncertainty 
and anxiety about self-loss. On the other hand, the valorization of the people, which let 
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the potentials of the people outrun the known limitations, inspires jovial feelings and 
restlessness. The theory of sublime people immunizes individual democrats against 
fantasies that the people can appear as overcoming of the representational limit. Such an 
endeavor runs a risk of falling, metaphorically, into “visionary rapture” [Schwärmerei], 
that is, “a delusion of being able to see something beyond all bounds of sensibility.”281  
 Whereas the reductionist paradigm intends to dispel the fear and direct the anxiety 
to cease by devitalizing the people, the aspirational paradigm focuses attention on 
amplifying self-indulgence in bringing transformative popular energies into existence. 
Yet what they fail to see, and, thus, fail to make use of, is the genuine pleasure of the 
sublime, which originates not from attending the event of the sublime per se, but from 
uplifting oneself through actively coming to terms with the partly unpleasant or difficult 
experience of the sublime. It is a salutary pleasure in proving one’s capacity via 
recognizing and overcoming one’s own limit. The sublime experience of the democratic 
people is important not because what the people are often claimed to be but because what 
the claim of the people causes to be done. 
 This point leads us back to the Kantian subreption. It is not the case that the 
people as an object deserve the full credit of sublimity. The sublime people, in the end, 
serve as an important medium, which stimulates and elevates the capacity of each 
individual citizen who is expected to gain prominence over the sublime object through 
the mechanism of subreption we discussed earlier.282 Crosscutting the dichotomous 
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conventional logic of democratic politics—holding the rather romantic283 idea that they 
can neither fully celebrate nor do without the people, by which they are at once attracted 
and burdened—those individual democratic citizens can make the people known in their 
absence and make representation visible in its negation.284 When the people become 
invisible at the usual site of representation, they should see this vanishing as at once their 
abiding. On the other hand, when they feel as though the people were appearing without 
mediation, they should be able to restore a distanced stance so that they can see the 
imaginative representation properly.  
 In other words, the sublime people calls upon the democratic subject to confront 
the people communicatively rather than enter completely into communion with it. What is 
suggested is to participate in the collective while using it as promoting her own 
singularities simultaneously. What the sublime people, therefore, proposes is a vibrant 
democratic politics, where individual democratic citizens are allowed and encouraged to 
keep invoking and engaging with the democratic people as an indispensable inspiring 
idea and real force while holding up against the tendency of endangering themselves to 
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lapse into uncritical passivity and the idolatry of the claimed people.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Many advanced democratic societies, the United States as well as others, have been 
increasingly egalitarian on the one hand, but still stubbornly hierarchical on the other. 
Ordinary citizens have been markedly alienated from politics, but at once enjoying the 
growing number of chances for overly assertive activism. One would think that the idea 
of the people seems to fade into oblivion, but it is still widely circulated and invigorated. 
It often remains reflex and not thoroughly reflected.  
 One of the most important conclusions to be extrapolated from this chapter is that 
both the reductionist alienation of the people and the aspirational celebration of the 
people fail to attend to an affective foundation suitable for a critical and resilient 
democratic citizenship. Motivated by uneasiness with the contemporary democratic 
theory that the people are often either unduly abstracted or unwarrantedly celebrated, I 
aimed to establish a middle term, or a different perspective, which is excluded and 
distinct from the two extreme camps outlined above, seeking to construct the people as an 
object of sublime, especially of a Kantian kind. 
  The framework of Kantian sublime that I have developed affirms, amplifies, and 
cultivates the popular energy necessary for a lively democratic politics while at once 
avoiding any hint of the mirage of the immediacy of the people. This leads us to further 




democratic imagination to shape and alter political structures, programs and agendas, 
opening up different levels of horizons that have been often ignored or simplified by the 
dichotomous understanding of democracy and the democratic people. Without it, I 
contend, democratic politics would easily become distorted, either squashed into its 
torpid minimum or swallowed up by intemperate and uncritical assertiveness, populist or 






















CHAPTER 4: The Temporal 
 
The Time of Frustration: 
Suffering, Convalescence, and Growth 
 
 






Real change is best understood by staying in one place. 
When I travel, I see differences rather than change.  
I resent traveling south in early spring in case I am away from home  
when I see my first tree coming into leaf.  







Previously, I have paid special attention to the two distinct dimensions of democracy—
communicative and symbolic—where the democratic subject takes the modality of 
citizen-partisan and citizen-sovereign, respectively. These distinctions are intended to 
emphasize that the distinct webs of relations are woven into the democratic world that 
citizens inhabit. Individual citizens qua citizens find themselves thrown in those webs of 
relations.  
 To be democratic citizens, as this study claims, means to enter into those 
relations. I have noted that there exist particularly frustrating problems concerning each 
of those dimensions of democracy. On the one hand, individual citizens form and 
perform their democratic agency in relation to other fellow citizens. The particular 
frustration attributed to this communicative dimension of democratic politics originates 
from two distinct conflicting pressures that individual citizens can hardly dispense with. 
First, they are thought to treat one another based on the principle of mutual respect. 
Second, they are striving for superiority as they come to interact with those whose 
opinions and views are dissimilar and even hostile to theirs within the context of partisan 
competition.  
 I argue that it would be futile to solve this problem by simply repressing the urge 
for superiority while making moralist pleas for mutual respect, civility, and tolerance 
precisely because it is not realistic—given ontological antagonism, epistemological one-




entirely desirable as such an endeavor, even if it does become realized, would discourage 
democratic citizens from actively engaging in a series of conversations and contestations. 
Certainly, it is not desirable just to wink at if not promote the sense of superiority because 
it would result in nurturing mutual impudence, hatred, and aggression. 
 On the other hand, individual democratic citizens exercise their democratic 
agency in relation to the people. This concerns the symbolic dimension of democracy, 
where citizens adhere to, interpret, and enact the principle of popular sovereignty. The 
peculiar frustration with which these citizen-sovereigns are confronted proceeds from the 
indefinite nature of the people as well as the simultaneous presence of two distinct 
traditions that understand and define the people in quite different ways.  
 The first tradition, which I called the reductionist paradigm, understands the awe-
generating constituent power of the people, but reduces the role of the people to a 
minimum abstraction as the legitimate foundation of the basic authority of democracy. It 
does so precisely in defiance of any attempts to support the release of the popular energy 
in the name of the people. The second tradition, which I called the aspirational paradigm, 
regards the people not as an abstracted symbol, but as commoners whose voices and 
interests often remain unheard and marginalized by the liberal representative scheme of 
democratic politics. Individual democratic citizens are exposed to these mutually 
conflicting significations with respect to the people, which arouse and promote the fear of 
the people, on the one had, and the delight or collective effervescence of popular power, 
on the other. Both tendencies can go unduly and extreme so far as to fall into either 




 My study for both problems aims to understand the democratic experience of 
individual citizens in relation to other fellow citizens and to the people, proffer a novel 
perspective from which to better attend to each of the frustrating situations, and finally 
show how a more persevering democratic citizenship can take shape. For the problem of 
the democratic subject as citizen-partisan, I propose the theory of magnanimity, arguing, 
based primarily on my reading of Aristotle, that we need to promote the sense of 
magnanimity as a non-destructive form of superiority, which can satisfy the citizen’s urge 
for superiority for the sake of keeping motivation alive while at once foreclosing any 
possibility of incendiary mutual hatred and aggression. Apropos of the democratic subject 
as citizen-sovereign, I provide the theory of the sublime people by drawing largely on 
Kant’s aesthetic. I demonstrate that by attending more closely to the limitlessness of the 
people, we can better understand the fear and delight or anxiety and excitement that 
individual democratic citizens may genuinely feel when they invoke, encounter, and 
engage with the claimed people. My theory encourages individual citizens to participate 
in the liminal experience of the sublime people without confusing any rigidly held 
construct of the pseudo-people with the immediate presence of the people. The 
experience of sublime could allow individual democratic citizens to see themselves 
elevated through recognizing and overcoming the limits of their own imagination, 
thereby paving the way for the ongoing regeneration of the people.  
 My views of citizen-partisan and citizen-sovereign tacitly suggest the third mode 
of democratic subjectivity or agency, which I call citizen-becoming. Both magnanimity 




Certainly, these are not moralist prescriptions recommended to impose on democratic 
citizens. For my theories of magnanimity and sublimity are expected to steer citizens 
down the path by tapping their moral-psychological satisfactions and aesthetic pleasures. 
Yet my project, still, assumes that it is preferable and worthwhile for citizens to actively 
participate in a series of vital and pressing democratic activities in the communicative 
and symbolic dimensions of democratic politics on the condition that they sustain and 
further develop their capacities and motivation so as to secure maximum openness to the 
future engagement. Both magnanimity and sublimity require some temporal space to 
grow, which in fact presumes a particular understanding of democratic time and 
temporality. Now, I would like to turn the question of time and frustration.  
   
DEMOCRATIC TIME BIFURCATED 
Time is notoriously difficult to investigate. It is so shadowy, elusive, and unfathomable a 
concept, which often escapes simple articulation.285 First, time seems to be a prerequisite 
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what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to 
explain, I am baffled.” See his Confession (New York: Penguin, 1961), 264. Similarly, 
Thomas Mann’s Hans Castorp ponders upon the similar question: “What is time? A 
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for our own existence, something we cannot not assume a priori.286 Yet the category of 
time itself is a social product as well, which bears particular social and political 
determinations.287 Time, in this manner, is a structure discernible only within a particular 
socio-political framework of temporality.  
 For instance, Emile Durkheim highlights the social origin of time-consciousness 
by pointing out that “‘[t]he division into days, weeks, months, years, etc., corresponds to 
the recurrence of rites, festivals, and public ceremonies at regular intervals.”288 Time is 
objective, public, and orderly, defining the rhythms and regularity of our existence. We 
can hardly express our temporal existence without objective signs and methods whose 
bases are undoubtedly social and collective. The best graphic illustration of the 
connection between the temporal and the social (and the political) is perhaps Joseph 
Conrad’s description of anarchist resistance in his novel The Secret Agent. Mr. Verloc, 
the anarchist hero, takes a mission to explode the Greenwich Observatory. To blow up 
the symbol of centralized time is deemed to make the centralized political power 
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example. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
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Timing History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 101-
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Press. 1995), 10. Charles M. Sherover also states that: “our questions about time 
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temporal development, the historic development of the culture that has nurtured us.” 
Sherover, “The Concept of Time in Western Thought,” in Gregory R. Johnson ed., Are 
We In Time? And Other Essays on Time and Temporality (Evanston: Northwestern 





 On the other hand, however, time is deeply internalized and personalized, whose 
essence can only be grasped subjectively. As Saint Augustine aptly pointed out, time is in 
us as much as we are in time. Plenty of notable philosophers and writers, especially from 
the end of the nineteenth century onward, have drawn much attention to this authentic 
experience of felt-time. These are a group of people who embodied the kind of 
disorienting yet romantic atmosphere of fin-de-siècle evidenced by their resistance to the 
sweeping rationalization, bureaucratization, and acceleration in rates of production, 
transportation, and communication of the time. Perhaps it was the growing predominance 
of objectivity, as Georg Simmel once put, that triggered the fascination of them with the 
opposite.290 
 Examples abound across different genres. Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology 
began with a rediscovery of the inner awareness of time. Henri-Louis Bergson redefined 
the notion of duration [la durée] as an authentic, unquantifiable, and non-spatial 
conception of time with which we better understand our experience of true freedom. 
Marcel Proust displayed the enchanting and captivating experience of “a fragment of time 
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“The Metropolis and Mental Life,” ed. Donald N. Levine, Georg Simmel: On 





in the pure state” [un peu de temps à l’état pur], and Walter Benjamin, who was deeply 
inspired by Proust, also laid stress on the revealing moment of awakening [das 
Erwachen].291 These examples show the mounting interests of the writers in grappling 
with the temporal experience of inmost authenticity. By illuminating and attending to the 
field of subjective felt-time, these thinkers sought out a kind of deliverance from the 
relentless course of objective and mechanical time. 
 When it comes to democratic time, people tend to adopt the dichotomous pattern 
of time. But, here, the layers of bifurcation have been multiplied: objective and 
subjective, apathetic and intense, stretched out and short-lived, and ordinary and extra-
ordinary. 
 For example, Max Weber once stated that “[we] are all ‘occasional’ politicians 
[Gelegenheitspolitiker].”292 In the context of modern democracy, according to Weber, 
ordinary people may act politically, but they do so only sporadically. The extent of their 
involvement in politics seems markedly insignificant and its time span is fairly short. The 
implication is twofold. First, the everyday phenomenon that can best characterize the 
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political life of ordinary citizens in modern democracy is rather passive acquiescence 
than active participation. Second, however rare and episodic, there still comes some 
occasion so impassioned and political that the inactive daily routine can be temporarily 
suspended. Weber’s own proposal of leadership democracy [Führerdemokratie] 
highlights the need to undercut the tyranny of bureaucracy—manifested in the famous 
image of “iron cage” or “a shell as hard as steel [stahlhartes Gehäuse], to be more 
precise”293—while emphasizing an opportune time [kairos] of interruption in which the 
charismatic leader emerges in tandem with and by virtue of democratic plebiscitary 
participation.294 
 The similar contrast between ordinary and extraordinary time is pronounced in the 
political thought of Hannah Arendt as well. Although Arendt’s first and foremost 
contribution to contemporary political theory centers on her denunciation of the 
Weberian paradigm of political rule and power as Herrschaft,295 she nonetheless helps 
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294 Certainly, Weber was skeptical of the idea of popular sovereignty or democracy 
understood in an idealistic fashion. But, as Tamsin Shaw rightly points out, he would 
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charismatic leader.” Tamsin Shaw, “Max Weber on Democracy: Can the People Have 
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perpetuate, as it were, the binary of ordinary non-political and extraordinary political 
time. Arendt famously distinguishes political action from labor and work. Labor displays 
the temporality of sheer repetition that corresponds to the cyclical rhythm of life itself 
while work is a forward-looking project defined and determined by the linear progression 
of artificial human time. The temporalities of both activities amount to the time of the 
everyday. On the other hand, action is deemed to be rare, fleeting, and extraordinary. 
Insofar as action—the political activity par excellence—bears the qualities of true 
novelty and unusual theatricality that disturb the dominance of the regular progression of 
time, the temporality of action can be judged as truly extraordinary.296 With her 
distinctive treatment of action, therefore, Arendt, not unlike Weber, accepts and 
reinforces the divided time-consciousness. 
 Contemporary democratic theorists seem to overemphasize relatively short-lived 
moments of higher register in one way or another. Some theorists interpret those 
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(Herrscher) and its subjects. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1958). See also Patchen Markell, “The Rule of the 
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allegedly authentic democratic moments as reinvigorating the monotonous institutional 
democracy, while others take those instants to be even more radical so as to fuel a more 
fundamentally transformative or oppositional politics. Margaret Canovan, for example, 
understands that democracy has both procedural and redemptive sides, which are 
conflicting but at once mutually complementing each other. Her complementary or 
reconciliatory thesis suggests that constant misrepresentation and failure of procedural 
democracy should be regarded as creating a fertile ground for a redemptive democratic 
politics, which would challenge but ultimately help keep animating the machinery of 
democracy.297  
 Sheldon Wolin also lays stress on two configurations of democracy. In democratic 
theory and practice, there are “two diametrically opposed notions that symbolize two 
equally opposed states of affairs.” “One is the settled structure of politics and 
governmental authority typically called a constitution, and the other is the unsettling 
political movement typically called revolution.” These two states of affairs are often 
taken to be mutually antithetical. For constitution is “the suppression of revolution” and 
revolution, “the destruction of constitution.” Albeit opposed, states Wolin, the two 
notions are connected by way of their respective relations to democracy. Hence 
democracy’s two configurations: constitutional democracy or “democracy housed within 
																																																													
297 Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of 
Democracy,” Political Studies, XLVII (1999), 9. Her distinction of the pragmatic 
(procedural) and the redemptive sides of democracy in fact comes from Michael 
Oakeshott’s earlier distinction between the politics of skepticism and the politics of 
faith. See Michael Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). For another informative account that supports 
Canovan’s point, see Benjamin Arditi, Politics on the Edges of Liberalism: Difference, 




a constitution” and “aconstitutional conception of democracy or democracy “as resistant 
to the rationalizing conception of power and its organization.”298  
 Apparent in Wolin’s analysis, again, is the tacit acceptance of the two 
diametrically opposed modes of democratic time. In other words, democracy is construed 
either as routine mechanical processes controlled and constrained by its constitutional 
and institutional forms or as rare and short-lived revolutionary movements energized by 
ordinary citizens’ spontaneous and intense actions. The greatness of democracy, 
according to Wolin, lies in its vitality, energies, and overflowing excesses. Only the 
latter, which is believed to suspend the normal progression of the everyday by creating 
momentary intervals of extraordinary egalitarian politics, can be called an authentic 
democracy. Here, Wolin, too, employs the dichotomous temporal frame by idealizing 
those fleeting yet exceptional moments of collective effervescence. Although Wolin’s 
proposal seems more dramatic and less associated with institutional practice than that of 
Canovan, they nevertheless all value the interruptive quality of those rare moments.  
 When it comes to democratic time, therefore, democratic theorists are prone to 
place much emphasis on relatively short-lived moments at which citizens find themselves 
acting as a ruling agent by expressing their wishes, desires, and opinions through various 
means of participation, electoral or otherwise. The rest of the ordinary time has hardly 
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Peter Euben, John R. Wallach, and Josiah Ober eds., Athenian Political Thought and 
the Reconstruction of American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 




been recognized as a democratic time.299 Put differently, it seems as though we simply 
assume that there are two dimensions or two axes of democratic engagement: pitch 
vertically and duration horizontally, if we use a musical analogy. Pitch concerns the 
intensity of engagement (high or low) while duration its elapsed time (short or long). 
According to conventional wisdom widely accepted in democratic theory and practice, an 
authentic democratic time is that which occupies only one quadrant reserved for high 
pitch and short duration—with reference to an overtly enthusiastic yet episodic time. 
This time of high intensity is sharply distinguished from and diametrically opposed to the 
low pitch and seemingly endless processes that embody languid ordinariness.300  
 The central question, therefore, is whether the life of democratic citizens can be 
fully captured and elaborated within this bifurcated temporal frame. This view of 
democratic time can go awry, but not because the differentiation between ordinary and 
extraordinary time in democracy cannot be discernible. To continue to use a musical 
analogy, there is an acoustical reason that we tend to focus more on (or hear more 
clearly) a melody that sits in the high range of texture. Likewise, it is understandable that 
																																																													
299 This statement might not do justice to a few theoretical attempts to ennobling the 
relatively under-appreciated ordinariness of democratic life. For example, Jeffrey 
Green’s ocular model of democracy is based on his attentive observation on “the 
citizen-being-ruled” in the everyday democracy. While investigating and singling out 
a particular mode of engagement as befits the normal capacity of ordinary citizens, 
however, Green still focuses on the possibility of a set of activities of higher register 
(certainly not in the form of voicing, but that of watching such as watching the 
televised debates between Presidential candidates) to be taking place in the ordinary 
time. See his The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010).  
300 My use of musical analogies in this chapter goes beyond this particular case of 
pitch and duration. More fundamentally, music is a temporal art revealing the fact 
that it might be impossible to conceive of a time without implying a certain mood. In 
this respect, music allows us to better understand the mood-bearing and feeling-




we pay more attention almost naturally to the exceptional events of higher register. 
Nonetheless, the bifurcated view of democratic time can still be problematic because this 
frame can constrain the ways in which democratic citizens understand their political 
agency temporally. First, it would push citizens to a false choice, a choice between 
retreating into the humdrum routine of ordinary time and taking part in extraordinary 
spectacular events as if the only way they can experience democratic time is by conjuring 
it up as a series of ordinary proceedings drained of élan vital save just a few ebullient but 
rare and short-lived events. These two modalities are mutually constitutive and 
intensifying: the former appears to be mostly abstract, trivial, and monotonous only in the 
light of the latter, and vice versa. Second, it naturalizes the pattern of thinking about and 
organizing democratic life in terms of disruption, intensity, and instantaneousness rather 
than continuity, duration, and growth. 
 What is missing in this picture? Quite ironically, it is time itself that is absent. 
Again, I do not mean to underestimate the value of short-term but largely ephemeral 
extraordinary forms of democratic participation and mobilization—electoral or popular. It 
is understandable that those moments of higher intensity draw much attention. Elections 
matter. Critical elections matter to a greater extent. Fugitive moments of democratic 
action are of great importance. My point, however, is that all of them matter especially 
when they serve to inspire future action and help strengthen the ongoing methodical work 
of politics. The problem is that the overemphasis on extraordinary moments tends to 





 The exception attracts quick attention and crisis calls for radical change. As its 
etymological root—krinein, or to decide—indicates, crisis designates a particular point-
time when a resolute decision should be made. What effect would this trend of 
highlighting momentary time have on ordinary individual citizens? At the moment of 
exception, time comes at us from ahead fast. It arouses the sense of urgency and 
promotes impatience. This situation itself may not be destructive. It could even be 
productive as it stimulates the urges for a far-reaching revolutionary reform that can 
extirpate the root of the problem. Yet it is also true that when the level of excitement is 
too high, people usually want to see a quick fix. They prefer an immediate 
improvement—which often comes as a merely temporary expedient carried out with less 
efforts or reflection—over a change that would take much more time and endeavors. 
																																																													
301 My point is that real change (good or bad) is almost always a partial change, 
which can be made even without the politics (and rhetoric) of crisis, and therefore 
we need to avoid to give too much emphasis on the exceptional or ecstatic quality of 
allegedly revolutionary politics. For example, three separate facts are worth noting. 
First, between 1965 and 1975, legislative gains of minority rights won by African 
Americans were extended to “a quite specific set of official ethnoracial minorities” in 
the “absence of both political mobilization from below and political debate from 
above.” Second, Reagan’s Tax Reform of 1986, “the most comprehensive tax reform 
legislation in modern American history,” was not an issue of campaign before and 
after the compromise was made. Third, at least in the United States, “incremental 
development of statutes, administrative interpretation, and political embedment” are 
no less important as some constitutional change in terms of governing and shaping 
the political life of ordinary citizens. See John D. Skrentny, The Minority Rights 
Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), Amy Gutmann and Denis 
Thompson, The Spirit of Compromise: Why Governing Demands It and Campaigning 
Undermines It (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), and William N. Eskridge 
Jr. and John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution (New 




When the initial excitement passes, people become more careless302 about a 
concatenation of non-sensational issues. In other words, democratic citizens, who do not 
necessarily think and act in strategic terms, often let themselves oscillate between 
impetuousness and carelessness. These are two different forms of inattentiveness, 
carrying with them too much excitement and boredom, respectively. Torn within the 
dichotomous temporal consciousnesses, citizens are excessively nervous and restless 
when they refuse to retreat into nonchalance, while being unable to allow themselves a 
time to fully experience what is really going on. Time shrinks in the former and it 
disappears into sheer mechanical movement in the latter. 
 
NIETZSCHE AND DEMOCRATIC TIME 
What needs to be restored is an alternative view of democratic time with which to 
conceptualize a temporal space suitable for ordinary but impassioned experience and a 
call for an art of staying in such a temporal space. This is a time that is intensely felt yet 
not compressed, passionate yet rather slow, and carefully attended yet not necessarily 
expressive. It is a time we can call a journey or project, highlighting its diuturnity and 
invitation to undertaking. This particularly arduous and prolonged dimension of 
democratic time is where the citizen can exist as citizen-becoming.  
 Citizen-becoming is a mode of democratic subjectivity distinguishable from the 
other two categories I used previously, citizen-partisan and citizen-sovereign. The most 
																																																													
302 We might use a Heideggerian term, Lässigkeit, which is related to 




remarkable difference is that there is no real or symbolic counterpart with or against 
which the subjectivity of citizen-becoming takes shape. It is obvious that citizen-partisan 
and citizen-sovereign are expressive of democratic agency. Their performance as a doer 
is clearly implicated. Yet citizen-becoming concerns the longing and realization of one’s 
autonomy over time, which entails the questions of self-transformation, self-growth, and 
self-overcoming.  
 In fact, the actor, as Arendt once pointed out, “is never merely a ‘doer’ but always 
and at the same time a sufferer.”303 The democratic subject, just as the word subject 
originally meant, is essentially that which suffers, or is subjected. The democratic subject 
as citizen-becoming suffers that which is beyond her control—her own desires, others, 
and democracy itself. The open-ended texture of democracy shows its particular bias for 
change, which enables and prompts individual citizens to have a penchant for hope.304 
The things individual citizens have most hoped for, however, often do not happen. Even 
if their hopes do become realized, they usually do not in the way nor at the time that 
would have been considered ideal. Their desires are almost destined to be 
																																																													
303 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1997), 190. 
304 Notice that Athenian citizens are characterized as confident and sanguine by 
Thucydides’s Corinthians. Thucidydes, The Peloponnesian War, Book I, Section 70. 
Barack Obama’s campaign rhetoric epitomizes the democratic culture of hope: “Hope 
is the bedrock of this nation. The belief that our destiny will not be written for us, but 
by us, by all those men and women who are not content to settle for the world as it 
is, who have the courage to remake the world as it should be.” Barack Obama’s Iowa 
Caucus Speech, January 3rd, 2008 [Electronic Source: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/03/us/politics/03obama-transcript.html]. For a 
more extensive study of hope in political theory, see Loren Goldman, “The Sources of 





“asymptotic.”305 Democracy’s intimation of its proclivities toward change, combined 
with the deferrals of the desires that citizens ordinarily experience, constitutes a particular 
discomfiture with respect to time. Moreover, as Stanley Cavell discusses in his seminal 
account of Ralph Waldo Emerson, “the democratic demand for consent” presumes “the 
training and character and friendship Emerson requires for democracy as preparation to 
withstand not its rigors but its failures, character to keep the democratic hope alive in the 
face of disappointment with it.” Cavell sees clearly the predicament that “we will be 
disappointed in democracy,” and that “the human individual meant to be created and 
preserved in democracy is apt to be undone by it.”306  
 The democratic subject thus is the one who endures frustration and resistance. She 
can take the initiative in renewing or rebuilding the situation, but only through self-
transformation via attending to the time of frustration. Otherwise she would only be 
equipped with basic reflexes, blindly following the recurring pattern of extraordinary and 
ordinary time. The secured temporal space allows the citizen to involve the longitudinal 
engagement in those difficulties. The time of citizen-becoming, therefore, is a time of 
suffering, convalescence, and growth. This engagement brings a heightened perception of 
democratic reality, often overlooked by the clamor of the subject as a doer visible in the 
short-lived moments. In order to develop my theory of time as a journey, I turn to 
																																																													
305 Frederick M. Dolan and Thomas L. Dumm, “Introduction to Part Two: American 
Alterities,” Frederick M. Dolan and Thomas L. Dumm eds., Rhetorical Republic: 
Governing Representations in American Politics (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1993), 121. 
306 Stanley Cavell, “Aversive Thinking: Emersonian Representations in Heidegger and 
Nietzsche,” Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian 




Friedrich Nietzsche.  
 Much has been written about Nietzsche.307  As far as Nietzsche’s political theory 
is concerned, there are two predominating approaches.308 On the one hand, the recent 
decades have witnessed a surprising turn in Nietzsche scholarship with regard to his 
																																																													
307 Nietzsche did not write any systematic political treatise, anything close to Plato’s 
Republic, Hobbes’s Leviathan, or Rousseau’s Social Contract. “[T]he most profound 
level of Nietzsche’s political thought,” as Tracy Strong once mentioned, “cannot then 
be concerned with the erection of systems in the manner of classical political theory.” 
Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration (Berkeley: 
University of California, 1988), 188-189. Although he might not be the keenest 
political mind of his time, his elusive yet extremely rich writings have had irresistible 
influence on a number of political theorists generation after generation.There was a 
time when Nietzsche was long accused of the fascist dispositions allegedly 
widespread in his work, due mostly to Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, his sister, who 
infamously abused and misused his manuscripts, fostering the assimilation of her 
brother’s philosophy to the right-extremist political cause. Elizabeth married 
Bernhard Förster, a fanatical anti-Semitic agitator, and the couple once moved to 
Paraguay to create a pure Teutonic colony. Their ambitious enterprise soon failed 
and Bernhard Förster committed suicide in 1889. Elizabeth stayed longer in Paraguay 
and returned in 1893. By the time Elizabeth came back, Nietzsche had been living as 
an invalid in the throes of insanity since his mental collapse in 1889. When their 
mother died in 1897, Nietzsche and his literary estate now came to be in the 
complete control of Elizabeth. She founded the Nietzsche-Archiv in Weimar and used 
her brother’s growing fame for the sake of her own interests. Many scholars for a 
long time often began a study on Nietzsche’s political thought with “a prolonged 
disavowal of his responsibility for fascism.” Joshua Foa Dienstag, “Nietzsche’s Friends 
and Enemies,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 2 (2000). That convention, 
however, seems to have died out. Walter Kaufmann’s landmark study on Nietzsche 
helped rescue him from the charge of fascism, and thereby making him much less 
hostile to the mainstream of liberal democracy. Alexander Nehamas and others also 
contributed to the proliferation of the now well-accepted cultural reading of 
Nietzsche, which has been often taken as a handy pretext for silencing Nietzsche’s 
particular assaults on modern political achievements. See Walter Kaufmann, 
Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1974) and Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985). 
308 Of course, there are some scholars who do not regard Nietzsche as “political 
thinker.” See Martha Nussbaum, “Is Nietzsche a Political Thinker?” International 




contribution to and role for “an invigoration of democratic theory.”309 Despite the fact 
that Nietzsche was an unapologetic elitist who never flinched from his abhorrence of 
modern democracy throughout his entire career, a number of democratic theorists have 
nonetheless sought democratic possibilities in Nietzsche’s allegedly non- or anti-
democratic writings.  
 Those commentators tend to read Nietzsche in favor of agonistic struggle geared 
toward an ongoing pluralistic contestation against every attempt at conclusive closure. 
Nietzsche’s acerbic and consistent criticisms of the Enlightenment philosophy, dogmatic 
religion, morality, rationalism, and utilitarianism serve as important theoretical sources 
for their agonistic vision of democratic politics.310 One scholar suggests that we view 
Nietzsche’s idea of Übermensch as an inspiring ideal type, claiming that “[every] 
																																																													
309 Mario Feit, Democratic Anxieties: Same-Sex Marriage, Death, and Citizenship 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), 126. 
310 William Connolly has championed this agonistic reading of Nietzsche. See his 
Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002), Pluralism (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2005), and “Nietzsche, Democracy, Time,” in Herman W. Siemens and Vasti Roodt 
eds., Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche’s Legacy for Political 
Thought (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008) [The almost identical versions of the 
last piece are also included in his Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) and in Jason Frank and John 
Tambornino eds., Vocations of Political Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2000)]. See also Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of 
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), Dana Villa, Socratic Citizenship 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), Lawrence Hatab, A Nietzschean 
Defense of Democracy: An Experiment in Postmodern Politics (Chicago: Open Court, 
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individual should emulate this figure as an illustration of what one can become if only 
one were to engage oneself in the way of creation.”311 
 Amid this growing trend of democratic rendition of Nietzsche, on the other hand, 
we have heard some voices to the contrary as well. Frederick Appel and other scholars 
have reasserted the undeniably aristocratic political posture in Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
They take those democratic theorists to task for the selective reading of Nietzsche. They 
claim that Nietzsche’s elitist and authoritarian stance should be thoroughly understood, 
and if we do, it is hard to interpret his political theory as promoting democratic openness 
and difference.312   
 Although I, too, seek democratic possibilities in Nietzsche, my goal here remains 
local and therefore modest. I aim to offer a close reading of a number of passages for the 
purpose of conceptualizing the way that citizens can cultivate a novel view of democratic 
time. Nietzsche’s sensitivity toward time—both tempo and temporality —helps us form a 
revision that would demand the correction of many of the stereotypes of bifurcated time 
pointed out earlier. His view of time is intimately intertwined with his understanding of, 
																																																													
311 Christine Daigle, “Nietzsche: Virtue Ethics … Virtue Politics?” The Journal of 
Nietzsche Studies, Iss. 32 (2006), 8. 
312 Fredrick Appel, Nietzsche Contra Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1999). Other extensive studies of the aristocratic nature of Nietzsche’s philosophy 
and politics include Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic 
Radicalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) and Luc Ferry and Alain 
Renaut eds., Why We Are Not Nietzscheans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1997). Recently, Corey Robin also well recaptures the aristocratic agon that 
Nietzsche intended to revivify in the modern context by revealing interesting 
selective affinities between his ideas and those of the advocates of the Austrian 
school of economics such as Friedrich Hayek. See Robin, “Nietzsche’s Marginal 
Children: On Friedrich Hayek,” The Nation, May 27, 2013. See also Peter Berkowitz, 




or attitude toward, suffering. We can perhaps even say that his ideas of becoming and 
self-overcoming are ultimately about how to stay with and make most use of the negative.  
 Let me begin with proposing a critical assessment of one particular interpretation 
of Nietzsche. The prime example, especially as long as our purpose is concerned, is 
William Connolly’s democratic reading of Nietzsche. Connolly stands out as strongest 
among others in that he uses Nietzsche’s notion of time as a means to build his own 
theory of democratic time as a rift. Since my main concern is not with investigating 
whether or to what extent Connolly is (or whoever else can be) Nietzsche’s most 
legitimate commentator,313 my disagreement with Connolly is nothing to do with the fact 
that he has formulated a position that Nietzsche would never defend. There is no 
ambiguity about his departure from Nietzsche.314 Like Connolly, I also aim to interpret 
Nietzsche as my guiding company in thinking about particular questions such as 
democratic time, without necessarily endorsing his overall positions. Yet the lesson I 
																																																													
313 Nietzsche once said in The Antichrist that “some men are born posthumously.” He 
himself certainly enjoyed a renaissance posthumously in the postwar western world 
in the latter half of the past century. Ever since then, his powerful and elusive ideas 
have appealed to a wide spectrum of political opinions, from staunch Strassians such 
as Werner Dannhauser and Allan Bloom to leftist democrats, namely, Bonnie Honig 
and Connolly himself. Tracy Strong sees Nietzsche’s principled resistance to “a 
master and mastering narrative” or “once-and-for-all-ness” as a warning for any 
definitive appropriation of his political theory. 
314 Connolly once stated that “There are plenty of ways I dissent from Nietzsche: his 
cultural aristocratism, which prizes becoming and plurality among a “noble” (though 
not necessarily moneyed) few while condemning “the herd” to a cultural dogmatism 
it is said to be predisposed toward; his (sometimes appealing) fantasy of residing on 
the margin of society beyond the reach of organized politics; his tendency (following 
from the first two themes) to neglect the politics of becoming in favor of cultivating 
individual distinctiveness; his profound ambivalence toward the basis and effects of 
gender duality; his periodic delight in petty cruelty against carriers of ressentiment; 
his occasional expressions of regret that people are no longer prepared to be 
“stones” in a cultural edifice; and so on.” William E. Connolly, Why I Am Not a 




draw from Nietzsche is quite different from that of Connolly. 
 Reading Nietzsche for his version of radical democracy, Connolly provides an 
interesting twofold claim, especially with regard to the question of time. First, not only 
did Nietzsche clearly recognize the accelerated pace of modern time, he also understood 
the very phenomenon as something deeply democratic. Second, despite Nietzsche’s 
supposed abhorrence of democracy, his overall project—updated in Connolly’s deft 
hands—could be in service of the provocation of democratic time as a disruptive rift.  
 The passage to which Connolly draws special attention is from The Twilight of the 
Idols: 
[Democratism] has been the form in which the organizing force 
manifests its decline. … The West in its entirety has lost the sort of 
instincts that give rise to institutions, that give rise to a future: it 
might well be that nothing rubs its ‘modern spirit’ the wrong way 
more than this. People live for today, people live very fast, —
people live very irresponsibly: and this is precisely what people 
call ‘freedom’.”315 
Connolly warns against the tendency of reading this passage as only displaying 
Nietzsche’s lamentation over the democratization of the modern world. “Lurking within 
this lamentation,” argues Connolly, “is the understanding that a quick pace of life and 
democracy are closely interwoven.”316 Democratic life so understood tends to be 
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dismissive of a long and steady time befitting any teleological and traditional worldview.  
 Nietzsche’s unflinching disdain for democracy notwithstanding, claims Connolly, 
it is misleading to believe that he would have absolute, deep-seated aversion to the 
“significant shift in the tempo of life” in democracy. According to Connolly, Nietzsche 
rather prizes the fragmented and disruptive temporality that democracy seems to presume 
because it is prone to engender a certain condition conducive to, rather than hostile to, his 
anti-foundational pluralism. Even while taking Nietzsche to task for his “aristocratic 
lamentation,” Connolly reads him as a harbinger of democratic pluralism whose ideas of 
tempo and temporality, particularly, can guide us into thinking about the fractal present 
promoting “the possibility of improvisation and self-experimentation.”317  
 Connolly’s efforts to portray Nietzsche as a proponent of the disruptive 
temporality and fast tempo that he himself endorses continue unabated in his reading of 
Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal recurrence of the same [die ewige Wiederkunft des 
Gleichen], arguably the culmination of his poetic vision of time and temporality. Like 
many of Nietzsche scholars, Connolly pays special heed to the section from Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, entitled “On the Vision and the Riddle [Vom Gesicht und Räthsel],” where 
Nietzsche envisages an image of time as a gateway. This passage is meant for a dwarf 
who has been involved in a dramatized conversation with Zarathustra: 
Behold this gateway, dwarf!’ I went on: ‘it has two aspects. Two 
paths come together here: no one has ever reached their end. ‘This 






ahead of us—that is another eternity. ‘They are in opposition to 
one another, these paths; they abut on one another: and it is here at 
this gateway that they come together. The name of the gateway is 
written above it: “Moment”. … ‘Behold this moment!’ I went on. 
‘From this gateway Moment a long, eternal lane runs back: an 
eternity lies behind us.318 
At first glance, Nietzsche seems to underscore a magnificent moment [Augenblick]319, 
which suspends the linear operation of mechanized time. For Connolly, “the gateway 
Moment” is primarily the time of dissonance where two opposing paths offend each 
other. The “Moment,” says Connolly, is “a protracted present,” which creates an occasion 
ripe for “accidents” by suspending ordinary punctual time. This image of time portrays 
the vitality of life, which escapes the simple logic of causality. Here, eternal recurrence is 
not as much about “the repetition of long cycles” as about “the fecundity of the moment 
from which new twists and turns can flow,”320 which intimates a Deleuzean open 
future.321 The primary source of democratic possibilities that Connolly seeks in Nietzsche 
is this idea of time as a rift, rupture, or fracture, which is conducive to “a spirit of 
presumptive generosity” for a more active and agonistic democratic politics.322 
 For sure, Nietzsche’s aesthetic view of life could be read against the dissecting 
																																																													
318 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), “Of the Vision and the Riddle.” 
319 One would translate this term literally as “glance of the eye.” 
320 William E. Connolly, A World of Becoming (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2011), 109-115. 
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and mechanizing course of time that reduces human life to dead matter. Connolly’s 
rendition of Nietzsche, however, exposes two problems. The first problem is Connolly’s 
negligence or mischaracterization of the complexity with respect to what he understands 
to be “the significant shift in the tempo of life.” The other one is his ignorance of the 
kinetic element of Nietzsche’s idea of eternal recurrence, not just of the idea itself, but of 
what this particular idea causes to be done. I will address the first problem here and the 
second one in the following section. 
 Let us first return to Nietzsche’s comment from The Twilight of the Idols: “One 
lives for today, one lives very fast—one lives very irresponsibly: it is precisely this which 
one calls “freedom.”323 The reason that we cannot read this statement merely as a 
welcoming remark as Connolly did is not just because we see here Nietzsche’s mockery 
of “freedom” (in quotation marks) as license quite conspicuously.324 For Nietzsche, the 
decline of the power of organization—especially, of an older kind which was based on 
transcendent values, profoundly exemplified by Platonic metaphysics and Christianity—
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324 Many since Plato have shown a particular intellectual propensity of likening 
democratic citizens to licentious people and democracy to anarchy. Plato thinks that 
in democracy, people tend to arrange their life “in whatever manner pleases [them].” 
In this respect, “the license” [exousia] is a quality commonly ascribed to democracy. 
He recognizes the attraction of democracy as it would nurture people to perform 
“whatever comes into [their] mind,” and thereby making its polity “embroidered with 
every kind of character type.” However, because of the same tendency of democratic 
people, claims Plato, democracy would also fall short of “order and necessity.” Since 
there is “no requirement to rule … or again to be ruled,” democracy is believed to be 
extremely unstable and dangerous even while it can be “the finest or most 
beautiful.” Plato, Republic, 557b-e; See also Herodotus, Histories, Book III, Section 
80-83. The Persian Otanes, upon the rejection of his proposal of establishing a 
democratic polity, declares that he will not enter the lists of possible candidates for 





marks a new beginning. But it is rather a challenge than a triumph. We need to approach 
to this new beginning with alacrity, but this does not mean that we can bear and bear with 
time as a rift and fracture wholeheartedly. 
 We can find Nietzsche’s similar tone in his discussion of the demise of God as 
well. Nietzsche’s concern there is not so much about declaring God’s demise—for it is 
“an accomplished fact of recent Western history”325—as about the ways in which we 
think and feel about its demise. In The Gay Science, he attends to the problem without 
jubilation or lamentation. What he faces is rather a predicament:  
God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How can 
we console ourselves, the murderers of all murderers?” 326 
The predicament that looms large is nihilism, or the radical repudiation of meaning. With 
the withering away of the otherworldly foundation of the old belief system, its structure 
of meaning has collapsed. It is daunting rather than liberating because we are now 
inclined to choose between a positivistic and a nihilistic embrace of meaninglessness.  
 “The significant shift in the tempo of life” is the tempo that could facilitate 
nihilism. Nietzsche finds it disturbing because people lose their touch with “the right 
time.”327 This is why Connolly’s portrayal of Nietzsche seems to go awry. Following 
Nietzsche’s path, Walter Benjamin and Byung-Chul Han take into serious account the 
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issue of time without meaning. Benjamin sees this time as robbed of meaning because 
“[its] method” now has become merely “additive; it musters a mass of data to fill the 
homogenous and empty time.”328 In the same vein of thought, Han distinguishes “the 
operation of a processor [Prozessor]” which “proceeds solely through addition” from 
“the procession [Prozession].”329 
Both “processor” and “procession” derive from the Latin verb 
procedere, which means “to step forward.” The procession is 
harnessed by narration scenically. Scenography marks them. 
Because of their narrativity, a particular temporality inhabits them. 
Therefore it is neither possible nor meaningful to accelerate their 
procedere. Narration is not addition at all. The procedere of the 
processor, on the other hand, lacks all narrativity. Its activity has 
no image, no scenes. In contrast to the procession, it tells [erzählt] 
nothing. It simply counts [zählt].330   
Han here captures the decline of temporal gravitation or temporal tension, which would 
transform time into “a mere sequence of point-like presences.”331 The modern time, in a 
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word, has become a disenchanted processor. The time, being deprived of its narrative 
quality, now “seems to overtake itself.”332  
 Here, Han makes a very important conceptual distinction between experience 
[Erfahrung] and experiencing [Erlebnis]. Whereas the former presumes temporal 
extension, the latter does not necessarily do so. We can say, for example, “[t]he 
significant shift in the tempo of life” makes people feel constantly hastened on. They are 
probably prepared, perhaps too readily, for momentary experiencing [Erlebnis]. What 
seems to be lacking is enough time for a genuine experience [Erfahrung].333 
 The experience merits special attention. As Giacomo Marramao rightly pointed 
out, the experience is experience-journey [Er-fahrung], which is like “taking a 
journey.”334 Reinhard Koselleck also noted that the verb “erfahren (to have an 
experience) implies going from one place to another,” which involves “something like a 
journey[.]”335 As will be discussed more in the following pages, taking a journey is in 
fact what Zarathustra displays with regard to the idea of eternal recurrence, not the 
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indulgence in eternal now as Connolly seeks to demonstrates.336 If fractured, ruptured, 
and accelerated time prevents us from, rather than invites us to, undertaking a genuine 
experience, Nietzsche would rather have us pause. He rather praises quite the opposite 
tempo of life. Two examples will suffice: one from The Gay Science and the other from 
Ecce Homo, his autobiographic essay.  
 In The Gay Science, Nietzsche explains some “atavism” that “rare human beings 
of an age” represent. It is as though they appear suddenly as “late ghosts of past cultures 
and their powers” because they are so rare and extraordinary especially in the world 
everything “change[s]” too rapidly.” Here, he stresses the importance of preservation 
against the fast tempo. Hence his comments: “in our case, what is absolutely necessary is 
an andante of development, as the tempo of a passionate and slow spirit[.]”337 Second 
one, which is from Ecce Homo, describes a passage from the earlier part of the second 
book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra.338 Setting aside his apparent pompousness and generous 
use of figural languages—both of which are not unusual for him—we can see his high 
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praise of the tempo of the speeches: “a tender adagio.”339  
 It is not unusual for Nietzsche to emphasize a medium or rather slow tempo—he 
even asserts that his blood “moves slowly”340— precisely because one of the most 
important and overarching themes for him—both Zarathustra in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
and himself in Ecce Homo—is convalescence, which should be understood in the context 
of a self-overcoming journey.  
 Why do we need an andante or even adagio in democracy? Why and how is the 
accelerated and fractured tempo and temporality detrimental to our democratic life? One 
answer is given no other than Sheldon Wolin. Wolin takes the question of time and tempo 
in his opening essay for Theory & Event entitled “What Time Is It?” He demonstrated 
that the accelerated pace of modern life has been a real threat to both democratic theory 
and practice. Wolin is concerned with “a pervasive temporal disjunction that has 
contributed to serious political difficulties and helped to make the task of the theorist 
daunting.”341  
 By that temporal disjunction he means the discrepancy between the tempo of 
democratic politics (and theory) and that of economy (or popular culture and war). 
Whereas the latter is mostly “dictated by innovation, change, and replacement through 
obsolescence,” claims Wolin, democracy “requires … a leisurely pace.” The same applies 
to theory as well. He laments over the fact that our daily life has become more vulnerable 
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to the accelerated turnover times of capital, fashion, et cetera. He clearly acknowledges 
that the current temporal mode of political existence whose characteristic volatility and 
ephemerality have failed to preserve and foster a fertile condition for democratic politics 
and theory: democracy has “thus exchanged the tempos of deliberation and 
contemplation for the temporal rhythms of contemporary culture and economy.”342 
 Wolin’s firm resistance to the disjunctive and accelerated temporality may 
surprise some readers. It would even provoke those who otherwise admire his radical 
democratic position to displeasure. As I briefly sketched Wolin’s view on democracy 
earlier, he normally understands democracy “as resistant to the rationalizing conception 
of power and its organization” or what he defines as “aconstitutional conception of 
democracy.”343 His notion of fugitive democracy is rather disruptive, transgressive, and 
demotic. The tempo of fugitive democracy does not necessarily have to be extremely 
hasty, but does not sound so leisurely either. But, here, in this essay, Wolin sounds more 
like Max Weber for whom politics means “slow, strong drilling through hard 
boards[.]”344  
 Yet my call for a Nietzschean passionate and slow tempo does not just mean to 
appreciate the time of deliberation and contemplation. It must be geared toward the 
journey of self-overcoming. Before we delve more into the question of self-overcoming, I 
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would like to note that the mischaracterization of the Nietzschean tempo by Connolly and 
the likes might have proceeded from their confusion of being fast and being lively, only 
the latter of which is almost always approved as commendable by Nietzsche. In order to 
elucidate this point, I would make a short excursion into Robert Schumann. 
 
INTERLUDE: ALLEGRO, NOT PRESTO 
Robert Schumann’s G-minor Piano Sonata (No. 2 Opus 22) begins with a lively 
movement. Schumann indicated a tempo on the score: “as quickly as you can” [so rasch 
wie möglich]. Interestingly, what follows later in the coda is Schumann’s seemingly 
unrealistic direction: “faster” [schneller], and then, “even faster” [noch schneller]. 
Without acknowledging two different kinds of tempo implicit in these directions, one 
may misunderstand Schumann’s point and thus be left wondering what his direction 
could possibly mean other than an embroidering overstatement that nobody can actually 
execute.  
 The confusion is first caused by translations. Following Beethoven, Schumann at 
the time believed that the notations on music should be written in German. The term 
“rasch” refers to allegro while “schnell” indicates presto. Perhaps quite different from 
what we currently believe, there were originally only two terms indicating tempo with 
regard to its speed: adagio or slow and presto or fast. Allegro was originally an indication 
signifying the mood of a piece of music: cheerful and lively as opposed to solemn [grave] 




demanding a particularly cheerful mood [allegro] and the fast speed [presto]. 
Schumann’s original notations, therefore, can be interpreted as indicating two separate 
messages: the nuance of the movement of notes [rasch; allegro] and the rate of the beat 
[schnell; presto].345 
 This revealing example of allegro and presto helps us to think further about the 
question of time and tempo entangled with its moods. Nietzsche is precisely important 
because he seems to understand a particular way of living with time, that is, taking a 
journey slowly yet cheerfully. 
 
BECOMING AND SELF-OVERCOMING 
Connolly sees Nietzsche “as a prophet of time as becoming in a world without God.” He 
contrasts “the experience of punctual time” to “becoming” in favor of the latter which he 
identifies as “real time.” Real time is a time ripe for “divine accidents.” It is the 
“Moment” so fecund and pivotal as to make “new twists and turns” that exceed efficient 
causality. Connolly, in so doing, perpetuates the popular opposition of the ordinary and 
the extraordinary time, hoping for the “paradoxical coincidence of fulfillment and 
interruption,”346 opened up by the pure moment. 
 The problem of this overemphasis on the divine aspect of becoming is that it may 
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blind us from seeing its human aspect. For Nietzsche, first and foremost, becoming 
simply refers to change, or the fact that everything changes. Nietzsche affirms the dictum 
of Heraclitus, panta rhei: “Heraclitus will always be right in thinking that being is an 
empty fiction. The ‘apparent world’ is the only world: the ‘true world’ is just a lie added 
on to it [hinzugelogen].”347 And “[c]hange does not stop.”348 Time, or change, however, 
arises by and for perspectives. For Nietzsche, we are not disinterested spectators with 
respect to our change. The sensitivity toward motions and changes cannot be separated 
from the heightened interests in growth and degeneration.  
 The basic temporal structure of becoming is determined by will or striving.349 
Willing or Striving involves a reach toward the future, and this movement, “that which 
gives the forms which are the pathos of any life,”350 is also famously called will to power 
[Wille zur Macht]. The will to power is first explained as a process of organism, 
applicable to all living creatures. What all of these would mean to an individual is that 
she could and should reflect upon herself in terms of her striving, suffering, overcoming, 
and growth. This requires a backward look as well. For in order to understand her own 
aims, she “must uncover the processes that shaped the drives working in [her].” In other 
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words, she “must grasp what function the drive plays in her, by seeing why she has it.”351 
This is in fact what genealogy is for.352  
 Here I pay attention to the relationship between the will to power, self-
overcoming, and suffering, or how Nietzsche sees suffering intimately tied to both what 
we have become and what we might become. Echoing the doer/sufferer duality I quoted 
from Arendt earlier, Nietzsche understands that “every action calls forth suffering” and 
“[all] suffering calls for action.”353 What is obvious in the human condition is that “the 
more we get involved in the active dimension of our existence, the more keenly we feel 
its passive dimension or our vulnerability to suffering.”354 As long as we keep on acting, 
we cannot avoid our suffering. As T. K. Seung emphasizes, “[to] suffer is to be passive, 
which is the meaning of the Greek word pathe[.]”355 The will to power entails suffering.  
 For Nietzsche, two strategies are starkly juxtaposed with each other with respect 
to the question of suffering: “abolishing suffering” [Leiden abschaffen] and “constructing 
suffering” [Leiden schaffen].356 According to Nietzsche, traditional moralists, scientific 
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determinism, and nihilism all represent the former. They all hold the view that “suffering 
is something that needs to be abolished.”357 As far as our purpose is concerned, the most 
serious problem of this approach is its determined inattention to the formative element of 
suffering. They see suffering as either something we have to avoid, or something that we 
have to passively accept while hoping for the final compensation. Nietzsche challenges 
both. Defending the discipline of suffering [Die Zucht des Leidens] instead, Nietzsche 
contends:  
[Don’t] you know that this discipline has been the sole cause of 
every enhancement in humanity so far? The tension that breeds 
strength into the unhappy soul, its shudder at the sight of great 
destruction, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, surviving, 
interpreting, and exploiting unhappiness, and whatever depth, 
secrecy, whatever masks, spirit, cunning, greatness it has been 
given:—weren’t these the gifts of suffering, of the disciple of great 
suffering?358  
This passage does not just affirm the truistic idea: no pain, no gain. It rather shows how 
the movement of the will to power takes a variety of forms and the need for us to 
recognize it. Suffering is an unhappy and frustrating site for self-overcoming via 
reflecting upon the will to power. 
 Self-overcoming [Sebsüberwindung] is arguably the central theme of Thus Spoke 
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Zarathustra. Perhaps contrary to the conventional wisdom, I view Zarathustra primarily 
as a sufferer, not as a Übermensch. By that I am less interested in the highest ethical and 
aesthetical values that Zarathustra as value-creator displays—often pictured as the 
Dionysian rapturous superabundance—than in the journey he cannot but undertake. 
While not underestimating the heroic stature of Zarathustra, I point out that Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra is primarily the story of him “going under,”359 not of his ascent to zenith. 
 Self-overcoming requires temporal space, envisioning a particular temporality. 
Right before the section called “On Self-Overcoming” in the second book of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, we see Zarathustra recalling and musing on his losses and sufferings. He 
cries out to his enemies, or it could just be a soliloquy: “More evil you did to me than all 
murder of human beings. You took from me what was irretrievable[.]” What was taken 
away from Zarathustra? Those include his youth, wisdom, yearning, and pledge. He 
meditates: “How did I bear it? How did I overturn and overcome such wounds? How did 
my soul rise again from these graves?”360 He knows how far he has overcome. 
 Three points are important here. First, it is unclear who exactly his enemies are. 
But what seems obvious is that Zarathustra clearly sees, and possibly casts his bitter 
accusations against, the power of time. What he has lost is that which he once possessed 
and enjoyed. Thinking of those things he held so dear, Zarathustra is now looking 
backward. The tension between his autonomous will and the brutal necessity of time 
appears on the surface. Second, his overcoming is his convalescence. It includes the 
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process of healing wounds. In fact, it is the beginning and ending of the self-overcoming 
process. Third, it is his “invulnerable” and “unburiable” “will”361 that has made possible 
of his self-overcoming, which is therefore a good preparation for the discussion on the 
subject of self-overcoming and the will to power.  
 In “On Self-Overcoming,” Zarathustra talks to the “wisest ones.” The wisest are 
truth-seekers, believing that they are driven by their conviction, morality, or “will to 
truth.” Yet Zarathustra points out that their alleged “will to truth” is in fact nothing but “a 
will to power” in disguise, implying that the most fundamental driving force of life is the 
will to power even though like the wisest, we may not be full aware of this half-hidden 
motivations. The people, who are unwise, are deemed to be better in that they know, 
perhaps intuitively, the basic premise that life moves lively by virtue of its will to power. 
 Zarathustra’s teaching on the will to power continues. He recounts what he has 
learned from “life,” or “the living.” The lesson is threefold. First, “all living is an 
obeying.” Second, “the one who cannot obey himself is commanded.” Third, 
“commanding is harder than obeying.” Zarathustra opposes commanding to obeying, but 
at once complicates the relationship between the two. He understands that the power to 
command is predicated on the capacity to obey. He urges us to see the intricate working 
of the pleasure coming from the will to be master. Zarathustra implies that self-
overcoming is an ongoing struggle against oneself. It involves a temporal extension. We 
																																																													




have “crooked paths” to “walk.”362 
 Here, I propose a political reading of “On Self-Overcoming.” The lesson that we 
can draw here is rather political, or even democratic. Zarathustra’s insights into the 
relationship between commanding and obeying evoke the classic definition of democratic 
rule by Aristotle. What distinguishes a constitutional rule [politikē archē] from a rule of a 
master [despoteia or despotikē archē], according to Aristotle, is the democratic principle 
of power sharing.”363 The citizen performs his agency both as a ruler [archon] and the 
ruled [archomenos]. “The excellence of the citizen,” states Aristotle, includes both 
“ruling and obeying.” The ruler in a constitutional rule “must learn by obeying.”364 That 
is the meaning of to be part of “the free” [eleutheros].365 
 Zarathustra says that “all commanding … is an experiment and a risk[.]” Self-
commanding or autonomy is a risky and burdensome experiment in part because in so 
doing, we make ourselves “the judge and avenger and victim of [our] own law.” What is 
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required of us is a heightened awareness of the intricate movement of the will to power. 
Both the strong and the weak exercise the will to power in a variety of ways. Since 
commanding is harder than obeying, people might aspire to command via obeying, and 
vice versa. We should be able to see what we are doing when we are ruled as much as 
when we are ruling. To invoke the earlier passage on the discipline of suffering, this is the 
time when the suffering of the frustrated gives rise to “inventiveness and courage in 
enduring, surviving, interpreting, and exploiting unhappiness[.]”366 Zarathustra also 
mentions the possibility of “the weaker who sneaks into the fortress and straight to the 
heart of the more powerful—and there … steals power.”367 In addition, we need to 
consider the opposite case as well: whether we choose to exercise the will to power 
against us. One illustrative example is given by Montesquieu. 
 Montesquieu once deftly described the cunning of the will to power in his story of 
Troglodytes.368 Troglodytes were a group of primitive people who once were subject to a 
fierce rule by a foreign king. After conspiring to kill the king and wiping out the entire 
royal family, Troglodytes were able to choose their own government. They tried many 
different forms. First they selected magistrates but became annoyed too soon and 
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slaughtered them all. Then, they chose to let their savagery rule the society, agreeing to 
refuse to obey anyone. Everyone welcomed the idea, but absent of sympathy, fairness, 
and justice, most of them suffered from famine, flood, property disputes, diseases, and 
eventually perished.  
 Only two virtuous families survived the collapse of their community, and they 
continued to thrive while establishing and practicing a virtuous democratic rule. Then, at 
the peak of their prosperity and virtue, they suddenly decided to choose a king. The man 
who was chosen as king by the assembly was an old, virtuous, and respectful citizen. He 
said to the deputies of the assembly that “if you are absolutely determined to [bestow the 
crown upon me] I must perforce accept it; but you may be certain that I shall die of 
misery, having at birth seen the Troglodytes free, and today seeing them subjects.”369 The 
lamentation of the new king well summarized the problem of the Troglodytes: 
I can see exactly what is happening, Troglodytes; your virtue is 
becoming burdensome; in your present situation, without a leader, 
you have to be virtuous in spite of yourselves, for otherwise you 
could not survive, you would fall into the misfortunes of your 
earliest forefathers; but you find this yoke too heavy to bear, you 
prefer to be subject to a prince and to obey his laws, which would 
be less strict than your own customs; you know that then you will 
be able to satisfy your ambition, amass riches, and live a life of 
ease and self-indulgent pleasure; and that, as long as you avoid 
serious crime, you will have no need of virtue.370 
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This is a colorful illustration of the will to power, which resonates deeply, rather in an 
inverted way, with the comment of Zarathustra: “even in the will of the serving I found 
the will to be master.”371  
 Against the overemphasis on the Nietzschean non-punctuated divinely accidental 
time, I have underlined the human side of his notions of becoming. Becoming is the will 
to power, aiming at self-overcoming. Self-overcoming requires the discipline of 
suffering, which demands an astute attention to oneself within the extended temporal 
space. It is a journey, or, as Zarathustra put, a walk on a crooked path. Both Stoic peace 
of mind [apatheia] and Epicurean tranquility [ataraxia] cannot be Nietzsche’s ideal.372 It 
is even harmful to expunge suffering from our experience. He rather follows the tragic 
tradition: pathei mathos.373 
 
CONVALESCENCE: A JOURNEY TO HOME VIA FRUSTRATION 
A striving for self-overcoming requires a genuine experience [Erfahrung]. If we can talk 
about the democratic subject as citizen-becoming, she would be the one who undertakes a 
journey of self-overcoming. Such an experience marks the maturation of the democratic 
self, and this journey defies the desire for adhering to the dichotomous time-
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consciousness. The operative dualism emphasizes the unusual and excessive excitement 
about the extraordinary moments, which is predicated on or even demands the distinctive 
monotony of the everydayness. Two distinct times are thought to be interruptive and 
offensive to each other but ultimately mutually interdependent. In other words, citizens 
can easily be trapped in the recurring oscillation between inertial apathy and 
untrammeled dedication to the momentary events. They leave their ordinary time largely 
unattended and uncultivated, which further intensifies the dichotomous understanding of 
democratic time. Being easily drawn into the vicissitudes of the ordinary and the 
extraordinary, citizens likely keep the mundane everyday at bay.  
 Yet the citizen would hardly see her own growth unless she becomes a true 
dweller in the everyday.374 As Nietzsche worried, she could remain far less accessible to 
herself. Essential is to learn how to stay or tarry in the ordinary time. To pay due 
attention to the ordinary, however, does not mean to simply indulge in daily trivial 
pleasures by completely surrendering to the present. It rather means to build or restore the 
narrativity of becoming and self-overcoming by way of facing, attending to, and bearing 
witness to—rather than avoiding—one’s own suffering and difficulty. Suffering has a 
cognitive and psychological value. The restored narrative resists the opposition of tense, 
disruptive, yet fleeting moment and lengthy, mechanical, yet disinterested process in 
favor of a carefully nuanced cooperation of the two for the sake of the reclaimed and 
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revitalized everyday. Instead of escaping from the pettiness and monotony of the 
ordinary, the democratic subject as citizen-becoming can and should propel herself to 
return to the quotidian everyday to make the ordinary time more endurable and alluring. 
It is a journey to investigate how what we have been affects what we are, and perhaps 
more significantly, what we might become. 
 To live in such a way is in fact closer to what Nietzsche would aspire to do: 
namely, one uses oneself up to the full. Nietzsche’s famous epigram, amor fati, is 
“neither narcissistic hubris nor fatalistic masochism, but rather the courage and the 
composure to accept one’s own life in all its reality and potentiality.”375 That love [amor] 
might be misleading. As it may indicate that what is needed is an explosive and volatile 
type of excitement that passes quickly. Instead, the Nietzschean amor is like what 
Dostoevsky once described as “love in action.” Unlike “love in thought,” which is greed 
for an immediate effect, “love in action” secures temporal space. It is “labor and 
fortitude.”376  
 Here we see the connection between amor fati and his notion of eternal 
recurrence, about which we yet to discuss much. Like Alexander Nehamas, I am far less 
interested in examining this idea as a cosmological theory of time.377 It is not just because 
Nietzsche once made it clear that each one is in the world only once and “no imaginable 
chance will for a second time gather together into a unity so strangely variegated an 
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assortment as he is.”378 We can find other evidence to imply otherwise, especially in his 
notebooks. What I am most interested in is the meaning of posing a truly “abysmal” 
thought itself such as the idea of eternal recurrence. 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra illustrates that Zarathustra severely suffers from the idea 
of eternal recurrence. He is stuck between determinism and voluntarism, necessity and 
freedom, or Spinozan Nature and Faustian Will. In “The Convalescent,” particularly, 
Zarathustra “collapsed like a dead man,” lost his appetite, and remained ill “for seven 
days.”379 In fact, as Paul Loeb reminds us, Zarathustra himself never “seems to fully 
express, explain, prove, endorse, teach, or definitely affirm the thought of eternal 
recurrence.”380 This ambiguity has sparked a plethora of interpretations.381  
What is most revealing, though, is the sharp contrast between Zarathustra and the 
allegedly unqualified characters such as dwarf, animals, and the likes. Those characters 
are incapable of understanding the depth of the idea of eternal recurrence, but do not 
hesitate to reiterate the sketchy phrases of the grave thought. Zarathustra, on the other 
hand, makes himself the object of his learning in the face of the abysmal thought, and live 
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with the very thought. Here, the Moment [Augenblick] is not the temporal form of 
Zarathustra. He needs some time for a genuine experience and convalescence. He takes a 
journey to himself. 
That Zarathustra is the convalescent is a significant reminder. “To convalesce” 
[genesen], states Heidegger, “is the same as the Greek néomai, nóstos. This means ‘to 
return home’; … The convalescent is on the road to himself, so that he can say of himself 
who he is. In the passage referred to, the convalescent says: I, Zarathustra, the advocate 
of life, the advocate of suffering, the advocate of the circle[.]”382 
 For those who do not have or care much about their autonomous will, the notion 
of eternal recurrence would not matter much. If they abandon the perspective of 
autonomous agents and choose not to fight against the necessity, they might even take 
pleasure in renouncing their agency. It is those who cherish freedom who feel real terror 
in facing their infinitesimal power against the cosmic rule. 
 In democracy, we routinely meet the problem of heteronomy,383 but not everyone 
fully experience and make most use of it. Grudgingly or not, citizens often submit 
																																																													
382 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume One and Two (New York: Harper & Row, 
1984), 412. 
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themselves to the decision made by the collective, of which each of them is only a small 
part. Of course, democratic citizens should not be obsequious; but they cannot be too 
cantankerous either. Democratic freedom and autonomy are intertwined with the genuine 
experiences of loss, submission, or heteronomy. To live up to the promise of democracy 
means to inherit a certain sensibility of suffering and frustration, constantly asking the 
question how carefully we attend to our suffering and frustration.    
 Citizens-becoming should see themselves as an agent of self-overcoming. They 
must keep themselves from being overtaken and overexploited by the fast-paced eventful 
time, the time that demands their instant reactions and aggravates their addiction to 
distractions. They need to secure some temporal space for exploring and reflecting upon 
their sufferings. Delving into the profound depth of suffering is crucial precisely because 
there they can find their frustration clearly as the meeting-place of converging two sides: 
hope and despair. Hope and despair do not just meet but form an angular extremity at the 
site of frustration. Frustration is a corner where those two can become explicit as they 
intersect. This is a kind of in-between time in which they are pressured to accept their 
failures and losses while at once not necessarily abandoning their initial hopes in its 
entirety. Besides they may find something else while lingering in frustration, something 
that they were not seeking in the first place. It is the time in which they make sense of 
frustration and make most use of it for convalescence and potential growth. 
 Learning about themselves—learning, in part, that their desires and hopes are 




condition of being undefined.384 What citizen-becoming experience is not just a 
momentary acceptance of loss or failure. It requires a pivotal tract of time during which 
citizens can grow more attached to reality, not less, and become more attentive, 
inventive, and determinant, as Nietzsche’s discipline of suffering aspires to do, even 
while teetering in a liminal realm of tensions and bearing up against an uneasy tug 

















384 Weber is quite right when he states that “the eventual outcome of political action 
frequently, indeed regularly, stands in a quite inadequate, even paradoxical relation 
to its original, intended meaning and purpose (Sinn).” Weber, “The Profession and 
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